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The Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy (CMTP) provides the official policy 
position on maritime issues in South Africa since 2017. It covers a variety of maritime 
matters relating to shipping conduct on the coast and offshore and extends to the 
utilisation of landside resources. However, this work evaluates policy provisions 
pertaining only to coastal shipping and in particular to cabotage.  
Cabotage refers to the rights a coastal state reserves for itself to trade vessels of its 
choice between ports along its coast. The CMTP states cabotage as the official coastal 
shipping policy in South Africa for the first time in over a century-and-a-half of coastal 
shipping. However, the CMTP does not state the manner in which cabotage will apply. 
In fact, some of its ambitions seem impractical. Through a thorough historical account, 
the thesis sheds light on why cabotage has never been adopted in South Africa. It also 
gives the rationale for abandoning in 2017 the laissez-faire position that had existed 
over many decades.  
Given that cabotage presents itself in different forms, the thesis provides an overview 
of the various cabotage forms by reference to a sample of comparable jurisdictions. It 
then asks the question: what is the prospect of South African cabotage in light of the 
continental and international cabotage practice scope? The question directs focus to 
three issues: the meaning of cabotage; the scope of its application; and the comparative 
measure for its application. The analysis gleans the likely direction for cabotage 
implementation from the CMTP and other instruments despite anomalies that exist 
between what the CMTP sets out to achieve and the proposed legal framework for its 
implementation. The conclusion is that, given the dearth of shipping capacity in South 
Africa, coastal trade dependence on feeder cargo and imbalanced cargo trades, the 
country’s only proper option, when cabotage is adopted, is liberal cabotage. It should 
be implemented without comparing South Africa to other jurisdictions but must be 
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
The origin of the term ‘cabotage’ is not certain. It seems to have been derived from 
either the French ‘caboter’ or the Spanish ‘cabo’, which referred to the sailing of ships 
from cape to cape without entering the high seas.1 Whatever its origins, in modern 
maritime trade, cabotage refers to shipping restrictions along the coast of a state and to 
trading  limits within its ports. An unintended consequence of cabotage is that it is 
discriminatory; it keeps foreign flags out of the coastal trade.2 
A jurisdiction that practices cabotage allows vessels registered in other jurisdictions 
uninhibited transit along the domestic coast. Foreign vessels may transit but not trade 
between ports along the domestic coast, because intra-coastal trade takes place within 
internal waters, which are ordinarily the preserve of the national fleet. Transiting 
foreign vessels would normally require permission to trade between domestic ports (in 
place of a national carrier). Therefore, use of the term ‘cabotage’ refers to the exclusion 
of foreign vessels or the imposition of restrictions that a coastal jurisdiction3 places 
over the loading and discharge of cargo between its coastal ports.  
Cabotage should not be confused with cargo reservations and flag discriminations. 
These generally refer to restrictions placed on certain cargos or to preferential treatment 
in respect of use of port facilities and sailing rights. Such restrictions do not routinely 
exclude foreign flags. Cargo reservations could mean that the loading of a specified 
category of cargo (for instance, government military cargo or aid cargo designated as 
such for a particular destination) is reserved, as the name suggests, for national carriers. 
Under these circumstances, any carrier can carry any other type of cargo to the same 
destination. Similarly, flag discrimination could be a result of bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements between countries to load one another’s cargo to the exclusion of others 
and may include preferential berthing for their vessels.  
 
1 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/cabotage. (Accessed 11 October 2017). See also 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/cabotage.html. (Accessed 11 October 2017). 
2 A. Odeke, Protectionism and the Future of International Shipping: The Nature Development and Role 
of Flag Discrimination and Preferences, Cargo Reservations and Cabotage Restrictions, State 
Interventions and Maritime Subsidies (1984). 
3 It is suggested that the use of the term “jurisdiction” rather than “country” provides a better 
description of how cabotage functions because cabotage practice sometimes extends beyond borders of 
a single country and may reflect collaborative restrictions of several sovereignties.  
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Cabotage, on the other hand, is more restrictive, since it reserves all coastal trade for 
the exclusive benefit of the national carrier. It excludes all foreign elements from 
participating freely in the coastal market. Typically, the exclusion of foreign vessels 
eliminates foreign competition with a view to promoting the establishment of the 
domestic fleet on the coast through guaranteed supply and demand.4 
Over the years, the concept of cabotage has evolved to refer simply to any form of 
restrictive practice which reserves a domestic market share for domestic service 
providers. Therefore, in modern industrial trade, cabotage is no longer confined to the 
shipping industry.5 
In the context of this work it is proposed that, properly defined, cabotage is the 
reservation of a jurisdiction’s right to engage a merchant fleet of choice wholly or partly 
excluding others from trading between its coastal ports. It occurs when the coastal 
jurisdiction, through legislative instruments, exercises its prerogative to dictate 
parameters for the development of its maritime industry in a manner befitting its 
economic and social imperatives.  
Unlike in other jurisdictions such as the United States, in South Africa cabotage refers 
to movable property (including animals) and not passengers. Consequently, the thesis 
focuses on cabotage in the context of trade and not on the carriage of passengers. This 
will become clearer when dealing with the proposed legislative framework for cabotage 
in Chapter 3 and in Chapter 8.  
1.1 THE RATIONALE FOR GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN 
COASTAL SHIPPING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
South African coastal policy has remained the same from the time of British rule to 
Nationalist Party days and throughout the South African democratic years. The various 
administrations adopted a policy of no cabotage over South African coastal waters. If 
South Africa has never reserved for itself the right to exclusive coastal trade, the 
question is then: why is there now a policy shift from having no coastal restriction to 
cabotage implementation? The answer to this question provides a proper basis for the 
 
4 Odeke op cit note 2 75. 
5 Cabotage and Aviation Rules relating to Cabotage on International Flights (nd), available at 
https://www.aopa.org/go-fly/destinations/international-travel/cabotage. (Accessed 16 October 2017).  
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core question that this work focuses on. The following section therefore attempts to 
address this question by looking at the government’s rationale for introducing cabotage 
as gleaned from various draft instruments6 over the past two-and-a-half decades. 
The reasons put forward by the government for its perceived sudden interest in coastal 
shipping in general are not new. Cabotage, shipbuilding, shipping skills transfer, 
attraction of favourable foreign exchange and job creation, for example, are some of 
the more commonly advanced grounds for state involvement in coastal shipping. 7 
Modern proponents of the concept articulate it in a fresh dialect. However, the idea 
itself is in fact an old idea. The impetus behind the promotion of what in recent years 
has become known as the “blue economy”8 seems to be generated by the notion that 
coastal countries derive significant benefits from state-driven shipping investment,9 
and that the fruit of such investment will place the country on a path to economic 
programmes that can boost what Jones aptly calls the “political economy”.10 Grounds 
for state-driven investment have been differently formulated over time.11 The rationale 
 
6 A fuller exposition of the development of the maritime policy will be dealt with in chapter 3. 
7 B.D. Ingpen South African Merchant Ships’ (1979) 23 cites A Golden Opportunity: Controlling our 
Own Exports. A South African Shipping Company (1916), which was a report that raised the same 
issues in 1916 during the early days of the Union government.  
8 The concept of the Blue Economy was originally formulated by Gunter Pauli and popularised through 
his book The Blue Economy: 10 Years, 100 Innovations, 100 Million Jobs (2010). Pauli advocates a 
balance between sustainability of the environment (the sea) with building up social capital while 
generating income and job creation. 
9 See T. Jones ‘Coastal Sea Transport and Intermodal Competition in South Africa’ (1985) 233. 
10 Ibid. 
11 The overarching rationale for state involvement in the sphere of maritime trade and transportation 
worldwide can be summarised as follows: 
a. State investment can foster, develop and maintain a merchant marine.  
b. A domestic merchant fleet provides services that generate earnings in foreign currency and in the 
process correct the effects of dependence on foreign transport services that generally harm the 
country’s balance of payments. 
c. State capital investment can rejuvenate coastal trade and in turn justify state exploitation of the coast 
exclusively for the country, 
d. The coastal state can harness skills in strategic areas, particularly in seafaring, and other expertise 
that are exclusively maritime in nature and may extend the benefit further to enhance hinterland 
projects.  
e. In particular, developing countries such as South Africa stand to benefit from state-directed maritime 
investment as they can stimulate commercialisation of coastal waters and revitalise other natural 
maritime resources to create employment opportunities.  
f. Adopting state-driven maritime investment can position the country to revive its shipbuilding and 
stimulate related maritime engineering industries. 
g. A domestic merchant marine would reduce the country’s dependence for trade on foreign bottoms. 
h. An efficient domestic merchant marine provides a ready and reliable means of transport that would 
be indispensable in times of diplomatic isolation, war and during other foreign-instigated 
insurrections.  
The list is not exhaustive. 
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for state involvement worldwide is generally around the same issues.12 In particular, 
the state seeks to implement cabotage as a kind of stimulus which, it is hoped, will 
possibly regenerate coastal shipping. Cabotage therefore seems to be the basis on which 
the government of South Africa seeks to re-enter the shipping industry, among other 
imperatives. 
Presented in no particular order, below is a list of reasons for state involvement in 
coastal shipping in South Africa. The list is derived from various policy documents that 
government has published over the past 25 years which include the South African 
Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy, 2017, hereinafter referred to as the CMTP. 
These policies will be dealt with in some detail in chapter 3. 
1.1.1 Socio-economic contribution 
The government proposes to implement a coastal carriage regime, from which it hopes 
to recoup a sizeable portion of the revenue derived from the country’s sea trade and 
transport. The policy drive indicates, in particular, that the government is keen on the 
benefits that could be generated from its direct involvement in coastal shipping.  
For instance, policy drafters have placed emphasis on the need 
to facilitate growth and development of South Africa’s maritime transport system in 
support of socio-economic development of the country whilst contributing in 
international trade.13 
The latest policy document defines “Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy” as 
that component of national policy relating to all forms of transport by sea … within 
which all national maritime assets can develop and be utilised for the socio-economic 
growth and prosperity of the nation whilst being of service to international shipping 
and trade.14 
Therefore, it appears that the government seeks involvement in the maritime industry 
not merely to stimulate mainstream shipping commerce but to ensure that state 
 
12 A. Odeke, Protectionism and the Future of International Shipping: The Nature, Development and Role 
of Flag Discrimination and Preferences, Cargo Reservations and Cabotage Restrictions, State 
Interventions and Maritime Subsidies (1984). 
13 CMPT cover page. Underlined for emphasis. 
14 Ibid. 17. 
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investment in coastal shipping yields economic fruit for social development and the 
general public good. 
1.1.2 Job creation 
In a country plagued by chronic joblessness,15 the state is under tremendous pressure to 
address unemployment. For this reason, maritime policy focuses on the exploitation of 
the country’s coastal waters for job creation through seafarer employment, shipbuilding 
opportunities, shore-based activities and in downstream businesses. Furthermore, in the 
South African historical context, the government seems to be looking to extend the 
policy to “upliftment” or “empowerment” of formerly socially-repressed and 
economically – excluded population groups.16 
1.1.3 Balance of payments  
Approximately 95% of South Africa’s total trade is carried by sea.17 Foreign vessels 
and operators service virtually all of that trade. Government laments the fact that the 
country pays about R160bn per annum 18  to foreign companies to procure these 
services.19 The extent to which South Africa relies on sea trade for its economic well-
being therefore cannot be overstated. As matters stand, the bulk of foreign shipping 
companies carry South African trade because the country desperately lacks domestic 
capacity to carry its own trade.  
Observations from comparable jurisdictions, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, 
point to the need for South Africa to possess a sizeable fleet on its register, consisting 
of different kinds of ships suitably equipped for movement of homogeneous cargos up 
and down the coast and between its ports and those of its trading partners. Therefore, 
South Africa will meaningfully strive to curtail foreign services and thus improve its 
 
15  The unemployment rate stood at 27.7% during the second quarter of 2017. See South African 
Unemployment Rate (2019), available at https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-
rate. (Accessed 8 August 2017).  
16 CMTP 29. 
17 Draft South African Maritime Transport Policy, 2009, Ministerial Foreword.  
18 SA Maritime Safety Authority Applauded for Ship Registry (2015), available at 
http://www.samsa.org.za/press-room/news/sa-maritime-safety-authority-applauded-historical-ship-
registry-2015. (Accessed 8 February 2016). The South African Maritime Safety Authority reports these 
figures. It states that 80% of imports are also carried on the back of foreign vessels.  
19 Neither the draft instruments nor the CMTP makes the basis for the figure given clear. The assumption 
is that the R160 billion is calculated based on South African Revenue Services (Customs) figures 
adjusted for balance-of-payments purposes as published by the South African Reserve Bank. That 
assumption is not without its own challenges.  
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balance of payments through seaborne trade only once it has established its own 
commercial fleet. What, then, is the status of the South African merchant marine? 
1.1.4 Stimulation of the South African domestic merchant marine 
The South African ship register listed the following commercial vessels during the last 
quarter of 2015. The vessels were Cape Orchid, Cape Enterprise and Oliphant. The 
registration of these vessels was hailed as a significant success, given that the South 
African ship register was shorn of any commercial vessels about 30 years ago. The 
Oliphant has since been withdrawn from the ship register. Reasons for her subsequent 
withdrawal have not been made public. Her owners remain the only South African-
owned enterprise that could possibly add a vessel to the flag in the foreseeable future. 
The lack of a cogent approach to building tonnage capacity becomes more pronounced 
if one observes stark contrasts in shipping capacity between South Africa and her 
immediate trading partners. BRICS members, Brazil, Russia, India and China boast a 
commercial fleet of 172, 1 891, 534 and 2 044 vessels, respectively,20 while South 
African trails with only two vessels under its flag. Even though it and its economy are 
far smaller than those of its partners, this is still a dismal picture. 
Therefore, the position with regard to South African shipping capacity is simple: the 
country does not have a commercial fleet. Government bemoans the status quo and 
seeks policy intervention to avert the perceived corrosive effect that the absence of a 
merchant marine imposes on the country’s economy. 
1.1.5 Shipbuilding capacity and maritime skills development  
Closely related to owning ships is the potential for capacity the government sees in the 
building of such ships. During the halcyon days of South African shipping, two Durban-
based companies built eleven commercial vessels in less than a decade-and-a-half for 
the South African trade. The last ship built on South African shores was the Unicorn 
Lines-operated (Offshore Supply Vessel) Voortrekker in 1983.  
China, Japan and the Republic of Korea have since made tremendous strides towards 
strengthening their shipbuilding capacities. These countries now dominate the 
 
20  Let’s Talk Maritime (19 January 2019), available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/ 
2013/03/25/. (Accessed 15 February 2016). 
7 
 
shipbuilding market. During the year 2016, these three countries accounted for a total 
of 91.8% of world tonnage built. Korea took the lion’s share with about 38.1%.21 If 
South Africa wants to build the fleet through new orders, its ambition depends on the 
shipbuilding capacity of these countries when only 35 years ago, South Africa had 
reasonable capacity for building ships.  
1.1.6 Skills transfer 
The castration of the strength of the South African shipyards had a negative effect on 
skills that the industry had developed over time. Skills transfer decline and local 
shipbuilding following the exodus of vessels from the South African register to registers 
elsewhere in the late 1900s.22 A more readily identifiable casualty of shipping decline 
was in seafaring, where crews that had been trained on decks of South African coasters 
had to seek employment offshore, thus leaving a gaping hole in skills transfer in this 
field. 
The government seeks to reverse this state of affairs by resuscitating coastal shipping, 
shipbuilding and complementary services. It also intends to re-establish skills through 
specialised domestic maritime institutions for seafarer training and education and 
related industries.23  
 1.1.7 Cabotage 
The government’s drive to implement cabotage emanates from the notion that South 
Africa has unexplored potential that government intervention can unlock. This is 
fuelled by the idea that the exclusive exercise of proprietary rights over the coast will 
result in significant economic benefits for the country. However, reservation of coastal 
shipping for the domestic fleet is, by its very nature, solely dependent on the presence 
of a strong domestic-flagged merchant marine. Therefore, in the absence of a domestic 
fleet, the government’s enthusiasm to implement cabotage is optimistic. 
The list of reasons for state involvement discussed above is not meant to be exhaustive. 
It is given simply introduce the reader to the grounds on which government seeks to 
 
21 The World Maritime Fleet in 2017 (10 July 2017), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1516. (Accessed 10 August 2017). 
22 The events leading to the evacuation of the South African register will be dealt with more detail in 
the following chapter.  
23 South African Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy, 2017, 100–107. 
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implement cabotage. Since the substance of the issues forms the bedrock of the 
government’s rationale for cabotage, the reader is alerted to the unavoidable 
restatement of some of the issues at a later stage, albeit that those will be focused on 
the development of the policy governing coastal shipping. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION  
Ordinarily one would look at policy and by dint of interpretation assess the outcome of 
a particular proposed directive by government and its execution. In the case of 
cabotage, the cart seems to have been put before the horse. Cabotage has been stated as 
the official regime to apply over South Africa coastal waters. However, the policy does 
not provide a blueprint for its application. The core question that this thesis aims to 
explore is therefore whether the South African maritime policy provides a meaningful 
platform for the implementation of cabotage. The thesis examines what the probable 
course for the South African cabotage regime is in view of the experiences of other 
jurisdictions. Consequently, the thesis looks into the prospect for cabotage in South 
Africa in light of the CMTP, bearing in mind the challenges that other jurisdictions 
have experienced in implementing the regime.  
The question traverses two distinct areas of commerce that interplay over coastal 
shipping. These areas are maritime economics and maritime law. It must be noted that 
the enquiry involves a practical evaluation of cabotage rather than theoretical debates 
on either economics or legal precedence. Therefore, ancillary questions that arise with 
respect to maritime economics require an evaluation of tonnage capacity and coastwise 
cargo to establish a quantifiable basis on which cabotage could apply. Maritime law, 
on the other hand, looks at policy influences that impact on the legal framework without 
any discussion of case law. The maritime law enquiry will identify framework 
misalignments and will deal with instances of potential conflict between the proposed 
legal framework and policy pronouncements.  
1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The question posited evaluates the policy with reference to three objectives: the 
definition and nature cabotage; the scope of its application and the comparative measure 
for its application. The aims of the study are therefore to define cabotage in the South 
African context; to evaluate the method of its implementation, particularly in light of 
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regional, continental and international cabotage practices; and to suggest the type of 
cabotage suitable for South Africa. 
The weight of the international character of maritime business, in particular, and its 
well-established and well-articulated norms, raises questions regarding whether or not 
the policy aspirations on cabotage are realistic and if in fact they can be achieved. With 
this in mind, the thesis evaluates the impact of cabotage, taking into consideration the 
fact that shipping takes place in a highly globalised environment. 
1.4 THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The impact of cabotage on the South African coast will be evaluated through an analysis 
of comparable jurisdictions. The approach will glean some context and patterns for 
cabotage implementation from countries where it is prevalent and from those countries 
that seek either to revive its application or to abandon it. This will be done through a 
comparative study of practices of a sample of countries where cabotage has taken centre 
stage. 
The sample countries are Nigeria, the United States of America, New Zealand and 
Australia. In these exemplars, cabotage presents itself in different forms, from the most 
rigorous to the most permissive. The choice of these countries bears this consideration 
in mind. However, no one country or combination of countries is perfectly comparable 
to South Africa. The sample is therefore meant to cover a broad spectrum of cabotage 
practices from which South Africa can derive the widest possible range of lessons. The 
basic reasons for the choice of each of these countries to undergird the discussion 
advocating cabotage implementation in South Africa are as follows: 
• NIGERIA: Nigeria is virtually the only African state with a legislated position 
on cabotage. Furthermore, the size of the Nigerian economy is relatively 
comparable to that of South Africa. Therefore, the ability to sustain cabotage 
can be juxtaposed from Nigeria to South Africa. Moreover, Nigeria can 
provide important lessons for South Africa because both countries are 
members of the African Union, which has called on its members to implement 
regional and continental cabotage. In general, Nigeria also serves as a good 
example of the operation of cabotage in a developing economy. 
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• UNITED STATES: Unlike Nigeria and South Africa, the US has a developed 
economy. However, a discussion on cabotage inevitably involves the US given 
its prolonged and consistent cabotage practice. Over the years the US 
government has defended and continues vigorously to defend cabotage as a 
fundamental policy for the country despite a barrage of criticism for not 
changing its stance on the policy.  
• AUSTRALIA: Material on Australia entails the most recent debate on the 
retention of cabotage. Australia practises liberal cabotage, which is the 
opposite of what is seen in both Nigeria and the US. The country began its 
cabotage journey in 1912 and continued the practice for another 100 years. In 
2012 an updated version was introduced. However, in 2015, another 
amendment was introduced to reverse changes that had been made. The 
cabotage laws introduced in 2012 thus remain law. Therefore, Australia shows 
the ebbs and flows of what works from time to time projected over a long 
period of time.  
• NEW ZEALAND: The debate in New Zealand started in 1994 when the 
government repealed cabotage. The country revisited the matter a decade later 
and conducted a study with a large stakeholder participation. The New Zealand 
approach to cabotage promotes consensus between the parties that are affected 
by the repeal or reintroduction of cabotage. However, the method supports a 
permissive form of cabotage in which room is given to re-evaluation of the 
effects of cabotage, for instance, on freight rates in particular and on the 
economy in general. The New Zealand approach provides latitude for variation 
that stringent forms of cabotage do not permit. The New Zealand policy 
approach is similar in a sense to South Africa’s, because like New Zealand, 
South Africa drives its policies through stakeholder participation and 
consensus.  
1.5 RESEARCH APPROACH AND HYPOTHESIS  
The approach of the dissertation is not necessarily to proselytise for or against cabotage. 
The study intends to point out the pitfalls of cabotage implementation. Because 
government has made cabotage a policy, but has not clarified what form cabotage 
11 
 
should take, for instance, the study attempts to show which cabotage forms the country 
is likely to follow and the challenges that are normally associated with such forms.  
The scope of this work requires a discussion of some basic maritime economics 
concepts. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate South African tonnage capacity and cargo 
movement at the outset. The hypothesis in respect of tonnage capacity is simple. The 
country does not have a commercial fleet through which to implement cabotage. With 
respect to cargo, the picture is more complex. Therefore, a fair amount of effort will be 
dedicated to evaluating data particularly for the coastwise movement of bulk, break 
bulk and containerised cargo. An analysis will be conducted to establish the types of 
cargoes and the volumes shipped and landed within South African ports and in ports in 
the range between Dar Es Salaam and Luanda. With respect to cargo the research 
ultimately seeks to establish whether or not sufficient cargo exists to justify cabotage 
implementation along the coast or in the SADC region.  
1.6 RESEARCH METHODS 
The thesis is based on an empirical study and a desktop review of academic journals, 
data from coastal shipping companies and other coastal participants. Various pieces of 
legislation, policies, treaties and other instruments governing the maritime field 
relevant to SADC or the continent will be analysed and articulated in a coherent, fluid, 
precise and objectively verifiable manner. The thesis employed quantitative methods 
of research to establish the maritime economics basis for cabotage particularly with 
respect to cargo data. In this regard, data was collated from shipping companies that are 
typical “coasters” and from Transnet (port terminals). Data analysis was directed 
specifically to determining the actual types and volumes of cargo moving along the 
coast (as opposed to mere categories).  
1.7 CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter 1 introduces the study and gives the rationale for cabotage. It also provides the 
blueprint for the study. Chapter 2 sets out the history of the development of coastal 
shipping in some detail to give a clear context of the issues canvassed in the various 
documents forming the basis for the maritime policy. Chapter 3 deals with domestic, 
regional and continental policies relating to cabotage. The chapter shows the correlation 
between AU and SADC instruments and how these affect cabotage implementation in 
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South Africa. Chapter 4 focuses on cargo and its trades. It emphasises the central role 
that cargo plays in cabotage. The chapter details cargo volumes and the types of cargo 
shipped and describes the trade routes on which domestic and regional cargo moves.  
Having adequately described the landscape and cargo base in which cabotage is set to 
apply, focus shifts to the practice of cabotage. Chapter 5 provides a worldwide 
overview of cabotage practice. Drawing from the sample of the specific countries 
chosen, chapters 6 and 7, respectively, discuss strict cabotage (Nigeria and the US) and 
liberal cabotage (Australia and New Zealand). Chapter 8 analyses lessons drawn from 
the specific instances of cabotage practices, particularly in the preceding two chapters. 
Chapter 9 provides the conclusion and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
DEVELOPMENT OF COASTAL SHIPPING 
This chapter provides a two-part historical overview of the South African coastal 
shipping trade. Section A gives early history, while Section B covers modern coastal 
shipping. The chapter is intended to serve as a canvas against which a proper discussion 
of the maritime policy and in particular cabotage implementation can take place. Its 
objective is therefore to explain how coastal shipping was established, expanded and 
sustained, and in the process, show the circumstances under which the region and South 
Africa in particular has over the years conducted coastal trade without cabotage. 
As a corollary, the narrative will shed some light on the tension that seems to prevail 
between industry (ship owners in particular) and the government. Currently the former 
controls coastal trade and the latter coastal waters over which trade operates. It is 
important to appreciate that the tone of the relationship between these two parties will 
inevitably impact on the implementation of cabotage.  
SECTION A: EARLY HISTORY 
This section consists of four parts that respectively discuss pre-colonial coastal 
shipping, colonial coastal shipping, development of coastal shipping until the middle 
of the 20th century and consolidation and rationalisation of the coastal fleet. 
2.1  PRE-COLONIAL COASTAL SHIPPING 
2.1.1 Trade with the East  
It is important to start by giving a regional perspective of the history of shipping because 
that was the approach to shipping before the region was divided up into colonies and 
colonial borders were established. Southern Africans traded with each and with other 
African coastal communities and with the island people of Madagascar.1 That trade was 
predominantly between these Southern African people and the Muslim Arabs.2 The 
 
1  The Rise of the Zimbabwe Civilizations Encyclopaedia Britannica, available at 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Mozambique/The-rise-of-the-zimbabwe-civilizations#ref932096. 
(Accessed 21 November 2017). 
2  O., R. & A. Atmore ‘Medieval Africa 1250-1800’ (1975) 6. A typical Arabic ocean trade along the 
African coast between 1250 and 1400 followed a route from Cairo along the coast to Aden. The route 
extended from there into the continent’s interior to Ethiopia. 
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route between Africa and the Arab world that had its roots in Baghdad3 generated much 
shipping activity in Southern Africa. Trading ports were found in Mogadishu, Malindi 
and Mombasa, Pemba and Zanzibar. The primary ports on the east coast were 
Mogadishu and later Kilwa in Zanzibar.4 At Zanzibar, trade branched off to the Island 
of Madagascar (where foodstuffs and timber were generally traded). An alternative 
trade route proceeded straight down to Sofala. At Sofala the route turned inwards to 
Sena. 5  Traders sailed further down the coast towards Mozambique and into the 
Zambezi and Limpopo Rivers for gold, and ivory, and other minerals.6 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Early Arab trade route to Southern Africa 
 
3 From there it went to Muscat, where it proceeded all the way along the coast (crossing the route from 
Eden to Calicut). Ibid. 
4 O. Oyekan Culture and Customs of Zimbabwe (2002). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Atmore et al. (note 2). 
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The Arabs did not advance into the interior until the 19th century.7 They focused on the 
coast, while the locals8 brought goods from Great Zimbabwe in the interior to the 
Arabs, who had established harbour towns in Sofala and Sena.9 The basin for this trade 
was Great Zimbabwe. Therefore, the trade footprint seems not to have extended to what 
is today known as South Africa.  
 
Trade with the east shows that there were no coastal restrictions for foreigners trading 
in regional waters. In fact, it seems foreigners and locals established prolonged 
harmonious trading patterns that even allowed cultural integration. Cabotage was not a 
practice.  
2.1.2 Trade with the West 
Europe’s wish to trade with the East was hampered by the need to follow the overland 
route (the Silk Road) which was under the jurisdiction of various Arab nations. Arab 
control blocked Western access to India and the Far East. Therefore Europe made 
efforts to re-establish entry into India. As a result, in 1488, the Portuguese established 
another route from Europe to India that circumvented Arab overland domination by 
sailing around the southernmost point of the coast of Africa, the Cape.  
During the 17th century, the Dutch also began to sail around the Cape to trade with the 
East and did so more purposefully. The Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (VOC), 
commonly known as the Dutch East India Company, sent Jan Van Riebeeck to the 
Cape, where he and his men arrived on 6 April 1652.10 The VOC wanted to establish a 
victualling station for its ships that passed through the Cape twice a year from the west 
to the Far East and back.11 Jan Van Riebeeck formed a council and built a fort to 
 
7 Ibid. 
8 The interaction between the locals and the Arabs gave birth to KiSwahili, which is a derivative 
language of Arabic and Bantu dialects. See, The Rise of the Zimbabwe Civilizations (note 1). 
9  The Zimbabwe Kingdom, although inland, had a trade network along the south-eastern African 
seaboard all the way to India. The route referred to above connects Africa to India through the Arab 
route at a point between Aden and Muscat. From there it proceeds all the way to the spice lands of 
Calicut in Kerala province. See T.N. Huffman Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe: The Origin and 
Spread of Social Complexity in Southern Africa 28 (2009) Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 
37–54 50. 
10 The council had administrative, legislative and judicial powers. It ruled over Dutch Cape between 
1652 and 1795. 
11 J. Hunt ‘Dutch South Africa Early Settlers at the Cape 1652 to 1708’ (2005). 
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administer and protect the station from the Khoi and the San people and from European 
competition, in furtherance of his VOC instructions.12 
Van Riebeeck immediately began operating on the coast, transporting salt, wood and 
cow manure to the fort. He had vessels built specifically for trading by 165513 for seal 
hunting and for transporting skins from Robben Island. However, Jan van Riebeeck’s 
ambitions lay in slave trading. He intended to supply some slaves to the Netherlands 
and to retain some for himself and for the “free burghers” who supplied produce to 
VOC ships.14 By 1658 Jan Van Riebeeck was utilising bigger vessels received from 
Amsterdam and had added the west coast slave trade route to his itinerary from the 
coast of Guinea to the Cape. 
There were other types of cargo traded in the Cape. However, slaves remained the 
primary commodity. High mortality and morbidity rates as well as Batavia’s own 
requirement for slaves spiked the demand for slaves from the Cape, from where they 
were constantly needed and trans-shipped to Batavia. These were ideal conditions for 
a vibrant coastal traffic, particularly between the Cape, Angola and Madagascar.15 
The trade environment ensured that the Cape route flourished beyond the original plan 
of having it as a refreshment station. By the mid-17th century, and despite Batavia’s 
instructions to make it a mere settlement, the Cape was at this time indisputably a 
colony. Trade continued at Table Bay under Dutch mastery for the rest of the century, 
albeit that the Cape remained predominantly a refreshment station for the VOC ships. 
The Dutch grip on the Cape began to loosen with the VOC bankruptcy in 1789 
predicating a new coastal trading pattern.16  
2.2  COLONIAL COASTAL SHIPPING  
2.2.1 Establishment of colonies and subsequent port development  
 
12 Ibid. 
13 His first-built vessel was the famous Robbejacht. See F. Mason History and Progress of Unicorn 
Lines (1995) (unpublished work, Seaford Knysna). 
14 Ibid.  
15 History of Slavery and Early Colonisation in South Africa (nd), available at 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-slavery-and-early-colonisation-south-africa. (Accessed 18 
April 2017). 
16 VOC Bankruptcy and the British Occupation US Library of Congress, available at 
http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/9.htm. (Accessed 25 April 2017). 
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The English took over the Cape at the beginning of the 19th century. Soon after that the 
English built a garrison town in Grahamstown. 17 Consequently, sparsely populated 
communities started to develop along the east coast, prompting the development of 
ports to service these communities. The occupation also influenced the resurgence of 
other small settlements in places such as Mossel Bay18 and Saldanha Bay.19 In 1820 the 
British established a settlement in Algoa Bay,20 situated along the banks of the Baakens 
River.21 As these were times of war, imported cargo (arms, uniforms, garrison stores 
and other cargo and personnel) from Britain landed in the Cape. It was easier to ship 
cargo up the coast to Algoa Bay than to utilise overland routes that were not always 
easily accessible. Therefore the route between Table Bay and Algoa Bay represents the 
first recognisable modern coastal shipping route in South Africa.  
The influx of English dwellers and the consequent establishment of English settlements 
on the east coast invigorated coastal shipping activity. This led to the establishment of 
the Kowie River port (later to become Port Alfred) in 1841.22 Castle Line and Union 
Line vessels called at the ports.23 Knysna lagoon developed over the same period. It 
was used as a timber port. However, very few vessels called at Knysna because entry 
to the port was difficult.24  Therefore, Mossel Bay gained prominence as the port from 
where general cargo was carried to Table Bay.25.  
The arrival at Table Bay on 16 August 1825 of the Enterprise, the first steam vessel on 
the South African coast, brought new ideas to the coast.26 In 1838 the Cape of Good 
Hope Steam Navigation Company ordered the Hope,27 the first paddle steamer built 
 
17 Built in 1811. See History of Cape Town, available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Cape_Town. (Accessed 22 April 2017).  
18 Mossel Bay was once the Portuguese watering post. On 3 February 1488 Bartolomeo Dias landed at 
Mossel Bay. Here they found a spring from which to replenish their water supplies. See Mossel Bay, 
available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mossel_Bay#History. (Accessed 25 April 2017). 
19 Also named after another Portuguese explorer, Antonio de Saldanha, who visited the country in 
1503. See Saldanha Bay Wikipedia, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saldanha_Bay#History. 
(Accessed 25 April 2017). 
20 Algoa Bay is located in the vicinity of modern-day Port Elizabeth. 
21 A major factor for this establishment was the Kaffir Wars between 1779 and 1878. 
22 E. Turpin ‘Basket Work Harbour – The Story of Kowie’ (1983).  
23 This occurred before the companies were amalgamated. Amalgamation into Union-Castle Line took 
place only in March 1900. See Union-Castle Steamship Company (2012) Cayzer Family Online 
Archive, available at http://www.cayzer.com/Union-castle. (Accessed 24 April 2017). 
24 Ibid. 
25 B. Ingpen South Africa Merchant Ships – An Illustrated Recent History (1979). 
26 The standard types of ships before this time were wind-propelled barques, brigs and schooners.  
27 Ingpen (note 24) 48. 
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specifically for the coast. The Hope plied her trade between Table Bay and Port 
Elizabeth until she was wrecked in 1840.  
An increase in east coast trading (from which came wool, animal hides and dried aloe 
sap28) led to the development of another pair of river ports, namely Beaufort29 and 
Malgas30 ports, by 1845. However, Beaufort and Malgas ports proved cumbersome for 
vessel operations. Beaufort soon fell into disuse and both ports were eventually closed 
by 1856. Kowie River port was also difficult to navigate, and as a result, it ceased to 
trade towards the end of the 19th century.  
There were new developments further up the east coast. The Trekboers who had left 
the Cape for the hinterland had reached Natal and established Natalia Republic in 1839. 
The British annexed Port Natal in 1844.31 Annexation meant the British now had three 
settled colonies, one on the west coast and two on the east coast. All three needed to 
communicate with each other and each with Britain. Coastwise trade was buoyed up by 
the mail service between the Cape and Natal.32 Other than mail, typical cargo for the 
outward leg to Natal was “building implements such as spades, hoes and also tents, 
building materials, wagons, liquor, etc.”.33 The cargo types were indicative of the fact 
that Natal was still being developed. The inward voyage to the more developed Cape 
was usually more varied and even exotic. Cargo parcels included ornamental products 
such as elephant tusks, sea-cow teeth, and horns of various types of game, as well as 
materials required for clothing apparel, such as buffalo and ox hides; and, of course, 
agricultural products such as Natal wattle and sugarcane. 34  This cargo formed the 
backbone of the return leg to the Cape for what was a British or Cape-owned and Cape 
- registered tonnage.35  
 
28 Overberg and Malgas, available at http://www.southafrica-travel.net/westcape/overberg_malgas.htm. 
(Accessed 25 April 2017). 
29 Beaufort was declared a port in 1841 and abolished as a port in 1864. See South Africa – History and 
Families of Witsand (White Sands) and Fort Beaufort (nd), available at 
https://www.geni.com/projects/South-Africa-History-and-Families-of-Witsand-White-Sands-and-Port-
Beaufort/12050. (Accessed 24 April 2017). 
30 The development of the railways and roads (in particular the Competitive Sea Transport Rates of 
1911) rendered this port completely irrelevant by the early 20th century. However, Malgas port 
remained navigable until 1930 (see note 29). 
31 Flag of the Natalia Republic (nd) Wikipedia, available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_the_Natalia_Republic. 
32 Ingpen (note 24). 




In an attempt to curb “capital flight”, Natal operators formed the D’Urban Shipping 
Company in 1844. That moment marks the beginning of the campaign for “domestic 
goods on domestic fleet” on the South African shores that has repeatedly reared its head 
over the intervening years, and is with us as cabotage, as we know it today. 
Natal harbour flourished and received the first steamer at Port Natal in 1852.36 In the 
same year the General Screw Steam Shipping Company of London commenced a 
steamer coastal service for the mail service between the Cape and Natal.37 Three years 
later the first Harbour Board was established to embark on deepening the port and to 
perform some form of dredging services.38 In all, the annexation of Natal had a positive 
impact on coastwise trade.  
The formation of the Natal Sugar Company in 1853 provided the colony with more 
reliable cargo supplies to other colonies, especially to the Cape. In 1858 exports totalled 
about 110 tons and had more than doubled by the following year to 290 tons.39Likewise, 
shipping of farming equipment into Natal showed a commensurate increase by 1859. 
40 The demand for labour to increase sugar outputs also led to the arrival of indentured 
labourers from Madras, who were engaged to work the sugarcane fields in 1860.41 
Natal had a very active community of sugar traders concentrated in the southern part of 
the colony. C.G. Smith was the driving force with the largest trade in this sector. His 
focus went beyond dealing in sugar. His interests extended to cattle trading and 
livestock distribution. He shipped sugar from Umkomaas and Umzimkulu river ports 
as well as from Port Shepstone to Durban.42 The return cargo consisted of general 
commercial goods.43  
 
36 The Sir Robert Peel on 16 August 1852, available at http://www.historic-
shipping.co.uk/gsssco/Sir%20Robert%20Peel.html. (Accessed 25 April 2017). 
37 P. Dickinson Shipping Interests of C. G. Smith 1886–1966 (March 1988) 3(1) SAJEH 20–32. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid. 
40 The value of agricultural equipment was 2.777 pounds in 1856, 1.943 pounds in 1857, 3.975 in 1858 
and 7.810 the following year. This represented an increase of about 181% in three years. Figures derived 
from A. McMartin The Early Days of The Natal Sugar Industry, with Special Reference to the 
Introduction of Varieties (1948) 85, available at https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9dec/ 
d0f3ff6d4ced63d775c28ddb9aedbef268be.pdf (Accessed 10 December 2019). 
41  For a detailed discussion see Ship List of Indian Indentured Labourers (nd), available at 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/ship-list-indian-indentured-labourers. (Accessed 25 April 2017). 
42 This service gave Smith and other traders on this route substantial savings of about £2 10s 0d per 
ton. Ibid. 
43 Ibid, 68.  
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An increase in the number of sugarcane planters entering the market prompted the rise 
in demand for coastal shipping services between the south coast and Durban. Smith’s 
Coasters carried sugarcane to Durban from Port Shepstone44 and Port St Johns.45 At 
some point, Smith’s Coasters46 extended its coastal service from the south coast to Port 
St Johns, East London (founded at the mouth of the Buffalo River in 1844)47, and 
Kynsna.48 However, the south coast service ran into problems49 and was eventually 
closed at the turn of the century.  
Coastal shipping on the eastern seaboard grew from strength to strength and received 
some stimulus from a hive of activities associated with the gold rush from 1878 50 well 
into the 20th century. Other events that caused a spike in coastal traffic were an 
outbreak of cattle plague (rinderpest) in the course of 1888-1889 and the Anglo-Boer 
War during the period 1899 -190251 The cattle plague stimulated regional coastal trade 
with Madagascar and Mauritius. Smith’s Coasters carried import cattle to replenish 
local supplies (for both meat and oxen for sugarcane plantations). The return voyage 
typically consisted of sugar from Mauritius. 52  During the Anglo Boer War, allied 
coasters carried war supplies for British soldiers fighting against the Boers. 53  In 
particular, Smith’s Coasters shipped mail from the other colonies to Natal. These events 
formed the foundations for South African coastal shipping. 
 
44 The Somtseu and later the Frontier ibid. 
45 The Umzimvubu. 
46 Somtseu and Umzimvubu. 
47 The British used this port for landing stores during the Frontier Wars. In 1848 Sir Harry Smith, the 
then Cape governor, claimed it for the Crown and named it London. When it was linked to the Cape 
later, it was renamed East London http://showme.co.za/east-london/tourism/a-history-of-east-london/. 
(Accessed 3 May 2017). 
48 B. Ingpen Unicorn, Navigating New Frontiers (2003). 
49 Challenges seem to have been both physical and economical in nature. Brian Ingpen (note 34) and 
Paul Dickinson (note 38) 20 detail some groundings in the south coast and problems with insufficient 
bridge heights that plagued coasters as being some of the challenges. The authors also indicate the 
introduction of railway lines from the south coast to Durban in 1901 as the proverbial nail in the coasters’ 
coffin. Dickinson states that rail introduced a more economical alternative for the transportation of cargo 
to Durban, with which ships could not compete. 
50 The first declared gold field in South Africa was in Knysna after a gold nugget was found in the 
Karatara River near Ruigtevlei in 1878. It attracted a number of fortune seekers which, for coasters, 
translated into transportation of passengers, equipment and foodstuffs. See Knysna (nd), available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knysna. (Accessed 4 May 2017). 
51 Ibid. 22. 
52 Dickinson (note 38) 30 shows figures for oxen at 2 122 head in 1896 and at a peak of 23 059 head by 
1902.  
53 V. Solomon South African Shipping Question 1886-1914 (1982). 
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Cabotage murmurs that saw the formation of D’Urban Shipping Company in 1844 
failed to gain momentum. Vessels continued to operate on the South and southern 
African coast regardless of where they were flagged. The “domestic goods on domestic 
fleet” campaign came to naught and the antecedent prevention of capital flight followed 
suit.  
Therefore, there was no cabotage on the Southern African coast at the end of the 19th 
century.  Calls to exclude vessels flagged outside a particular coast failed. We turn now 
to look at the period from the beginning to the middle of the 20th century.  
2.3 DEVELOPMENT OF COASTAL SHIPPING (1900 TO THE 1950s) 
Three significant events mark this era. The first is concerned with the establishment of 
the Union Castle Line and subsequent Conference dominance. The submission is that 
the presence of Union Castle Line had an impact on the coast despite the fact that the 
company operated a predominantly international trade. The second event was the 
implementation of Sea Competitive Rail Rates (SCRR), which was aimed at 
stimulating railway traffic. The third relates to the effect that the Great Depression and 
the two World Wars had on coastal shipping. 
2.3.1 Conference dominance 
The service operated by the Union Steam Ship Company constituted the umbilical cord 
connecting Britain and its South African colony.54 The company had held rights to the 
Cape mail contract since 1857 and had two sailings to Europe per month.55 The mail 
service formed the basis for an association of the lines steaming between the two 
countries. These lines later became known as the South African Conference Lines or 
simply the Conference,56 led by the influential Donald Currie. This meant that Donald 
Currie also had exclusive rights in the distribution of mail along the coast to other 
colonies.57  
 
54 G.R. Berridge The Politics of the South African Run: European Shipping and Pretoria (1987). The 
author argues, for instance, that South African exports were referred to as “homebound” traffic while 
imports to South Africa were known as “outbound” traffic. The proper perspective was therefore, at least 
at the beginning of the trade, to view Britain as “home” and South Africa as an “outpost” with which 
England was trading.  
55 Solomon (note 54). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 7. 
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Donald Currie’s Castle Mail Packets Company Limited amalgamated with the Union 
Steam Ship Company to form the Union Castle Line in 1900.58 The merger formed an 
even greater force to reckon with on the high seas and on the coast alike. It is no 
exaggeration that the merger made Union Castle a shipping colossus and gave it the 
right to take the first bite of the South African shipping trade cherry.59  
The effect that Conference activity had on coastal trade cannot be overstated. First, any 
genuine efforts for coastal competition were stifled by the presence of the Conference, 
as it was the Conference’s modus operandi to preserve its share to the exclusion of other 
coastal participants, especially newcomers. Second, a “British shipping services 
provider” bias was firmly entrenched in South Africa over this period and this would 
have directly stunted the growth and development of international and coastwise trade 
in the interest of South Africa.  
The environment that the Conference presence created set the scene for the Ocean 
Freight Agreement (OFA), which followed soon after the formation of the Union of 
South Africa in 1910. The OFA divided carriage of cargo in and out the country into 
three categories: Mail Contract, Northbound and Southbound. The government 
traditionally gave Union Castle, the only negotiator for the Conference, the right to 
carry mail to and from South Africa. In a manner that suggested an exchange, the 
Conference agreed to keep freight for export agricultural products down and to recover 
the shortfall against freight for consumer and capital imports. The OFA also obliged 




58 All Conference chairmen were from Union Castle and the company also housed the Conference 
Secretariat although Conference members shared the expenses of running the office, for instance. Ibid. 
4. 
59 Berridge (note 56) 7 states that Union Castle had an annual subsidy and received priority berthing 
during times of port congestion. 
60  Berridge (note 56) 5. 
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Solomon states that strictly speaking, there were three Conferences: The Outward 
Conference, the Homeward Conference, and the Coastwise Conference.61 The OFA 
was never intended to burden the coast or to subject it to Conference control. Therefore, 
“coastal conference” terms would have been the illegitimate products from the 
Conference that the Union could never have intended but which clearly had the Union’s 
acquiescence. The argument is therefore that government hands were tied. The 
arrangement between the Union government and the Conference meant that the 
government could not promote coastal shipping because of the OFA. 
Paul Dickinson states that there were 16 coastal vessels operating along the coast during 
this time. Thesens, Smith Coasters, African Coasters, Dart & Howes and others owned 
these vessels.62 Generally, coasters had staple cargo to sustain their business during this 
period. However, Thesens, Smith Coasters and African Coasters held a bigger share of 
the market. 63  Precise cargo and route distribution patterns could not be verified. 
However, it is clear that the routes were sustained by some means of informal route 
allocation, which prevented overlaps that could lead to excess tonnage available on any 
single route. This balance did not depend on any Conference arrangement.  
Smith Coasters carried sugar from Durban to the Cape and returned with groceries, 
building materials, automotive cargo and canned foods. African Coasters traded on the 
same route transporting general cargo and newspaper print made from Natal wattle to 
Cape Town. 64  These companies seem to have had settled informal terms not to 
compete. 
Similarly, Thesens and Dart & Howes traded from Table Bay to the West African coast 
and along the south and eastern Cape. Thesens carried timber, general cargo and 
passengers. When road access improved between the Cape and Knysna, Thesens shifted 
its focus to the provision of service to fishing concerns (as well as seal-skin traders) 
and those in the mining of copper and diamonds, especially after diamond discovery 
near Port Nolloth. By the late 1930s, Thesens was carrying palm oil, timber and 
passengers up the west coast to Matadi in the then Belgian Congo.65 
 
61 Solomon (note 54) 28. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ingpen (note 49). 
65 Ibid. 
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Dart and Howes traded in the Beaufort West/Table Bay port range. The outward 
carriage was made up of petrol drums and general cargo, while the return voyage 
consisted of bagged wheat, barrelled water, and in some instances, construction 
materials and fishing equipment.  
However, the presence of the Conference had a destabilising effect on the further 
development of coastal trade. The OFA committed government cargo to the Conference 
for half a decade in the first period of its operation. The Union government effectively 
signed away the opportunity for domestic carriers to ship South African tonnage over 
that period. The position of foreign-owned shipping enterprises was thus enhanced and 
secured for 78 years. 66  The effect of the OFA was that high-tariff, time-sensitive 
coastwise cargo was carried by foreign-owned fleets, the greatest objection to this 
practice being in respect of coastwise cargo from East London and Port Elizabeth.67  
In the wake of the scuttling of one of its vessels, Captain Tonnesen of Thesens 
commented: 
Owing to strong competition from overseas ships in the coastal trade, the South 
African coasters – excellent and efficient little vessels that they were – found that 
there was very little trade for them. Here we have the South African government 
subsidising68 a foreign shipping line while our own merchant fleet – small though it 
is – is left entirely in the cold. The coasters cannot possibly be expected to compete 
with the huge vessels sailing along the coast and if something is not done, other 
vessels will follow this one which would probably not have been sunk had things been 
better.69 
Thesens were basically arguing for cabotage. The idea was then, as it is now, that the 
exclusion of foreign vessels from participating in coastal trades would stimulate growth 
of the domestic coastal fleet. The message was directed at government and the request 
was for government to protect coasters from international competition. The government 
did not heed the call but continued with the OFA, which entrenched foreign vessel 
domination. 
 
66 The OFA lasted from 1912 well into the 1990s: Berridge (note 56) 4. 
67 Ingpen (note 49) 28. 
68 Berridge (note 56) 14 places such subsidy at £300 000 in 1945, all of which the government 
committed to British interests without making any provision for South African coasters. 
69 Ingpen (note 49) 28. 
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Any party that did not have Conference approval found it quite difficult to trade on 
South African international routes or along the coast. Conference restrictions on 
international routes were to be expected. However, the Conference pursued control of 
the coast with just as much vigour. For instance, Thesens and Co was not part of the 
Conference and therefore had to contend with Conference opposition when the 
company started sailing70 between Port Elizabeth and Knysna.71  
The parameters of the mail contract (to which Union Castle had exclusive rights) did 
not extend beyond the Cape. Rennie provided the mail service between the Cape and 
Natal, supplemented by passengers and other cargo.72 Rennie therefore provided feeder 
services that linked the two colonies for British ships using the Cape as the point of 
entry.73 Naturally the arrangement, particularly relating to the mail service, required 
confirmation from the Union Castle and the Conference. This becomes more evident 
when one considers the fact that when Rennie’s ships were wrecked (four years after 
commencing the inter-colony mail service), it was Union Castle who took over the 
service between the Cape and Natal.74  
2.3.2 Sea Competitive Railway Rates 
Coastal shipping faced an even bigger challenge than the Conference and its OFA 
during this time. The Union Government enacted the Sea Competitive Railway Rates 
(SCRR) in 1911. The SCRR was an adaptation of the policy first employed by the old 
Colonial Cape government through which it favoured transportation of cargo by rail. 
Through the state-controlled South African Railways Administration, the Union 
extended this policy to cover a wider range of cargo.75 The SCRR applied to any freight 
moved between ports in the Union and the hinterland close to the coast.76 The policy 
set a rail charge below the sea freight rate to any competing port in the Union. The type 
 
70 With the Clara. 
71 Ingpen (note 49) 17, where he shows a copy of a letter from the Union Castle’s London office in 
which Union Castle stipulated who could trade on the coast and on what terms. The letter also reveals 
that an “attack” would ordinarily be launched against a competitor, whether or not such acts would 
improve efficiencies. 
72 Ibid. 6.  
73 Ibid. 16. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ingpen (note 49) 27. 
76 Ibid. 
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of cargo affected would typically be that which coasters would otherwise have carried 
at profitable rates.  
The net effect of the SCRR was that coasters were left to lift low-value cargo such as 
paper and sugar.77 The whole object was to make it impossible for coastal vessels to 
compete with rail. As a state entity, the Railways Administration had no pressure to 
turn a profit. Therefore, it could afford to sustain the practice of undercutting shipping 
rates regardless of the fact that it was uneconomical for it to do so.78 The policy was 
maintained despite its glaring anomalies.79 The SCRR led to a significant decline in 
coastal tonnage.  
2.3.3 Effects of the Depression and the World Wars 
Coasters suffered a further setback during the First World War (1914 to 1918) and the 
Great Depression of 1930. Disruptions during the Second World War between 1939 
and 1945 saw a significant depletion of the coastal fleet. During this time, ten of the 
sixteen coastal ships from South African operators were called up for wartime duties.80 
Some of the commissioned tonnage was converted to troop vessels or set apart for the 
exclusive use as carriers of army stores and war supplies. At one stage of the war, only 
one vessel81 from Natal had not been commissioned for war out of the entire coastal 
fleet.82  
Sustained market distortions caused by the unpredictability of wartime trade patterns 
eventually dried up coastal cargo. Shipping operators lost personnel to war call-ups 
which, as a consequence, stifled coastal operations. 83  Therefore, whatever strides 
coastal shipping companies had made post the First World War and the Depression 
were lost during the Second World War.  
 
77 Dickinson (note 38) 22. 
78 Ingpen (note 49) 28. A similar policy applied with respect to road transport. 
79 For example, Trevor Jones ‘Coastal Sea Transport and Intermodal Competition in South Africa’ 
(1985) cites instances in which railage charge was set higher on short than on long hauls. A typical 
example of this would be a charge for cargo from Cape to Durban by rail over about 2 106 kilometres 
set at a lower rate than a Cape to Durban port-to-port rate covering 1 474 kilometres.  
80 Ingpen (note 49). 
81 The Nahoon from Smith’s Coasters was still under repairs after an accident. She continued to ply her 
trade between Natal and the Cape but not without fear of being torpedoed.  
82 Ingpen (note 49).  
83 Ibid. (note 49) 33. Ingpen records that Walter Grindrod and Cecil Renaud received the military call-
up to North Africa, where they would be stationed, which left the company in limbo during their 
absence. 
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2.3.4 Overview of the period 
In all, coastal shipping suffered tremendously during this era from Conference 
interference and the OFA, implementation of the SCRR, and disruptions caused by the 
economic downturn and the two World Wars. 
Natal was home to flourishing sugarcane fields, and the Cape was the hub for the 
manufacturing of canned foods, vineyard produce and confectionery. Sugar trade 
volumes recorded over this period were significant, particularly during the period 1916-
1917 and 1926-1927, as reflected in Figure 2.2 below. Therefore, it was the sugar 
industry that kept coastal shipping in business over this period, particularly on the main 
coastal route between the Cape and Natal. 
 
Figure 2.2: Manufacturing industry’s sugar demand during the period from 1927 to the 
mid-1950s 
(Source: Dickinson, 1988) 
Arguably, the first half of the 20th century was among the most difficult for coastal 
shipping. However, a constant supply of cargo from the sugar industry propped coastal 
shipping up for a while until it could reinvent itself. Sugar continued to play an 
important role in the development of coastal shipping in the following era when the 
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2.4 CONSOLIDATION AND RATIONALISATION OF THE COASTAL 
FLEET (1950 TO 1976)  
The highlight of this era was the abolishing of the SCRR on 1 September 1954. The 
news led to a sudden availability of high-freight cargo and a resultant surge in coastal 
shipping. Coastal cargo rose from 443 000 tons in 1953 to over a million tons by 1955.84 
The surge demonstrated the shortcomings of the SCRR which the government pursued 
over 50 years.   
Foreign vessels began to terminate their southern African services in Durban. These 
vessels would then rely on coasters to distribute the cargo to Lourenço Marques 
(Maputo), Nacala, and Beira.85 The cargo windfall encouraged the formation of Durban 
Lines (Pty) Ltd,86 registered in 1955 for the Durban-Mozambique-Ocean Islands route. 
Buoyant market conditions continued, with the result that coastal rates increased in 
1959. Higher revenues provided coasters an opportunity to supplement their fleets and 
to adopt modern technologies. 87  This modernisation was first evident in the 
introduction of diesel-powered engines on the coast and the accompanying profits 
derived from new diesel efficiencies.88 
However, in the early 1960s, coasters battled to secure capital to meet further 
expansion. The result was inefficiencies that inevitably follow dependence on ageing 
fleets and the associated heavy maintenance costs. The rate of growth had therefore 
reached its peak. Cargo started to decline as well, which reduced tonnage demand. This 
eventually led to the reduction of coastal operators from seven to four.89 The survivors 
were Smith’s Coasters, African Coasters, Durban Lines, and Thesens. 90  With the 
exception of Thesens, which at the time was owned by Coast Lines of Liverpool, the 
 
84 B. Ingpen Grindrod – Charting New Horizons (2010) 42. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Formerly Durban Coasters (Pty) Ltd.  
87 The gains were significant. For instance, Smith’s Coasters managed ownership of only 13 ships in 
71 years from 1889 to 1960. However, the company acquired nine ships in four years between 1960 
and the time when it was sold 1966. These figures were derived from Dickinson (note 38) 32. 
88 Ibid. 29. Dickinson points out that in the trade where Smith’s Coasters was earning £14 307 with 
Nahoon, they were earning £43 858 with its replacement, diesel-powered Intaba. 
89 Ibid. 31. 
90 Houston bought Thesens in 1921 but kept the name and fleet colours. Houston sold Thesens to 
Mitchell Cotts. In 1936 the latter sold Thesens to Coast Lines, Liverpool. 
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rest of the coastal operations which survived were South African owned. All vessels 
operating along the coast were flagged in South Africa.91 
It was at this point that ownership of coastwise fleets experienced perhaps the most 
significant shifts. In 1962 African Coasters secured an exclusive deal to carry sugar for 
Huletts and Umfolozi sugar distributors. The deal was meant to exclude Smith’s 
Coasters from shipping sugar along the coast.92 However, in a strategic comeback, C.G. 
Smith and Tongaat acquired control of Huletts in the same year. The two companies 
formed a subsidiary distribution company, which transferred all carriage rights to 
Smith’s Coasters, leaving African Coasters without any sugar cargo.93 Smith’s profits 
consequently soared and as a result the company managed to acquire a new fleet of 
eight vessels.94 
African Coasters resolved to sell its shares to a mining house, Union Corporation 
Limited (which later became known as Gencor), which took a controlling stake in the 
company in 1964. In return, the Corporation committed the carriage of the products of 
its subsidiary, the South African Pulp and Paper Industries (commonly known as 
SAPPI) on the fleet of African Coasters. As a direct outcome of this development, 
African Coasters acquired six modernised vessels, which then set it on the path for 
further acquisitions of other coasting businesses.  
In 1966 a further re-organisation of the coastal fleet took place. Although Smith’s 
Coasters had sufficient sugar as its base cargo and general cargo for its vessels, its 
parent company, C.G. Smith, was desirous of focusing on its core sugar business. 
Without the approval of Smith’s Coasters, C.G. Smith merged its shipping subsidiary 
with African Coasters.95 The merger of the two companies became known as Unicorn 
Lines.96 Large volumes of sugar cargo had thus been added to the expanded Unicorn 
Line fleet that was already enjoying dominance in the carriage of paper and paper-based 
products. 
 
91 Ingpen (note 86). 
92 Ibid. 10. 
93 Ibid. 54. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 B. Ingpen Development of Unicorn 1869–2004 (nd) states that the name of the new company 
reflected the majority shareholder’s logo; hence it was called Unicorn Shipping Lines. 
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In 1965 Safmarine, having been established in 1946 and plying its trade predominantly 
in international waters, bought a controlling shareholding in Thesens.97 The move held 
hopes for the fulfilment of an old ambition of having a domestic carrier which would 
trade both on the coast and the high seas. However, in 1967, Safmarine sold Thesens to 
Unicorn Lines in return for a 40% stake in the newly-formed giant.98  
The amalgamation exercise placed Unicorn Lines in a position to deploy tonnage at 
will in an environment that was favourable,99 and at a time when the company had a 
formidable fleet of 26 ships100 and not many coastal competitors.  
In 1969 the government reduced wharfage charges for coastal vehicle shipment, which 
Unicorn Lines and Skipkor (Port Elizabeth) sought to take advantage of. However, the 
duopoly was short lived. Unicorn bought out Skipkor in its first year of operation.101 
Unicorn Lines thereafter enjoyed a monopoly over the trade. The company turned its 
conquest towards the north to capture the Mozambique route, where Durban Coasters 
(Pty) Ltd102 (aka Durban Lines) was the dominant coaster. The two companies initially 
competed. However, in 1970 Unicorn Lines took up a 32% shareholding in Durban 
Lines and had bought the entire shareholding by 1974.103  
The Unicorn Lines coastal fleet continued to expand. However, by 1974 it had been 
reduced to 23 vessels after new and more purpose-built substitute vessels had been 
acquired and the old ones had been sold. 104  Unicorn Lines added two petroleum 
products tankers at this time for the coast.105 
In the light of such massive acquisitions and fleet modernisation it came as no surprise 
that Unicorn Lines was the forerunner of cellular cargo delivery and handling on the 
coast. Unicorn Lines (bare boat) chartered the Voorloper, a 1 900-dwt (deadweight 
 
97 B. Ingpen Coastwise Shipping in South Africa: A Study in Transportation Geography (1983) 
(unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Port Elizabeth). 
98 Ibid. 69. 
99 Ibid. 68. Ingpen records that coastwise cargo increased 121.5% between 1960 and 1966. 
100 African Coasters contributed 12 vessels to the merger, Smith’s 8 and Thesens 6. Ibid. 69. 
101 Ingpen (note 99). 
102 The company was registered under this name in 1951 and changed its name to Durban Lines in 
1961 http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/za~hf.html#dl. (Accessed 26 May 2017). 
103 Ingpen (note 86) 76. 
104 At this time the company was gearing to develop trade routes to Sri Lanka, Israel, South America, 
the Indian Ocean islands and West Africa. Ibid. 69.  
105 Mason (note 13). 
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tonnage) ro-ro cellular vessel. This marked the beginning of a new era of boxed cargo 
movement along the coast.  
 
SECTION B: MODERN COASTAL SHIPPING 
This section deals with coastal shipping developments over the period between 1977 
and 2010. It consists of four segments, namely coastal containerisation, coastal 
monopoly, shipping in the new millennium and the conclusion. 
2.5 MODERN HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICAN COASTAL SHIPPING 
As the heading suggests, this section deals with the history of coastal shipping in the 
modern era of diesel engines and containerised cargo.  
The development of coastal containerisation was an extension of the advances already 
achieved in deep-sea cargo handling and transportation. Therefore the evolution of 
coastal cargo movement from purely bulk and breakbulk parcels to boxes does not 
possess a frame of reference independent of wider international developments that took 
place at the time. The discussion of the development of coastal containerisation is 
therefore conducted bearing this context in mind.  
2.6 COASTAL CONTAINERISATION (FROM 1977 TO 1985)  
Containerisation was set to commence on the South African coast on 1 July 1977.106 
Durban and Port Elizabeth on the east and Cape Town on the west coast met the 
deadline and were declared ready to transit to the new form of cargo handling.107 
Richards Bay, having been inaugurated on 1 April 1976,108 was at the time new and 
possessed tremendous potential for expansion. However, it was better positioned as a 
bulk export terminal and coal terminal. Therefore, Richards Bay would receive calls 
only from dry bulkers and not cellular ships. This port was therefore not designated for 
participation in the new era of containerisation. Efforts continued to prepare the other 
ports to handle containers. 
 
106 Berridge (note 56) 210.  
107 Ingpen (note 86) 63. 
108 The official opening of the port occurred when Safmarine’s SA Vaal entered the port with Prime 
Minister B.J. Vorster on board to attend the occasion. Ibid. 20. 
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Unicorn Lines had by this time cornered for itself a niche coastal market and had also 
expanded its operations into developing countries. International southbound cargo was 
on the rise, and Safmarine held the lion’s share of its traffic. 109 For the coast, the 
significance of trade expansion was that first, most of the large European vessels would 
not call at smaller Southern African ports such as Walvis Bay and East London. Second, 
European carriers generally used Durban as the terminal port. This resulted in the 
availability of large amounts of feeder cargo for the African eastern seaboard.110  
It was also expected that the coast would benefit further because other groupings such 
as the South Africa-Far East Conference and later the US Conference had undertaken 
to adopt containerisation in the early 1980s. These operators would not call at all the 
ports. 111 The movement of cargo from the excluded ports would therefore cause a surge 
in coastal activities. The stage seemed set for unprecedented coastal trade prosperity. 
The success of the coastal trade was not dependent merely on transshipments. Unicorn 
Lines enjoyed high-volume trades between Durban and Cape Town and Cape Town to 
Port Nolloth. The company began to provide a purely containerised service using two 
vessels.112 Its service to Port Nolloth was also thriving on the back of the discovery of 
Africa’s largest deposits of zinc, copper, and lead on the west coast. The chief cargo to 
Port Nolloth was fuel oil supplies for (diamond – mining) dredgers and dry cargo to 
mining and fishing communities along the west coast.113 
However, the period was not without its challenges. The expected growth was stunted 
by political instability caused by Apartheid policies. The Soweto uprising of 16 June 
1976 (as well as the Sharpeville insurgence in 1960) were probably foremost in the 
thoughts of the would-be investor looking to plunge into the prospective containerised 
South African trade. Inevitably South Africa suffered the backlash of economic 
sanctions imposed as a result of the unhealthy political environment. In the end, this 
translated to less coastal cargo for feeder services than predicted. 
Even more disturbing was the fact that organised boycotts and sanctions against the 
Apartheid government affected virtually all the various sectors of business life, and 
 
109 Ibid. 64.  
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 119. 
113 Ibid. 
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mining was among the most affected. Consequently, Gencor (formerly Union 
Corporation Limited) had to streamline its operations by selling its majority share in 
the parent entity 114  of Unicorn Lines. However, Grindrod managed to buy that 
controlling stake for itself, thus establishing its name on the coast well into the 
foreseeable future.  
Unicorn Lines was a formidable coastal shipping company by tonnage size and 
operational expertise. However, the company still had competitors to contend with. 
There were three other coasters at the time, namely Rennie’s Coasters, Green R Line 
and Zambezi Africa Line. The first two soon disappeared in a consistently depressed 
market, leaving Unicorn and Zambezi in a duopoly. There were further competitive 
pressures from rail, albeit relatively small, and road transport, which had found a way 
of offering rates lower than profitable sea rates.115 The result was an unimpressive 
coastal trade trajectory. 
In 1979 Zambezi joined hands with Unilever for the transportation of the latter’s 
products between Natal and Cape Town with an intermediary call at Port Elizabeth.116 
The two companies operated a fully containerised service called Cape Natal Lines. The 
service enjoyed a 15% market share on the coast.117 However, in the now established 
tradition of competition elimination, Unicorn Lines eventually took over Cape Natal 
Lines in 1983. Consequently, the entire coastal share was in the hands of Unicorn Lines.  
It will be remembered that the South African Railways (SAR) ships had provided the 
coastal coal service earlier between Maputo and the Cape and later between Natal and 
the Cape. The demand for coal, especially in the Cape, arose from supplies for steam 
locomotives, steam tugboats, coal-powered electricity stations, and also for general 
industrial and household use. The introduction of the first nuclear-powered turbine 
station in Koeberg in 1984118 sounded the death knell for the SAR ships. The station 
caused a sharp decline in the demand for coal, following less dependency on coal as a 
source of energy. The installation of the second Koeberg turbine in 1985 was the 
 
114 African Coasters Holdings. 
115 Ingpen (note 86) 64. 
116 Ingpen (note 99) 232. 
117 Ibid. 72. 
118 Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koeberg_Nuclear_Power_Station. (Accessed 26 May 2017). 
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proverbial nail in the SAR ships’ coffin. The SAR dispensed with its coastal coal 
service and sold all the assets used in this operation.  
With the demise of the SAR ship operation, Unicorn Lines was the only coastal operator 
by the end of the millennium and virtually the most powerful coaster in Southern 
Africa. Significantly, the company’s rise to dominance occurred without direct 
government involvement and certainly without the protection afforded coasters in the 
cabotage trade.  
2.6.1 Milestones of this period 
Containerisation may not have delivered on all its promises by the end of 1985. 
However, there were a few discernible milestones worthy of note that arguably marked 
this period as the crest of South African shipping both on the coast and on the high seas.  
Cargo volumes on the coast witnessed a tremendous growth from a mere 0.4 million 
tons in 1953 to 2.1 million tons by 1981,119 and vessels of about 46 415 tons operated 
on the coast.120 The rise of Unicorn Lines to shipping eminence, which the company 
achieved in the 1980s, eventually served the long-held ambition of the provision of 
coastal services by a South African-owned coastal operator. Unicorn became the only 
operational member of the South African Coastal Conference from this era onwards.121 
The company was therefore on a path to take advantage of the earliest upswing in feeder 
service when it occurred, as was evidenced in the following season of coastal 
development. Overall, the first decade of coastal containerisation introduced 
measurable efficiencies that translated to tangible profits for the South African fleet. 
Progress over this era extended to other areas of maritime business. For instance, an 
improved South African shipping outlook predicated port expansion. Typical examples 
of this were the establishment of the Richards Bay122 port for coal and the expansion of 
the Saldanha port for its staple ores. Since the latter’s focus was exports, the venture 
would have served to ameliorate the country’s woes associated with balance of 
payments. Further progress was also achieved in public/private sector relations. The 
 
119 Ingpen (note 99) 73.  
120 Ibid. 214. 
121 Ibid. 
122 A. de V. Minnaar Richards Bay (1985) 17 Contrée 15–20 20 says the port was on its third phase 
expansion from 26 million tons capacity per annum to 44 million tons of coal per annum by 1983.  
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government’s collaborative work with both Safmarine123 and Unicorn Lines124 revealed 
a new approach to business conduct, one that prioritised common commercial goals 
above (sometimes trivial) non-commercial differences. Increased domestic tonnage and 
the rise in the number of international port calls created a demand for tugboat 
building.125 Local ship builders met the demand.126 These tugs were available for port 
service and for salvage operations. The country’s shipbuilding industry flourished and 
contributed to locally-produced tonnage of small container ships.127  
The overall effect of this hive of activity would have been manifest in the corresponding 
skills development transferred to local crews, engineers, shipbuilders, operators, shore-
side services, and all who interacted with and serviced the South African fleet and its 
related businesses. The country turned around a trade service heavily reliant on 
overseas players into an independent shipping service and offered services to other 
jurisdictions. All this was achieved without cabotage. The results were evident in the 
fleet that the country possessed, as shown in Figure 2.3 below. 
  
 
123 The IDC bought tankers and handed them over to Safmarine to operate albeit ironically these never 
came under the South African flag. Nevertheless, South African crews in attendance undoubtedly 
gained some valuable skills from working on these tankers.  
124 Ingpen (note 24) 117 says that the Department of Foreign Affairs was the catalyst in making way 
for Unicorn Lines to enter trade in the Middle East. 
125 The government had already ordered seven tugs to augment its fleet. See Ingpen (note 99) 107 for 
full details. 
126 Two Durban-based shipbuilders, Barens and Dorbyl, built eleven vessels for Unicorn Lines between 
1969 and 1983. Jones (note 81) 241.  
127 Unicorn placed orders in Durban for two 8 000-ton ships and eventually built at least ten ships 
locally. For further details, see Ingpen (note 24). 
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Figure 2.3: South African commercial fleet during the period from 1947 to 1985 
(Source: Tonnage figures adapted from Berridge, 1987:229) 
These and other achievements established a basis on which South Africa could build 
further on its coastal trade. 
2.7 COASTAL MONOPOLY (FROM 1985 TO 2000) 
In the mid 1980’s Unicorn Lines were indisputable champions of the coastal trade. At 
this stage the company boasted a fleet of 19 ships.128 However, in the course of its 
expansion, not all of the company’s tonnage was registered under the South African 
register at this time although the company’s operations were still largely South African. 
In 1985 the company contracted to carry 270 000 tons of salt per annum129 from Walvis 
Bay to Durban, where it would be used as a base substance in chemical preparations by 
AECI paints and manufacturers at Embokodweni (formerly Umbogontwini), south of 
Durban. 130  Unicorn Lines managed to corner this market, with the result that the 
company carried virtually the entire annual demand two years later.131 
In July 1986 Unicorn Lines shareholding changed hands, and with that the holding 
company (to which Unicorn Lines was a subsidiary) became known as Grindrod 
Unicorn Group, which was shortened to Grincor, later called Grindrod. Grindrod listed 
 
128 Mason (note 13) 136. 
129 The annual demand for salt was 400 000 tons per annum. Ibid. 
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on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange on 5 November 1986, thus becoming the first 
listed South African coastal operator.132  
However, the listing of Grindrod came at a very politically tense time. The 
government’s tyrannical policies and generally messy political handling invited fresh 
calls for tougher economic sanctions, which reduced the number of South Africa’s 
trading partners even further. This limited cargo to the country, which in turn had a 
negative effect on feeder volumes on the coast. The 1987 global shipping recession 
exacerbated commercial frugality. Grindrod was driven to relocate some operations to 
offshore centres to shield133 the business from negative perceptions created by adverse 
political conditions in the country.  
Further pressure on coastal shipping came in 1989 with the abolition of the road permit 
system. The long-awaited overhaul of the road freight system finally arrived. It will be 
remembered that commercial road freight was heavily regulated until this time. Long 
distance road haulage had been operated under strict licence conditions for a period of 
about 60 years since 1930. Some flexibility had been introduced under the Road 
Transport Act of 1977, which saw a measure of competition between road and rail.134  
Jones states that this period saw an unprecedented rise in road freight’s market share, 
largely at the expense of rail, and to a lesser extent at the expense of coastal shipping.135 
He shows that road had gained a 55% share of the freight market only ten years after 
deregulation, while rail, the main casualty, had stagnated at 45%. This, of course, 
resulted in financial strain for Grindrod, which had to shoulder the burdens occasioned 
by the shrinking coastal market share.  
In the light of new market conditions, Grindrod decided to move its core operations 
offshore as well, with disastrous consequences for the country’s ship registry. This shift 
was particularly perilous to coastal trade because the company had a virtual monopoly 
 
132 Safmarine retained its 40% share in Unicorn Lines acquired during the 1967 the merger, while 
Grincor held the other 60%. 
133 For instance, Grincor formed Griffin Shipping Holdings Limited and moved its vessels into that 
company to enable the vessels to trade in an identity that had no association with South Africa. The 
business operated out of Hong Kong. For fuller details see Ingpen (note 86) 88. 
134 Trevor Jones in S. Jones The Decline of the South African Economy (2002) 143.  
135 Ibid. 193. 
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at this stage. It effectively resulted in the complete “de-flagging” of the South African 
commercial ship register. 
In the absence of cabotage anywhere on the African coast, Unicorn Lines began to 
operate as a foreign flag further up the coast of Africa, both to the east and to the west, 
through joint ventures with European entities that were already established on the 
routes. The company also operated services to the Indian Ocean Islands in a joint 
venture with Delmas. Furthermore, the company joined Moore-McCormack from the 
US and together they operated fortnightly calls at all South African ports, and in 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya. On these trades, Unicorn Lines vessels bore no 
reference to South Africa. The trade was eventually conducted under the guise of the 
US counterpart who were free to trade on the coast. The glaring duplicity was, of 
course, the fact that none of the African countries in which US companies traded 
enjoyed reciprocal rights on the US coast due to the latter’s ardent cabotage policy.136 
Unicorn Lines increased its capacity on the west coast of Africa routes in 1992 to 
Angola137 and to the then Zaire.138 However, this did little to enhance the company’s 
financial standing. The Indian Ocean Island route was also badly affected by 
fluctuations in returns and therefore was soon phased out. Trade between Angola and 
South Africa eventually improved, and this prompted a joint venture between Unicorn 
Lines and Safmarine to provide coastal services that covered ports from Angola in the 
east to Kenya in the west. However, service on this route was withdrawn because of 
over-tonnage.139 
In 1994 South Africa shed its pariah status and did so convincingly. Despite the new 
developments, Grindrod retained its tonnage offshore. The company listed the 
subsidiary, Griffin, on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange, but kept Griffin’s core 
operations in Hong Kong. 140  It seemed that through Griffin, Grincor had been 
convinced that it was more worthwhile to operate from offshore than from the South  
 
136 Ingpen (note 86). 
137 Ibid. The conflict in Angola, at its peak in 1995, led to higher insurance premiums. The turnaround 
came with the assassination of Jonas Savimbi in 2002. The event was followed by peace and fresh 
investments. 
138 Ibid. Zaire civil war disrupted the services with consequent financial losses.  
139 Grindrod withdrew from this route as soon as it bought the “Safmarine shares” in 1999. 
140 Griffin delisted in 1997 following the Asian market crash that significantly lowered chartering rates. 
Its fleet was either sold or brought back onshore to Unicorn Lines. Ingpen (note 86) 90. 
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African coast. Grindrod’s 141  approach to coastal services changed from this point 
onwards. The result was that by the turn of the century, the company had withdrawn 
whatever was left of its multi-purpose fleet from the South African registry.142 
With Unicorn Lines operating overseas or trading on the African coastline under 
pseudonyms or joint ventures, the beginning of the new millennium marked the end of 
South African-flagged vessels on the coast. The country was confined to trading with 
foreign-flagged vessels which has, for all intents and purposes, remained the norm to 
date.143  
2.8 COASTAL SHIPPING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM  
Currently, Grindrod serves the coast on two fronts: containerised and tanker services. 
Both services are operated with other companies utilising vessels registered elsewhere. 
First, the containerised service is undertaken through Ocean Africa Container Lines, a 
joint venture the company operates with AP Møller. The focus of OACL (as it is 
commonly known) is the movement of containerised cargo between ports in the country 
and the handling of feeder cargo to West Africa as far as the port of Luanda in Angola. 
On the east the service goes as far as Beira, in Mozambique.144 Grindrod’s focus is 
therefore on the broader African seaboard. The recent picture shows that coastal 
shipping, particularly container trade, has once again settled into its original Southern 
African regional base. 
The second service was born out of interactions with the oil majors. 145 Previously oil 
majors moved their own products along the coast and elsewhere in the region 
themselves. However, in the last two decades, these companies have enlisted Unicorn 
Lines to ship their oil products along the coast instead. The second service is therefore 
a joint venture service Unicorn Lines offers, initially through Southern Tankers,146 and 
 
141 Ingpen (note 86) 23 says Grincor changed the name to Grindrod after the company acquired 
majority shares after buying back the Safmarine shares from the Restis Group. 
142 The History of South African Shipping, available at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:U11ZGNAYLrYJ:mastermarinersa.co.za/ 
wp-content/uploads/2016/06/HISTORY-OF-SOUTH-AFRICAN-SHIPPING.docx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct 
=clnk&client=safari. (Accessed 14 June 2017). 
143 Ingpen (note 86) 5. 
144 Before 2004, OACL vessels sailed all the way to Mombasa, Kenya. Because of delays in that port, 
OACL subsequently ended its service in Beira. 
145 Shell, Caltex, Engen (ex-Mobil) and BP. 
146 With Dudula Shipping Company 2004 to 2007. 
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subsequently through UniCal.147 UniCal services the refineries between Durban and 
Cape Town as well as Mossel Bay. In this way, Unicorn Lines maintains its presence 
on the coast in the shipment of oil and petroleum products. Initially this service was 
provided through Unicorn Bunkers under contract with BP and Engen in Durban and 
with Chevron in Cape Town 148 and lately through Linsen Nambi Bunker Services.149 
Whether on its own or in a form of a joint venture, Unicorn Lines has no vessels 
registered in South Africa, although it remains a South African-registered company. Its 
fleet is registered in Singapore, the UK, and elsewhere. The amalgamation of the entire 
South African fleet under the same roof therefore placed the country’s entire coastal 
shipping expertise on the table of a single boardroom. For all intents and purposes, it 
has remained there. No other coastal operator has emerged since; nor is there any 
realistic prospect that there will be new entrants in the near future. 
2.9 CONCLUSION  
The chapter began with a discussion of the early history of coastal shipping. The 
narrative of 11th century Southern African routes shows coastal shipping that was 
buoyed by the trade of the Arab Muslims with the coastal and river merchants of Great 
Zimbabwe and the people of the eastern seaboard islands. South Africa and 
Mozambique did not exist. Borders of these and other countries are postcolonial 
constructs. Nevertheless, evidence exists to suggest that foreign traders were not only 
welcomed to areas located in modern Southern Africa but that integration between 
foreign traders and locals was sufficiently intimate and sustained long enough to 
produce shared values.150 Therefore, Southern African precolonial history shows no 
evidence of coastal discriminatory practices. Similarly, nothing suggests that Arab 
traders or local traders or both as an amalgamation sought to exclude others from 
coastal routes. Therefore, cabotage does not appear to have been practised over this 
period.  
 
147 A joint venture that started in 2008 with Calulo Services (Pty) Ltd. 
148 Unicorn Bunkers, available at http://www.grindrod.co.za/Company/28/Unicorn-Bunkers. (Accessed 
21 July 2017). 
149 The company operates three South African registered vessels; two service BP/Engen in Durban and 
the third vessel services Astron Energy in Cape Town. See https:/linsennambi.com/about-bunker-
services, accessed 17 February 2020. 
150 Swahili became a coastal trader’s language that flourished since then. Today Swahili has its own news 
channel on BBC NEWS, available at https://www.bbc.com/swahili/dira-tv-48275890. (Accessed 17 May 
2019). 
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The arrival of the Dutch during the 17th century may have expanded trade along the 
coast, especially the slave trade. However, vessels of various flags plied the Southern 
African coast equally exposed to capture, cargo theft, piracy and other plundering 
methods of the time. There were no restrictions with regard to who might trade on the 
coast apart from European territorial conquests between the Dutch, the English and the 
Portuguese, which determined who ruled the conquered coast and who was excluded. 
British colonisation of the Cape led to the development of predominantly English 
coastal settlements. British domination spread from the southernmost tip of Africa 
further into the interior and paved the way for the development of coastal shipping 
fleets, ports, and other coastal infrastructure. The chapter shows a chronological 
development of the coast and features the dominant characters. It also highlights events 
that shaped coastal shipping such as economic downturns, market crashes, World Wars, 
government-sanctioned anti-coastal shipping policies and a political climate averse to 
trade and other coastal development. The entire development was almost exclusively 
driven by British men loyal to England. It was not driven by locals for the development 
of South Africa. 
It is important to note that British policy151 over this period was that cargo to and from 
British Colonies had to be carried on British vessels.152 The effect of this was that all 
cargo to or from the Cape and Natal was exclusively reserved for carriage by British 
fleets. Therefore, it was British colonisation of South Africa that introduced cabotage 
on the coast. However, Natal attempted colonial cabotage towards the middle of the 
19th century. The colony wanted to see local cargo carried exclusively by local vessels. 
The attempt resulted in the formation of D’Urban Shipping Company. However, efforts 
for this exclusivity amounted to naught. After that, cabotage never really took root in 
the colonies.  
The chapter then tracks coastal shipping at the end of colonial South Africa. It has been 
pointed out that at the beginning of the 18th century, Britain was one of the sea powers 
 
151 Navigation Acts applied between 1651 and 1853 and the Merchant Shipping Act of 1869. For a full 
treatise, see Bruce Farthing International Shipping: An Introduction to the Policies, Politics and 
Institutions of the Maritime World (1987). See also A. Berriedale Keith ‘Merchant Shipping Legislation 
in the Colonies’ Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation 
Vol. 9, No. 2 (1908), pp. 202-222 (21 pages). 
152 It is therefore unsurprising that a voyage from the Cape to Britain was known as the “homebound” 
voyage because a vessel bound for Britain was going home, where it was flagged. 
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but that at the end of the century, Britain “was the sea power”.153 It was from this 
position of strength that Britain abandoned cabotage and any form of coastal restrictions 
during the middle of the 19th century. British shipowners wanted freedom to trade with 
vessels from anywhere.154  
Expansion of dominance over coastal colonies was thereafter practised without any 
policy restrictions, through pure market control. This dominance meant that on 
becoming independent at the beginning of the 20th century, the Union had to rely on a 
variety of international fleets operating in a market environment controlled by the 
British. For the coast, British control of international carriage predicated British control 
of coastal transshipments. The Union’s OFA contracts bound it to internationally-
flagged fleets that also controlled coastal transshipments, particularly between colonies. 
In the process the Union acquiesced in the suppression of local coasters.  
The Union had no room to suggest policies that would restrict coastal access to 
international vessels. Therefore, once Britain had abandoned coastal restrictions, its 
former colony, which did not have shipping capacity, could not advocate cabotage. The 
Union instead implemented stifling policies and tariff structures that deliberately 
undermined coastal shipping (such as the SCRR) which were introduced early in the 
19th century and subsisted well into the middle of the century. These policies were 
ruinous to coastal enterprises owned by South Africans.  
The new Republic of South Africa was formed in the 1960s. Like the Union before it, 
the Republic did not promote coastal shipping. Instead it focused its energy on 
supporting its hinterland developmental policies in favour of rail while actively 
suppressing coastal shipping and other modes of transport. Hopes of a South African-
owned coastal fleet were raised when Safmarine bought Thesens in 1967. However, 
Safmarine soon after sold Thesens for a share in Unicorn Shipping. South African 
coastal shipping history leading up the late 1970s shows that the country never had an 
appetite for cabotage. Cabotage practice introduced by the British at the beginning of 
the 19th century (as reflected in the Navigation Acts and subsequently in the Merchant 
Shipping Act of 1869) was abolished and replaced by British market-share control in a 
new, restriction-free coastal environment. 
 
153 Farthing (note 152) 10. 
154 Ibid. 
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Section B of the chapter covers coastal shipping history over the modern era at the 
beginning of a containerised shipping. During this period the presence of international 
vessels on the South African coast (which were increasingly non-British) was a familiar 
sight. These vessels utilised Durban as the terminal port, where cargo would then be 
transshipped to destination ports along the African seaboard. Over the next two decades 
transshipment services operated through feeder operations saw significant growth in 
coastal shipping.  
Unicorn Lines dominated coastal services and feeder services after its coastal business 
take-over bid during 1966 to 1983. However, the government exercised cargo 
reservation over state cargo, particularly coal, which was only carried by SAR ships. 
Lack of demand for coal led to the demise of SAR ships. Unicorn Lines became the 
only coastal operator from 1985. From then, South African coastal shipping was 
characterised by Unicorn Lines’ rise to prominence as a single coaster which saw the 
company with a fleet of 19 ships and listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 
1986 under its new parent company, Grindrod.  
In the new millennium Unicorn Lines had to contend with the effects of economic 
sanctions, global recession and the abolition of the road permit system, which trimmed 
company revenues. Grindrod moved its core operations offshore, thus removing its 
vessels from the South African register. However, Grindrod continued to ply its trade 
on the coast and expanded its operations further up the west coast to Luanda and up the 
east coast to Kenya.  
The positivity that came with a new political dispensation in 1994 generally stimulated 
trade and coastal cargo. However, the Unicorn Lines coastal fleet did not return to the 
South African register. No new ship-owning enterprises have emerged either to join or 
to compete with Grindrod since then. Currently Grindrod maintains its presence on the 
coast through OACL and Unicorn Shipping. Unicorn Lines flags the fleet of about 42 
vessels under its control in jurisdictions where favourable employment and convenient 
operating conditions exist. Similarly, the OACL fleet is not registered in South Africa. 
In the context of this study, it must be borne in mind that Grindrod’s continued ability 
to trade on the coast using a fleet that is not registered in South Africa and the freedom 
afforded other foreign-flagged vessels to operate on the coast continues by virtue of the 
fact that there is no cabotage in South Africa. Therefore, the government seeks to 
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reserve coastal trade to South African-registered ships. This premise forms the basis for 
cabotage, which is central to the South African maritime policy.  
The history of coastal shipping provides a canvas against which the development of 
maritime policy in South Africa ought to be understood. It also shows why South Africa 
has not adopted cabotage over the years. The effect of the absence of a domestically-
registered fleet lies at the core of the reasons for the government’s eagerness to change 




DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL COASTAL POLICY  
This chapter deals with the development of South African maritime policy. It evaluates 
regional and continental instruments that influence this development. The discussion 
regarding regional and continental instruments encapsulates the interplay between 
domestic and regional trade policy, particularly over the SADC region. This interplay 
becomes more apparent in the next chapter, which covers movement of domestic and 
regional cargo. 
This chapter deals with policy development in two phases. The first phase deals with 
domestic developments over the period 1996 to 2018. Advances made in developing 
policy over this period will be traced chronologically through the following 
documentary instruments: 
• National Transport Policy (White Paper) 1996 
• Draft Maritime Policy 2009 and 2010 
• Review Report on the South African Maritime Transport Policy 
• Green Paper 2015 
• Draft Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy 
• Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy, 2017 
• Draft Merchant Shipping Act 2018. 
The second phase of the chapter deals with regional and continental policies pertinent 
to domestic cabotage. A discussion of these policies is prompted by the fact that South 
Africa is a member of SADC and SADC is a polity of the African Union.1 As such, it 
is essential to consider South Africa’s regional and continental commitments to these 
structures insofar as they impact on cabotage. Such considerations are important, 
especially given that the AU aims to implement continental cabotage. Therefore, the 
state of affairs requires an evaluation of domestic cabotage policy in the context of 
broader regional and continental endeavours. It must be emphasised that the discussion 
in the second phase will be confined to the effects of SADC and AU instruments on 
 
1 Commonly known as the “AU”. 
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cabotage implementation in South Africa as opposed to the effects of South African 
cabotage implementation on SADC and the continent. 
3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF DOMESTIC POLICY (1996 TO 2018) 
The period immediately after the first South African democratic elections in 1994 saw 
significant policy shifts with regard to how maritime transport and coastal shipping in 
general was perceived.  The government consciously moved towards integration of 
coastal shipping into the broader transport framework to align the maritime industry to 
government’s wider national building objectives.2 
3.1.1 National Transport Policy White Paper (1996) 
The first of the government’s efforts to define coastal shipping policy under the new 
dispensation came with the National Transport Policy White Paper. 3  Perhaps to 
underscore its importance, the National Transport Policy became official policy within 
two years of the new government assuming power.  
However, the National Transport Policy paved the way for the development of transport 
strategies for all modes of the country’s transportation system and not just for shipping.  
It dealt with infrastructure, operation and control of land passenger, land freight 
transport, civil aviation, maritime transport and road traffic and safety.4  What was 
significant about this policy was that maritime transport now, unlike before, enjoyed 
parity with other modes of transport. However, its scope was wide and therefore 
provided no definitive maritime policy. Nevertheless, the National Transport Policy 
introduced or at least formalised the idea of freight services as a vehicle for social and 
economic development.5  
  
 
2 Prominent policies and frameworks of the time were the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP), the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, the Accelerated 
Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA) and programmes to aide participation in the 
economy by historically disadvantaged individuals, were all directed at socio-economic development.  
3 Referred to hereinafter as the National Transport Policy. 
4 See policy statement dealing with “Operation and control”, for instance. 
5 The National Transport Policy sought to “Provide safe, reliable, effective, efficient, and fully 
integrated transport operations and infrastructure which will best meet the needs of freight and 
passenger customers at improving levels of service and cost in a fashion which supports government 
strategies for economic and social development whilst being environmentally and economically 
sustainable”. See “Policy vision”. 
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With regard to cabotage, the National Transport Policy stated that: 
Cabotage options will be monitored in the light of changing international cabotage 
practices and attitudes. The introduction of cabotage protection legislation on an 
African continental or Southern African regional basis will be investigated.6 
Therefore, the policy does not commit to any specific position with respect to cabotage. 
However, the policy was unambiguous about the fact that a legislative framework for 
cabotage was envisaged and that such framework would consider regional and 
continental developments. 
3.1.2 Draft Maritime Policy (2009 and 2010) 
It took over a decade for drafters to deliver a policy document specific to the maritime 
industry.7 The White Paper on the South African Maritime Policy8 came in two parts. 
The first came out in 2009 and was the first draft. It provided impetus for further 
maritime policy development through stakeholder engagements. The second version, 
published in 2010, embodied industry comments and amendments to the first draft. 
However, there were no remarkable differences between the two versions. Therefore, 
for convenience, both draft versions have been dealt with as a single draft document.  
As expected, general ideals of the National Transport Policy set the tone for the Draft 
Maritime Policy and were indeed used as a platform for subsequent renditions of a more 
comprehensive maritime policy.  Therefore, the first decade of the 21st century saw 
great strides being made in the development of the first South African policy document 
intended to deal exclusively with shipping and related matters.  
The Draft Maritime Policy also emphasised regional policy developments and 
integration. It recognised the importance of the SADC Protocol on Transport, 
Communication and Meteorology, 9  which seeks to harmonise the role of coastal 
shipping and align regional cabotage practices.10  It is important to note that the SADC 
Protocol specifically requires its members to progressively remove restrictions on 
 
6 See the section dealing with “The operation of ships”. 
7 However, it must be remembered that progress was registered elsewhere. The policy resulted in the 
promulgation of the South African Maritime Safety Authority Act (SAMSA Act), 5 of 1998 and the 
revised Ship Registration Act, 58 of 1998, promulgated in the same year. 
8 The Draft Maritime Policy. 
9 Of 2006; referred to hereinafter as the “SADC Protocol”. 
10 Ibid. paragraph 3.3.2.5, 23. 
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cabotage between SADC member states and commit those, like South Africa, who do 
not prohibit cabotage by vessels registered in SADC countries to ensure the status 
quo.11 Therefore, the SADC Protocol unequivocally prohibits cabotage between its 
members. 
The Draft Maritime Policy rightly acknowledged that cabotage developments in South 
Africa “hold little promise if not sequenced with those of other SADC states or even 
those that fall under the African Maritime Transport Charter”.12  The Draft Maritime 
Policy called for cabotage development at sub-regional, regional and continental 
levels.13 As pointed out earlier, this statement undergirds the discussion in the second 
part of this chapter regarding the AU Maritime Charter.14 
At the heart of the Draft Maritime Policy was the need to re-engineer maritime business 
by ensuring that the maritime industry, both publicly and privately owned, support the 
government developmental state approach and its attributes.15 However, although clear 
on its intentions, the Draft Maritime Policy was not a comprehensive policy. It 
recognised the need for the development of other policies to deal particularly with 
cabotage amongst other issues.16  Nevertheless, the relevant policy statements left no 
doubt that cabotage implementation was among the policy’s foremost priorities 
alongside the establishment of a home-grown fleet and the establishment of regional 
corridors.17 
3.1.3 Review Report on the South African Maritime Transport Policy (2013) 
The Review Report on the South African Maritime Transport Policy18 was prepared by 
the National Maritime Policy Transport Technical Policy Committee consisting of 
various government departments, SAMSA and the Ports Regulator of South Africa, 
National Treasury and Transnet. The Maritime Report consolidated the position 
regarding policy development from the National Transport Policy in 1996 and updated 
 
11 Ibid., read with Article 8.2 of the SADC Protocol, 8/2. 
12 Ibid. paragraph 3.3.4.4. 
13 Ibid. paragraph 3.12.2.1. 
14 The African Maritime Transport Charter is an instrument of AU in which member states resolved to 
co-operate in all fields of maritime activity and to co-ordinate and harmonise their maritime policies. 
Ibid. paragraph 3.12.2 
15 Ibid. paragraph 3.17 at 68. 
16 The then National Minister of Transport described it in his foreword as “one instalment in policy 
formulation around the maritime industry and responsibilities” Ibid.   
17 Draft Maritime Policy (note 8), 5. 
18 Hereinafter referred to as the “Maritime Report”. 
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it to 2013. The Maritime Policy highlighted and emphasised what government 
considered crucial for incorporation into what would be a comprehensive maritime 
policy. 
It reiterated the government’s position as a developmental state which then undergirded 
the urgency with which the state sought the maritime industry’s collaboration to 
eradicate poverty, inequality and unemployment. Further work on the policy was done 
on the basis of what it had produced during 2009 and 2010.19 Notably the Maritime 
Report adopted the stance that the approach to maritime policy required problem 
identification through research, analysis, and consultation through quantitative and 
qualitative methods.20  The approach meant policy development would be based on 
scientific evaluations and would be conducted through stakeholder engagements. 
Cabotage would therefore not be handed down to industry as a directive; consultation 
would be a key feature in its development.   
The remainder of what the Maritime Report covered comprised iterations and useful 
expansions of the Draft Maritime Policy. However, two notable nuances are worthy of 
mention. First, the Maritime Report categorised trade into four sectors. Second, even 
more significant, the Maritime Report clearly demarcated interests which policymakers 
sought to fall under cabotage. 
3.1.3.1 Trade categories  
The Maritime Report advocated aggregation of trade into coastal, regional, continental 
and international systems.21 These were then described. A brief delineation (excluding 
International shipping) is given below in turn. 
i Coastal shipping 
The coastal system was described as any marine commercial activity conducted along 
the South African coast, including the carriage of cargo, passengers and equipment 
on board a ship from one coastal place to another coastal place in the same country.22   
 
19 Maritime Report (note 18), 8 paragraph 1.5.1.2. 
20 Ibid. 1.5.3. 
21 Ibid. 25. 
22 Ibid. 3.8.7. 
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With regard to cargo, South African vessels must be “mandated … for carrying 100% 
of all cargo movement between ports within South African borders” and alternatively 
on the basis of reciprocity. Such coastal cargo carriage must also conform to the 
requirement providing for 25.1% preferential access to BBBEE candidates.23 
The Maritime Report stated that: 
The national maritime interests linked to the transformation of the shipping industry, 
strategic control of the South African coast, broader maritime security, employment 
creation and the economic development of the region have to be the overall guiding 
principles in regard to exercising rights over the country’s coastal trade economy by 
introducing cabotage regime.24 (Underlined for emphasis.) 
The national maritime interest that cabotage should be designed for would protect a 
wide list of interests that include: 
• “Activities of exploration and exploitation or transportation of living and 
nonliving resources at sea by a South African ship from one port to another 
one within the Republic  
• Carriage of passengers by a South African ship from one port to another 
within the Republic  
• Manning of South African ships, including the training of a sea cadet, in the 
waters of the Republic”.25 
It is important to bear these coastal interests in mind.  The discussion relating to the 
draft legislation on which to implement cabotage (dealt with later) shows a 
misalignment of these interests. 
ii Regional trade 
Here, the Maritime Report expands on regional policy development and integration 
stated in the Draft Maritime Policy. It recognised that South Africa was a member of 
SADC bound to NEPAD countries and arrangements that requires institutionalised 
regional development including in relation to coastal shipping. This position in SADC 
has been formalised by the SADC Protocol, which recognises the strategic importance 
 
23 Ibid. 3.8.16.28, 33. 
24 Ibid. 3.8.12. 
25 Ibid. 3.8.14. 
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of the role of coastal shipping. The Maritime Report therefore recommended a SADC 
Regional Coastal Shipping System that is in line with the AU Maritime Charter and 
AIMS.26 
iii Continental trading  
The Maritime Report highlighted Africa’s reliance on “outside” trade and lamented the 
lack of intra-Africa trade which averages about 10 percent of total trade.27 It called for 
a coastal shipping system that recognises a Combined Maritime Zone of Africa 
(commonly referred to as the CEMZA) in line with the AU Maritime Charter. This 
implied an intention to implement cabotage, as the name suggests, over the entire 
African coast.  
Having consolidated the position of the Draft Maritime Policy and having been more 
specific on the basis of the maritime policy, work progressed to produce a 
comprehensive maritime policy. A comprehensive draft came out only in 2015. In the 
intervening period, government introduced Operation Phakisa in August 2014, which 
many confused with a maritime policy. Operation Phakisa was a delivery action plan. 
It was a strategy intended to fast track implementation of programmes in focus areas.28 
It did not deal with coastal shipping. 
3.1.4 Green Paper on the South African Maritime Transport Policy (2015) 
The Green Paper South African Maritime Transport Policy, published in 2015,29 was 
the first attempt at providing a comprehensive maritime policy. It called for further 
development of policies including a policy on cabotage30in line with domestic, regional 
and global imperatives, bearing in mind South Africa’s commitment to SADC and the 
AU.31 In particular, the Green Paper sought to establish a framework through which to 
 
26 AIMS refers to the Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050. 
27 Maritime Report (note 18), 32. 
28 The focus areas were: Marine Transport and Manufacturing, Offshore Oil and Gas, Aquaculture and 
Marine Protection Services and Ocean Governance. Refer to Report on Operation Phakisa 
Implementation (report by State President to media and stakeholders) (13 August 2015). 
29 Hereinafter referred to as the “Green Paper”. 
30 The Green Paper (note 29) incorrectly defined “cabotage” as the “transport of cargo between the ports 
of a country in a ship registered in another country”. See definitions vii. 
31 Green Paper (note 29) Executive Summary x. 
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investigate how coastal and regional shipping can be used as a vehicle for economic 
development and trade facilitation to achieve the ideals of the AU Maritime Charter.32 
The Green Paper stated that the main objective was “to ensure a level playing field for 
South African shipowners and operators against foreign competition and to attract both 
domestic and foreign investment in the local maritime industry”. Pivotal to this 
objective was the development of cabotage and related policies. Specific cargo was the 
target for cabotage, namely sugar, paper and petrochemicals carried by tank 
containers.33 
Furthermore, the Green Paper for the first time made a distinction between genuine 
coastal services and feeder services. It advocated for the promotion of regional and 
continental coastal shipping services in a similar way to domestic coastal services. The 
idea was to promote cabotage to control all African shipping services other than feeder 
services through bilateral or multilateral agreements with African countries that trade 
with South Africa.34 These trades would operate on the UNCTAD model of 40:40:20.35  
Notably, the Green Paper makes four important points: 
• Cabotage and other restrictions are proposed whenever measures to promote a 
shipping industry in South Africa are under discussion. Such proposals tend to 
undermine practical proposals that could be implemented to benefit the 
industry. 
• There is not much domestic cargo that could move as cabotage.  
• The exclusive use of South African-flagged vessels for cabotage is likely to 
result in a loss of domestic production to foreign imports, as most of it is 
locally-produced sugar moving from Durban to Cape Town, and cabotage 
restrictions could raise the shipping costs sufficiently to render imports less 
expensive.   
• There is no South African-flagged fleet to carry cabotage cargo, particularly if 
cabotage includes feeder cargo.  
 
32 Ibid. 
33 Green Paper (note 29) 27. 
34 Ibid. 34. 
35 See Policy statement 115. 
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Where cabotage includes feeder cargo, the cost of “feedering” imports and exports 
would surely rise, especially because liner companies would in all likelihood divert 
feedering to elsewhere outside the South African coast.36  
Insofar as the objectives of the policy are directed at socio economic upliftment, the 
above pointed to the counterproductive nature of cabotage implementation. Therefore, 
government undertook a feasibility study to deal with this and other issues. 
3.1.5 Draft Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy 
The proposed Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy for South Africa, also known 
as the Maritime Passage of Hope and Development, was published in 2016.37 Perhaps 
in an effort to cure the defect of its predecessor, the Draft CMTP defined cabotage as a 
“trade transit of a foreign vessel along the coast (cabotage trading), from one port to 
another within the territorial limits of a single nation”. However, the inclusion of 
“transit of a foreign vessel” left the definition wanting.  
Cabotage definition was further conflated by the definition of “coastal shipping”, which 
includes “the carriage of cargo by a ship from one place in the Republic … to any other 
place in the Republic … either directly or  through a place outside the Republic … 
provided that this shall not apply to cargo which is consigned on a through bill of lading 
to or from a port outside the Republic and is unloaded at a port within the Republic for 
transshipment purposes only”. 
The Draft CMTP called for: 
• A statutory framework to regulate coastal shipping through cabotage; 
• Registration of vessels on a preferential basis for the creation of a South 
African fleet to be primarily used for cabotage; 
• A licensing regime to regulate coastal cargo carriage and coastal services 
along the coast on an incentivised basis; 
• Such framework to be part of a long-term strategy to promote South African 
ship ownership to serve national and regional economy.38 
 
36 Green Paper (note 29), 36. 
37 Hereinafter referred to as the “Draft CMTP”. 
38 Draft CMTP (note 37), 60. 
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With regard to regional and continental commitments, the Draft CMTP proposed a 
collaborative approach between South Africa and other regional structures to establish 
common standards for the alignment of the SADC Protocol and AU Maritime Charter 
systems with regards to cabotage. 
The Draft CMTP released a plan for the establishment of a legislative review and a 
cabotage framework for a “phased in cabotage restriction” to commence within five 
years.39 
3.1.6 Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy  
The Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy for South Africa40 was gazetted in June 
2017.41 The work that commenced with the National Transport Policy in 1996 finally 
produced the first South African maritime policy. The CMTP defines itself as that 
“component of national policy relating to all forms of transport by sea … concerned 
with creating the conditions for a safe, secure and stable environment within which all 
national maritime assets can develop and be utilised for the socio-economic growth and 
prosperity of the nation whilst being of service to international shipping and trade”. 
The CMTP clearly defines cabotage as “trade transit of a vessel along the coast 
(cabotage trading), from one port to another within the territorial limits of a single 
nation.” However, cabotage does not apply to cargo discharged in a domestic port for 
transshipment to ports outside of South Africa.42 Therefore, feeder cargo consigned on 
a through bill of lading will similarly not form part of cabotage cargo. 
Policy statements clearly emphasise the development of a regulatory and legislative 
framework for cabotage and the introduction of “cabotage restrictions on coastal 
shipping as part of a long-term strategy to promote South African ship ownership to 
serve the national and regional economy”.43  It is also envisaged that movement of 
cargo along the coast will be conducted on the basis of a prescribed licensing regime 
 
39 Ibid. 121. 
40 The final policy retained the name “Maritime Passage of Hope and Development” introduced at draft 
stage. It is referred to hereinafter as the “CMTP”. 
41 Government Gazette 40904.  
42 CMTP (note 40) 4. 
43 Ibid. 48. 
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which will grant the designated national carrier preferential treatment in the use of port 
facilities.44  
With regard to the region and continent, the CMTP commits South Africa to SADC 
and the AU Maritime Charter through the Association of Maritime Administrations 
whose aim is to promote and foster collaboration among African Maritime Authorities 
on a variety of initiatives including implementation and monitoring African cabotage.45 
The schedule to the CMTP shows that the plan is for South Africa to commence phased-
in cabotage in 2022.46 
3.1.7 Draft Merchant Shipping Act 2018 
The Draft Merchant Shipping Act 2018 (Draft MSA) is discussed here as a policy 
offspring of the CMTP.  It proposes various amendments to the Merchant Shipping Act 
57 of 1951. This section deals only with the main provisions of the Draft MSA pertinent 
to cabotage.  
The Draft MSA makes it abundantly clear that only South African-owned ships can be 
involved in cabotage trades. Section 62 states: “No ship, other than a South African-
owned ship, is permitted to engage in coastwise traffic”. The definition of “coasting 
ship” is a “… ship employed in plying between ports in the same country but does not 
include any fishing vessel …”.  In terms of the CMTP such vessel will be engaged in 
cabotage trade. 
Notably, involvement of foreign interests in coastal shipping has not been precluded. 
The language used suggests foreign participation on the basis of minority 
shareholding.47  The trade over which the restriction applies covers all routes and all 
activities relating to loading and discharge of in the range of ports between Richards 
Bay and Port Nolloth.  
Section 63 proposes licensing of vessels involved in cabotage trade, referred to as 
“coastwise traffic”, a term which has been given a corresponding meaning to “coasting 
ship”. Section 63(1) states: 
 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 23. 
46 Ibid. 111. 
47 See section 14 of the Draft MSA. 
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The owner or the master of a South African-owned coasting ship engaged in 
coastwise traffic or of a prescribed ship, shall be in possession of a licence issued to 
him or her in terms of this Act by the Authority. 
Therefore, coasting ships can engage in cabotage only under license issued by SAMSA. 
The licence will be issued only in respect of South African-owned ships. Section 
61(2)(b) specifically states that a foreign vessel is not a coasting ship: 
… although bound for one or more intermediate ports in the Republic … nor shall its 
voyage between ports in the Republic be deemed coastwise traffic. 
To conclude, the development of domestic policy in respect of coastal shipping 
shows that South Africa is poised to implement cabotage under a comprehensive 
policy that has been progressively developed over two decades from 1996 to 2018. 
However, the discussion shows that cabotage implementation as gleaned from the 
Draft MSA does not necessarily reflect the CMTP’s cabotage ambitions. This issue 
is canvassed further in chapter 8. 
3.2 REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL POLICIES  
This section broadly assesses SADC and AU instruments that influence the 
development of South African coastal shipping policy. To avoid redundancies, this 
section will deal only with policy-related matters. It does not deal with cargo-related 
matters, which will be dealt with in the following chapter. 
A proper context for SADC cabotage requires a brief overview of the AU maritime 
policy position and the proposed integration of the continent through Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) and the role of the RECs as regional extensions of the 
AU.  
3.2.1 AU maritime instruments  
The starting point for any meaningful discussion of cabotage in Africa requires an 
understanding of the role of the AU as the overarching body driving cabotage in the 
continent through its regional structures. An overview of how the AU implements its 
programmes in the regions is therefore important as it provides context for SADC 
regional cabotage and for domestic policies such as the South African CMTP and any 
legislation derived from it.  
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The AU position on maritime transport integration in general and on cabotage in 
particular is derived from two AU instruments, namely the Revised African Maritime 
Transport Charter 2010 (AU Maritime Charter) and the Africa Integrated Maritime 
Strategy 2050 (AIMS 2050). 
3.2.2 The AU Maritime Charter 
The main objective of the first instrument, the AU Maritime Charter, is to set out a clear 
path for maritime transport in Africa and the structuring of coherent policies that would 
ensure sustainable growth and development of African trading vessels. 48  Other 
objectives 49  seem ancillary to the prioritisation of developing a robust African 
merchant fleet. A corollary of this objective is the advancement of African coastal 
trades in which the African merchant fleet will operate.  
As part of the implementation process, the AU Maritime Charter emphasises the need 
to establish regional and sub-regional purpose-driven organisations that will focus on 
maritime transport, inland waterways and port operations. It places an obligation on 
member states to form these organisations without delay.50 
3.2.3 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 (AIMS 2050) 
The second instrument, the AIMS 2050, “provides a broad framework for the protection 
and sustainable exploitation of the African Maritime Domain for wealth creation”.51  
The framework acts as a tool through which the AU seeks to address Africa’s maritime 
challenges for sustainable development and competitiveness.52  The idea is to integrate 
and direct collective resources to foster wealth creation through the exploitation of 
oceans, seas and inland waterways falling within the African domain. 
 
48 Chapter II Article 3 of the AU Maritime Charter. 
49 There are twelve other objectives stipulated in the Charter (note 48). 
50 Chapter III Article 6 of the Charter (note 48). A number of these organisations are not directly 
affiliated to the AU.  However, they operate on the basis of a regional mandate within SADC, for 
instance, as the Southern REC. A typical example is the Port Management Association of Eastern and 
Southern African PMAESA chaired by Namibia. The organisation focuses on integrated strategies for 
greater port productivity within SADC and for integration SADC strategies with those of other RECs. 
For further details see Namibian Ports Authority Group Annual Report 2016-2017, available at 
https://www.namport.com.na/files/files/2016_2017%20Namport%20Annual%20Report(1).pdf. 
(Accessed 16 October 2018). 
51 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) 10. 
52 Ibid. 
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In this context, some of the AU instruments use the term “Trans-African Cabotage” to 
refer to proposed cabotage between regions. The AU Maritime Charter, for instance, 
defines Trans-African Cabotage as “the exercise of maritime transport and related 
activities between Member States [of the African Union]”.53 
3.2.4 AU regional agenda 
Regional cabotage by its very nature operates only as a collaborative effort of several 
autonomous jurisdictions. In Africa, the responsibility of ensuring fruition of these 
collaborative efforts rests with the AU as the body that is responsible, in particular, for 
coordinating regional maritime transport. AU statutes delineate five African regions, 
namely the Northern, Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Regions.54  
In the aggregate, these five regions are comprised of 55 AU member states. As part of 
the AU agenda to drive African maritime integration, the AU formed the African 
Economic Community (AEC) to govern the overall development of the continent. The 
AEC in turn established RECs as a means of delivering on the AU objectives in each 
region. With regard to maritime matters, the AU places an obligation on RECs to 
develop, coordinate and harmonise maritime policies and strategies.  RECs work 
closely with one another and with the AU, which uses them as building blocks for 
implementation of its programmes regionally with the eventual objective of integrating 
the economy of the whole continent.55  The number of RECs is more than the number 
of African regions because RECs are not confined to the geography of their statutory 
regions. Room has been left for the development of new RECs and for consolidation of 
existing ones. 
There are currently eight RECs. 
• THE ARAB MAGHREB UNION (UMA). Its member states are Algeria, 
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.56  The UMA is not a signatory to 
 
53 See the Charter (note 48) definitions at 2–4. What is in the square brackets contain own additions.  
54 These were established in terms of the African Union’s Resolution CM/Res.464 (XXVI). 
55 See AU 50th Solemn Declaration, for instance, available at 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31464-file-50th_anniversary_solemn_declaration_en.pdf. 
(Accessed 6 October 2018). 
56 AMU – Arab Maghreb Union, available at https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/amu-arab-maghreb-
union. (Accessed 8 October 2018). 
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AU protocols, but it is a recognised functionary of the AEC in the Northern 
Africa region.57 
• THE COMMON MARKET FOR EASTERN AND SOUTHERN 
AFRICA (COMESA). COMESA has 21 member states. These are Burundi, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Egypt, Kingdom 
of Eswatini, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe.58 
• THE COMMUNITY OF SAHEL-SAHARAN STATES (CEN-SAD). The 
CEN-SAD consists of 24 states; Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African 
Republic, Chad, the Comoros Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, the 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia.59 
• THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY (EAC) is made up of the Republic 
of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
and the Republic of Uganda.60 
• THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES 
(ECCAS) members are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao 
Tome and Principe.61 
• THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES 
(ECOWAS) consists of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, 
Burkina Faso and Cabo Verde as its member states.62 
 
57 African Union: Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (nd), available at 
https://au.int/en/organs/recs. (Accessed 8 October 2018). 
58 COMESA Members States (nd), available at http://www.comesa.int/comesa-members-states/. 
(Accessed 8 October 2018). 
59 CEN-SAD – The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (nd), available at 
https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/cen-sad-community-sahel-saharan-states. (Accessed 8 October 
2018). 
60 Overview of EAC: About EAC (nd), available at https://www.eac.int/overview-of-eac. (Accessed 
8 October 2018). 
61 ECCAS – Economic Community of Central Africa (nd), available at 
https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/eccas-economic-community-central-african-states. (Accessed 
8 October 2018). 
62 From an ECOWAS of States to an ECOWAS of Peoples Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) (nd), available at http://www.ecowas.int/member-states/. (Accessed 8 October 
2018). 
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• THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT 
(IGAD). IGAD member states are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, 
Somalia, the Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda.63 
• THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
(SADC). Member states in SADC are Angola, Botswana, Comoros, DRC, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, eSwatini, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe.64 
The Abuja Treaty (1991), the AU Constitutive Act and the AU Protocol on Relations 
Between the African Economic Community and the Regional Economic Communities, 
2008 (AU Protocol), in particular, regulate the relationship between the AU and 
RECs.65 The mandate given by these instruments allows the AU to enforce execution 
of the objectives of the AU Maritime Charter and implementation of the AIMS 2050 in 
SADC and in other RECs.  
3.3 SADC REC STATUS   
SADC was originally formed in 1980 in Zambia as the SADCC, an acronym for 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference.66 It was reconstituted into its 
current form in the early 1990s after Namibia and South Africa joined the group in 1992 
and 1994, respectively. 67   The Treaty of the Southern African Development 
Community, 199268 is its founding document. The SADC Treaty can be enforced in 
member states because SADC possesses “legal capacity as is necessary for the proper 
exercise of its functions”69 to deal with its members in their territories. Figure 3.1 below 
shows SADC member countries. 
 
 
63 The IGAD Region: The Geography of the Region (nd), available at https://igad.int/about-us/the-igad-
region. (Accessed 8 October 2018). 
64 Member States (2012), available at https://www.sadc.int/member-states/. (Accessed 8 October 2018). 
65 African Union (note 57). 
66 The SADCC’s aim was to wean its members off economic dependence on Apartheid South Africa 
and to enhance regional integration. See Southern African Development Community (2012), available 
at https://www.sadc.int/themes/economic-development/. (Accessed 19 October 2018). 
67 Members of the SADCC were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.  
68 Referred to hereinafter as the ‘SADC Treaty’. 
69 See Article 3 dealing with the legal status of the SADC Treaty (note 68), in particular, Article 3(2). 
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Figure 3.1: SADC Member states 
(Source: SADC.org) 
3.3.1 SADC Protocol 
While the SADC Treaty forms the legal basis of all SADC law in general, the Protocol 
on Transport, Communications and Meteorology in the Southern African community 
region 199670 specifically undergirds SADC cabotage. The SADC Protocol obliges 
member states to recognise that “they are all members of the African Economic 
Community bound to implement this Protocol in accordance with its principles”.71 The 
SADC Protocol serves as a policy and regulatory framework designed to nurture an 
efficient, reliable, cost-effective, environmentally responsible and economically 
sustainable integrated transport system.72 The authority of this instrument points to the 
fact that the success of domestic maritime policies such as the South African CMTP 
 
70 The Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology in the Southern African Community 
Region 1996 (SADC Protocol) was signed 1996 in Lesotho on 24 August 1996. 
71 The preamble requires SADC states to be mindful of the protocols they have concluded and that will 
in future be signed.  For further details see SADC Protocol (note 70) 1. 
72 Article 2.3 of the SADC Protocol (note 70). 
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will, in the long run, be achieved only if such domestic policies remain compatible with 
broader policy frameworks of the REC, AEC and ultimately the AU. 
The SADC Protocol regulates transport, communications and meteorology. Its text is 
accordingly presented in three parts.73 This discussion, however, looks only at the part 
dealing with maritime transport and inland waterways (chapter 8 of the SADC Protocol) 
and ignores the other parts.   
The SADC Protocol has a wide scope of application that comprises the entirety of the 
transport sector in each member state. 74  Its main objective is to promote regional 
economic development. 75 The attainment of this objective requires the development of 
a harmonised maritime and inland waterways transport policy to achieve a collective 
approach regarding relevant concepts.  
Areas in which member states align policies and develop common understanding relate 
inter alia to:  
• Shipping and port policy; 
• Promotion of ship ownership as a base for the establishment of a viable SADC 
merchant fleet industry;  
• Enhanced use of coastal shipping and feeder services for the region;  
• Encouragement of joint ventures and alliances between ship owners to 
improve economies of scale within the region; 
• Sale of bulk regional cargo on CIF basis; and  
• Promotion of efficiency in maritime transport along individual coasts.76 
What the SADC Protocol envisages is the establishment of a strong regional shipping 
industry based on combined tonnages (both public and private) of its members, who 
will trade freely on each other’s coasts. Member states that already have cabotage 
restrictions have bound themselves to grant access to vessels of other member states. 
 
73 It consists of twelve chapters. The text of the first two chapters contains definitions and introductory 
information and sets the tone of the framework. The three regulatory divisions are transport (chapters 3 
to 9), communications (chapters 10 to 11) and meteorology (chapter 12). Maritime and Inland 
Waterways Transport is dealt with in chapter 8 65. 
74 See Article 2.1. 
75 Article 8.1 65. 
76 Article 8.2. 
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Similarly, members whose cabotage practices do not exclude coastal participation of 
other member states have bound themselves to maintaining the status quo.77   
Furthermore, any country or region that refuses SADC vessels access into their trades 
will also not be allowed to trade in SADC, while a country or region that grants access 
to SADC vessels will likewise be granted access to SADC coastal trades.78 The SADC 
Protocol arrangement suggests regional cabotage will impose no restrictions between 
its members and that vessels foreign to SADC will be dealt with purely on the basis of 
reciprocity. In the event that SADC vessels are not permitted cabotage trade, for 
instance in the EU, EU vessels will be excluded from cabotage trades in SADC. This 
means EU vessels, in this example, would be allowed to load cargo in SADC only 
where such cargo is destined for ports outside SADC. Alternatively, such vessels may 
discharge SADC cargo loaded outside the region.  
In conclusion, the tone (if not the letter) of the regional and continental policy 
environment subjects domestic cabotage policies to SADC and AU cabotage 
imperatives. The implication is that South African domestic cabotage as expressed in 
the CMTP and as proposed in the Draft MSA will be exposed to SADC and African 
cabotage in the event of any misalignment. Cabotage in South Africa cannot exist 
outside of these instruments. A glaring omission therefore seems to be the fact that, 
apart from acknowledging these instruments, neither the CMTP nor the proposed 
implementation framework (presented by the Draft MSA) gives full weight to the 
binding nature of the AU and SADC instruments. The prime example of this shows in 
the fact that, in direct conflict with the SADC Protocol, the domestic position is that 
African-registered vessels will be excluded from participating in South African 
cabotage trades. The domestic cabotage position offers no reprieve for AU registered 
vessels and in turn predicates the exclusion of South Africa from the SADC and Trans-
African cabotage trades. Domestic cabotage policy adamantly reserves cabotage trades 
solely for South African-registered fleets on the basis of a licence. However, the Draft 
MSA suggests that transiting African-flagged vessels, along with other foreign vessels, 
may have some access to trade on the South African coast. At the heart of the domestic 
 
77 Article 8.2.2 and 8.2.3  
78 Article 8.2.4 and 8.2.5. 
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policy conundrum is the fact that AU member vessels will not be treated any differently 
from other vessels registered outside the African continent. 
3.4 CONCLUSION  
The chapter dealt with policy development in two phases. First it dealt with domestic 
instruments that have driven policy development and thereafter considered the 
influence of AU and SADC instruments on policy development. On the domestic front, 
the chapter showed development of the South African coastal shipping policy from 
inception in 1996 to finalisation about two years ago. The development involved a 
consultative process in which government released to the public a series of draft 
policies and other documents for comment over a period of about 20 years which 
eventually culminated in the CMTP in 2018. The CMTP is a document which, for the 
first time, comprehensively deals exclusively with South African maritime policy. As 
the first step towards cabotage implementation, the Draft MSA was then published in 
2018. The Draft MSA proposes reservation of cabotage trades to South African-
registered fleets on the basis of a licence. However, the proposal suggests that transiting 
foreign vessels will still be allowed to trade along the coast and that foreign-flagged 
vessels may do so without a licence.  
The chapter thereafter evaluated continental and regional instruments. The conclusion 
derived from these instruments gives context for the South African coastal policy. 
These instruments are binding on South Africa. Therefore, it was crucial and will 
remain necessary for South Africa to align its position with its AU commitments 
(particularly with respect to the AU Maritime Charter and AIMS 2050), SADC Protocol 
and other regional development initiatives such as the New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) and protocols binding it to other structures. 79   Further, 
obligations also arise under the Southern African Customs Union80 and from bilateral 
 
Clause 95 in particular states: “As a Regional Economic Community (REC) SADC complements the 
AU in the Southern region of Africa, driving the regional integration agenda. Accordingly, SADC co- 
operates on all matters, including maritime, with other RECs in the continent such as the East African 
Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)”. 
79  See CMTP (note 40) clauses 90 to 98 20 and 21 for further details. 
80 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), as the name suggests, is a customs union of five 
Southern African countries, namely Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. See 
Free Trade Agreements (EFTA) (1 May 2008), available at http://www.efta.int/free-trade/free-trade-
agreements/sacu. (Accessed 19 October 2018). 
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and multilateral arrangements with the Indian Ocean Rim and the South Atlantic 
organisations. 
Therefore, the CMTP and indeed the legislative framework flowing from it must 
conform to AU and SADC instruments. The CMTP was developed domestically and 
largely crafted for domestic usage. However, its objective will be validly implemented 
only to the extent that it complies with SADC aspirations. 
The following chapter deals with domestic and regional cargo movement. SADC trade, 
in particular, further highlights the importance of integrating regional cabotage trades 




THE ROLE OF CARGO IN COASTAL TRADES 
Sustainability of any trade route and, consequently, its success largely depends on the 
availability of cargo. It follows that any proposal to implement cabotage requires an 
assessment of cargo availability on the routes in which cabotage will apply. Policy 
indications are that cabotage will apply either within South Africa in the range between 
Richards Bay and Saldanha Bay or, if applied regionally, within the range of SADC 
between Angola in the west and Tanzania to the east. 
The policy neither states the routes nor identifies the cargo or cargo sources that will 
drive cabotage within South Africa or in the region.  This chapter therefore seeks to 
evaluate the current state of the coastal cargo base in South Africa and on a broader 
SADC port range to determine whether existing coastal cargo patterns point towards 
any cargo as the potential driver for successful cabotage implementation. It is important 
to note that in the context of cabotage context “cargo” has been defined to exclude 
passengers. (See Chapter 3 at 3.1.7). 
In the attempt to appraise coastal cargo, the chapter will evaluate the major routes and 
cargo carried domestically by analysing TNPA port statistics and, on a wider regional 
base, the chapter will assess statistical data provided by dominant coastal and regional 
operators. South Africa has no navigable inland waterways. They do not form part of 
formal trade patterns in SADC. As such they have been excluded. Therefore the 
discussion on cabotage cargo only relates to seaborne trade. 
4.1 COASTAL ROUTES AND COASTAL SERVICES 
South Africa does not have islands or navigable inland waters. Therefore the study of 
cargo routes exclusively focuses on domestic cargo movements along the coast between 
Richards Bay and Saldanha. Similarly, the assessment of regional cabotage does not 
include inland waters. It covers the coast in the range of ports between Luanda and Dar 
es Salaam including the island ports of Reunion, Mauritius and Madagascar. However, 
services on the southern African coastal region are concentrated principally between 
Mozambique and Angola. The effective set of ports on which the appraisal anchors 
therefore lies between Beira and Namibe. Instances of significant coastal activities 
outside these boundaries exist and will be specified. The main coastal route in the set 
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runs between Durban and Walvis Bay. Grindrod, through its wholly-owned subsidiary,1 
Ocean Africa Container Lines, (OACL), continues to dominate domestic coastal routes, 
a market Unicorn Lines (as it was then known) had cornered successful. OACL 
provides a coastal domestic and regional containerised sea freight service as well as a 
dedicated coastal feeder service for international carriers.2   
4.1.1 Container and breakbulk services 
OACL operates a scheduled containerised service on the Southern African coast using 
three vessels3 on a fortnightly basis. These vessels have a capacity to carry about 1 100 
TEUs (Twenty-foot Equivalent Units).4 All three vessels have an additional capacity to 
carry breakbulk cargo of about 4 500 tons, depending on the type of cargo (weight, 
dimensions and packaging) and the ship’s gear capacity required on board, among other 
factors.  
In 2012 OACL inaugurated a service between Nacala and Luanda.5 As a result of erratic 
cargo supplies, operations were subsequently truncated to the port range between Beira6 
and Namibe.7 In order to improve efficiencies, optimise space utilisation and minimise 
the effects of trade imbalances, coastal vessels do not call at all consecutive ports in 
both directions. Actual calls at some ports may be subject to inducement.  On a typical 
voyage from east to west, vessels call at Beira, Durban, Cape Town and Namibe. On 
the return voyage vessels leave Namibe and call at the two Namibian ports of Walvis 
Bay and Lüderitz. Thereafter vessels would call at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban, 
Maputo and Beira.8 
 
1 OACL was originally formed in partnership with Safmarine/Maersk. It was formed as a vehicle for 
feeder services. In 2012 Grindrod bought the 51% share and made OACL a wholly owned Grindrod 
subsidiary. See Grindrod Acquires the Remaining Shares in Ocean Africa Container Lines (27 August 
2012), available at http://www.grindrod.co.za/News/44/Grindrod-acquires-the-remaining-shares-in-
Ocean-Africa-Container-Lines-(OACL). (Accessed 13 December 2017). 
2 OACL data. 
3 Currently these are the Border, Barrier and Boundary, with the capacity to carry 1.162, 1.104 and 
1.112 TEUs respectively. Border and Boundary are registered in Antigua and Barbuda, while Barrier 
is registered in Madeira, Portugal. 
4 On average, that translates to about 755 TEUs of full container loads calculated at 14 metric tons (mt) 
per TEU per vessel.  However, the true determinant of the carrying capacity of these vessels is gross 
tonnage, which on average is about 11000 mt.   
5 OACL data (note 2). 
6 On a straight-line distance calculation Beira lies some 845 km south of Nacala. 
7 Namibe is located some 717 (straight-line) kilometres south of Luanda.  
8 OACL data (note 2). 
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4.1.2 Feeder services 
Coastal traffic consists of domestic, regional and feeder cargo. 9  Feeder cargo 
constitutes about 80% of total traffic moving along the coast. 10 The South Africa-
Europe Container Service (SAECS) is the major distributor of feeder cargo in the 
region. It distributes coastal feeder cargo on the basis of logistics strategies that, for 
instance, reduce costs through minimised vessel turn-around times.  
Currently OACL remains the primary common feeder operator in Southern Africa. A 
significant portion of feeder service takes place in the eastern Cape ports of Port 
Elizabeth, Ngqura and East London. In this regard, OACL provides a weekly scheduled 
service to Daimler Chrysler on behalf of the SAECS consortium. One vessel11 with the 
capacity to carry about 1 150 TEUs12 services the eastern Cape. On its westbound 
voyage, it sails directly to Port Elizabeth; while the eastbound voyage starts at Port 
Elizabeth and sails via Ngqura to arrive back at East London.13 In a similar way to 
vessels servicing other coastal routes, the vessel employed in the eastern Cape service 
has additional capacity to carry breakbulk cargo.  
Therefore, OACL leads the coastal feeder market through contractual feeder 
arrangements that enable it to adjust to the requirements of European lines. Apart from 
its general coastal domestic and regional feeder service, OACL offers a dedicated 
service to six international container shipping lines.14 Therefore, this larger portion of 
coastal feeder base remains in the exclusive hands of a single operator. 
It must be borne in mind that feeder cargo is consolidated on the basis of market 
conditions that prevail from time to time. Therefore, logistical arrangements for coastal 
feeder may be varied according to demand, risk and costs.  For this reason, it is 
foreseeable that European lines may vary logistic arrangements at any given time to 
meet prevailing conditions.  For instance, SAECS may relocate a feeder hub from 
Durban to a jurisdiction outside South Africa, such as, Maputo whenever this may be 
 
9 South African Maritime Transport Sector Study (2011).  
10 Ibid.  
11 Currently, the Horizon. 
12 That is, 909 (full container load) TEUs. 
13 OACL data (note 2). 
14 CMA, CGM, DAL, Safmarine, MOL, Maersk and Ignazio Messina. 
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deemed necessary in the event that cabotage operations increase costs or become 
generally inconvenient. Since feeder cargo cannot be entirely locally controlled, it may 
therefore not strictly speaking be considered a good candidate for South African 
cabotage. The scenario would be much more complex if regional cabotage applies. 
4.1.3 Overview of coastal tonnage  
The coast is currently serviced by a fleet of nine vessels comprising four container 
vessels and five product tankers. The fleet has a combined carrying capacity of about 
176 500 deadweight tons which includes a total carrying capacity of about 4 450 TEUs.  
An overview of domestic coastal and regional as well as feeder services appears on 
Table 4.1 below. The service involves certain ports. In the order of their appearance, 
these are Beria (BEW), Maputo (MAP), Durban (DUR), Port Elizabeth (PLZ), Cape 
Town (CT), Lüderitz, (LDZ), Walvis Bay (WVB), Namibe (NBE), NCT (Ngqura), East 
London (EL) and Mossel Bay (MZY). 
Table 4:1: Overview of coastal and regional routes and vessel deployment  






SCHEDULE   
BEW/MAP/DUR/PLZ/ 
CT/LDZ/WVB/NBE 
General cargo  3 3 x 14 000 Fortnightly 
 




Tanker services 5 3 x 16 500 +  
1 x 29 000 + 
1 x 39 000 
Monthly  
(or as per 
demand) 
(Source: Author, from OACL/Unicorn Tankers data) 
4.2 COASTAL CARGO MOVEMENT  
This section expands on the foregoing, which presented the types of coastal services, 
the amount of tonnage involved, and route activity on the Southern African coast. Focus 
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will now shift to the types of cargo that move on the different routes described above. 
Cargo appraisal on these routes will be conducted on the basis of two sources. The first 
source will be TNPA port cargo statistics, particularly in relation to the status of 
domestic coastal cargo. The second source will be the collated statistical data and other 
information obtained from coastal operators, which show regional cargo movement.  
It must be stated at the outset that TNPA cargo statistics are not, for the purposes of this 
study, sufficiently disaggregated. Coastwise cargo is stated in broad categories of bulk, 
breakbulk and containers. No further delineation has been given, for example, bulk: 
iron ore and coal, among others. In addition, it is customary for ports not to describe 
container contents.  Ports receive sealed containers and shippers are under no obligation 
to declare container contents outside recognised norms for carrying dangerous goods. 
Therefore, the container contents are not known on a commodity-specific basis.  
Furthermore, and more detrimental to the proper appraisal of coastal cargo movement, 
is the fact that TNPA data does not reveal the shipping port for landed cargo. 
Conversely, the landing port for shipped cargo is not stated. Therefore, there is no 
indication of the load port for a container discharged in Cape Town. Similarly, no 
destination port is indicated for a container loaded in Cape Town. Cargo data records 
volumes per port but only in respect of cargo landed in that particular port without any 
reference to where that cargo was shipped. Likewise, data in respect of cargo shipped 
from a particular port has no corresponding entry showing where such cargo will be 
landed.  
4.2.1 Overview of domestic coastal cargo 
TNPA statistical data presents coastal cargo in three categories of bulk, breakbulk and 
containers, as stated. It shows volumes handled in each port without any specificity 
regarding the actual type of cargo. The analysis below gives some indication of the type 
of cargo that moves along the coast.  The discussion deals first with bulk and breakbulk 
cargo (primarily bulk cargo) and thereafter proceeds to containerised cargo. The 
discussion begins by identifying sources of cargo and thereafter relates it to the volumes 
depicted in the TNPA statistical data. 
4.2.1.1 Sources of bulk cargo  
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There are four crude oil refineries located along the South African coast. They are 
controlled by a handful of oil majors. These refineries are found in Durban, Mossel Bay 
and Cape Town. There are two refineries in Durban. Engen Petroleum Limited (Engen) 
owns one and the other, SapRef, is jointly owned by Shell SA (Pty) Ltd (Shell) and BP 
Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd (BP).  PetroSA Ltd owns the refinery at Mossel Bay. Cape 
Town also has a refinery and a storage and distribution facility. Chevron South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd (Chevron) owns the refinery formerly operated by Caltex. The storage and 
distribution facility is operated by Burgan Cape Terminals (Burgan). There are other 
refineries located inland, namely Total South Africa (Total) and Sasol. To the extent 
that the study focuses on coastal cargo, inland refineries are mentioned only for the 
sake of completeness. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated by the text, inland 
refineries are irrelevant to the discussion.  
Oil majors have varying production capacities. Chevron and PetroSA produce about 
110 000 barrels per day (bpd) and 45 000 bpd respectively. PetroSA products such as 
gasoline, diesel and kerosene are shipped to East London and Port Elizabeth while the 
rest of its products are exported.15 The Sapref plant, which is a shared facility between 
Shell and BP, produces about 180 000 bpd. The bulk of its production is sold in South 
Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Namibia, while a significant amount is 
exported to the Southern African region. Over and above that, BP, in particular, also 
operates on the eastern seaboard. It distributes its products to Mozambique, Malawi and 
Tanzania.16 Engen’s capacity is in the region of 120 000 bpd.17  The company operates 
in about 30 countries, mostly situated in Africa. These include Namibia, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Kenya, and countries in Central and West Africa as well as in the 
Indian Ocean rim.18  
The total South African petrochemical production by oil majors is therefore about half 
a million barrels per day. However, it must be borne in mind that not all of this 
 
15 R.M. McLaren Towards a Contract Affreightment Basis Underlying the Maritime Transport of 
Petrochemicals in the Richards Bay–Walvis Bay Range – A Comparison of Alternative 
Combinations of Tankers (2001) University of Natal 49. 
16 Ibid. 47. 
17 South African Fuel Industry (nd) South African Petroleum Industry Association, available at 
http://www.sapia.org.za/Overview/South-African-fuel-industry. (Accessed 11 September 2017). 
18 Ibid. 44. 
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production moves by sea. Petroleum products are also moved through pipelines, rail 
and road. Pipeline volumes, however, do not have much effect on the coastal corridor.  
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4.2.1.1.1 Carriage of coastal petrochemicals 
Over many years, until 2014, Grindrod provided a significant portion of coastal services 
to the refined petroleum products industry through Unicorn Tankers. Unicorn Tankers 
operated an exclusive carriage contract with oil majors Shell, Total, Chevron and Sasol, 
which equated to about 90% of the total coastal capacity.19 The service operated on the 
basis of Unicorn Tankers as carrier or as charterer. Unicorn Tankers tonnage has 
therefore been at the forefront of the distribution of petrochemicals and refined oil 
products from sources in Durban, Mossel Bay and Cape Town to sink ports along the 
east coast such as Port Elizabeth and East London. 
However, during 2014, Unicorn Tankers ceased to be the dominant operator in the 
carriage of refined petroleum products on the coast. Oil majors have since undertaken 
the carriage of their own products themselves. This turn of events significantly trimmed 
Unicorn Tankers’ involvement in the service. Currently, the company services the coast 
on two fronts. First, it operates on its own two vessels20 of about 16 500 deadweight 
ton capacity.  However, the standard space utilisation of these vessels is about 14 000 
tons.21  This tonnage 22  services Sasol, Chevron and Total. The outward leg of the 
services is Durban/East London/Port Elizabeth/Mossel Bay/Cape Town, and the inward 
leg is Cape Town/Mossel Bay/Durban or, depending on cargo, Cape Town/Port 
Elizabeth/East London/Mossel Bay/Cape Town.  
Second, Unicorn Tankers jointly owns another vessel23 with Engen on an equal-share 
basis. This service has the following locations as sources: Engen refinery in Durban, 
PetroSA in Mossel Bay, Chevron and Burgan in Cape Town (although cargo is also 
discharged here) and Puma Energy (Pty) Ltd in Walvis Bay.  Sink ports for this cargo 
are located in East London, Port Elizabeth, Maputo (Bulk Procurement Systems), Beira, 
Dar es Salaam and Mombasa.24 The service extends to sinks of lesser demand in the 
Indian Ocean Islands and Mauritius. The westbound voyage in this route would 
typically be Durban/East London/Port Elizabeth/ Cape Town and Walvis Bay.  
 
19 Unicorn Tankers data. 
20 Currently these are Kowie and Breede. Both are flagged in Singapore. 
21 Unicorn Tankers data (note 19). 
22 Provided by the capacity of the Kowie and Breede. 
23 Berg is flagged in the United Kingdom and boasts a deadweight ton-capacity of 16 870. 
24 Unicorn Tankers data (note 19). 
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Engen operates on its own another 40 000 deadweight ton-capacity vessel 25  that 
appears on the coast from time to time. This vessel connects the services of Reliance 
Industries, India to the South African east coast and therefore cannot strictly be counted 
as part of the coastal tonnage. However, its relevance in this study is that Engen utilises 
its capacity to supplement its own coastal capacity whenever necessary.26 
Other operators in coastal carriage of refined petroleum products are Shell and BP. 
Shell currently operates on the coast with a 29 000 deadweight ton-capacity vessel,27 
while BP deploys a 39 000 deadweight ton-capacity vessel.28 
In appraising coastal tonnage, it must be borne in mind that coastal operators share 
capacity on occasions. Data from coastal operators suggests that shared capacity is 
intermittent and that it does not cause significant changes to the distribution flows given 
above. However, what may distort distribution patterns is that coastal operators also 
utilise capacity available on import vessels calling on the coast. The method is vaunted 
as being cost effective and efficient for capacity utilisation purposes.29   
Records relating to sharing arrangements and the use of import vessels are closely held 
for marketing reasons. This coastal capacity, although currently not readily 
quantifiable, possesses a cost-saving aspect that naturally promotes its continued use. 
It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that freight rates offered by such a service 
would be more attractive to the shipper than standard coastal freight rates. The 
proposition is made on the simple basis that the import vessel would already be on 
course to the shipper’s discharge port and therefore would bear only marginal cost for 
accommodating coastal cargo if the import vessel has available space. On this basis, it 
is likely that a properly evaluated impact of engaging an import vessel for coastal cargo 
would not be insignificant. As stated, coastal operators treat this information as 
confidential, which in turn limits this study. 
  
 
25 The UK-registered 40 000 Lavela is fully owned and operated by Engen. 
26 Coastal Carrier data. 
27 Shell currently runs its coastal operations with the Singapore-registered Maersk Brigit.  
28 Eco Revolution is a newly built tanker (2016) registered in the Marshall Islands. 
29 Unicorn Tankers data (note 19). 
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4.2.1.2 Overall bulk cargo distribution   
TNPA statistics provide a picture of how bulk cargo is distributed along the coast. 
Statistics before 2014 appear intermittent and fairly inconsistent in many respects. As 
such, they reveal no discernible trend. For this reason, the study will appraise TNPA 
statistical data only for the period of four years from 2014 to 2017.  
Figure 4.1 below provides an overview of annual coastal bulk and breakbulk (non-
containerised cargo) handled in South African ports which predominantly consists of 
liquid bulk movements of refined petroleum products (as will be more fully explained 
later). This category shows a steady volume decline over four years. The year 2015 
shows 6.8% less cargo volumes than 2014, while regression between 2015 and 2016 
was about 1.85%. A further volume decline of about 3.9% was recorded between 2016 
and 2017.  
 
Figure 4.1: Non-containerised coastal cargo volumes in million tons (2014-2017) 
(Source: TNPA port statistics) 
Figure 4.2 below subdivides non-containerised cargo into bulk and breakbulk, thereby 
providing some distinction between the two categories. The overall picture that one 
gains is that coastal bulk cargo volumes are not plentiful and further that bulk cargo 
volumes have suffered a steady decline in recent years. Another observation is that 
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cargo. The sheer paucity of coastal breakbulk cargo instantly renders it a bad candidate 
for cabotage. Consequently, breakbulk cannot receive too much attention in an enquiry 
to determine whether the coast has sufficient cargo with which to support cabotage. It 
will, however, be important to look at the status of coastal breakbulk as potential 
supplementary cargo. On the above basis, petroleum bulk cargo is presented as a 
potentially more substantial traffic base for coastal shipping and consequently for 
cabotage. 
 
Figure 4.2: Bulk and breakbulk comparison  
(Source: TNPA port statistics) 
4.2.1.3 Average bulk cargo monthly distribution  
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 below explore typical bulk data using 2015 annual figures 
(representing monthly average) to show bulk flows at different ports to depict monthly 
activity.  
Durban, Mossel Bay and Cape Town are major sources of refined petroleum products 
with Sapref (BP/Engen) in Durban, PetroSA in Mossel Bay and Chevron and Burgan 
in Cape Town.   
  















Shipped Landed Shipped Landed
2017 2931858 2357925 42732 9907
2016 2853514 2570791 72608 17705
2015 2826116 2562661 67295 15567
2014 2978223 2633039 279927 97374
Bulk & breakbulk
2017 2016 2015 2014
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4.2.1.3.1 Shipped monthly activity 
Accordingly, the picture of average volumes for shipped bulk in Figure 4.3 is consistent 
in that it shows Durban as the port that ships the highest volumes of bulk cargo, 
followed by Mossel Bay and Cape Town. As would now be expected, other ports show 
minimum monthly shipped bulk activity, as they are cargo sinks and not cargo sources. 
 
Figure 4.3: Shipped bulk monthly average 
(Source: TNPA 2015 port statistics) 
4.2.1.3.2 Landed monthly activity 
The same trend appears when looking at landed bulk cargo, as shown in Figure 4.4 
below. On this chart, East London shows the highest bulk landed volumes, followed by 
Port Elizabeth, Richards Bay and then Cape Town. Durban shows minimal activity 
because, unlike Cape Town, which acts as both cargo source and cargo sink, Durban is 
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Figure 4.4: Landed bulk monthly average 
(Source: TNPA 2015 port statistics)  
4.2.1.3.3 Synopsis of bulk cargo figures  
What the above exercise illustrates is that Durban handles the highest volumes of 
coastal bulk shipment in South Africa at an average of about 1.3 million tons per annum, 
while Cape Town handles the highest volumes of landed bulk cargo and averages about 
750 000 tons per annum.   
The effect of these statistics, particularly the annual coastal volumes over four years 
(Figure 4.1 above) is that there could be no suggestion of additional bulk tonnage 
becoming available in the near future. Adding a single bulk vessel on the coast may 
result in over-tonnage. In fact, continued volume decline alone points towards reduction 
of the current coastal bulk fleet. Therefore, cabotage on the South African coast cannot 
be approached on the basis of an expanded coastal bulk fleet unless a case for increased 
bulk volumes can be shown. 
4.2.1.4 Containerised cargo volumes 
The fact that TNPA statistical data does not disclose the port of shipping for a container 
landed at any port and vice versa potentially means that the handled total volume of 








Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
Landed Bulk
Richards Bay Durban East London Ngqura
Port Elizabeth Mossel Bay Cape Town Saldanha
 79 
twice, initially at port of loading and subsequently at port of discharge. If one relies on 
a simple calculation that adds up containers handled at each port to determine annual 
handled volumes, for instance, that may lead to a higher total volume count than the 
actual unit count of containers in the coastal trade. In an attempt to avoid distortions 
created by potential duplications, it is therefore important to delineate handled volumes 
into landed and shipped containers. For this reason, Figure 4.5 below is a better 
representation of seaborne container volumes on the coast.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Total shipped/landed coastal TEUs (2014-2017) 
(Source: TNPA port statistics) 
The following two diagrams (Figures 4.6 and 4.7) give an overview of cargo flows 
between landed and shipped TEUs with particular emphasis on handled cargo volume 
differences between port located at cargo sources against ports that receive such cargo. 
The distinction between these two types of ports must be borne in mind when 
considering sources of South African cargo. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show landed and 















Figure 4.6: Landed annual TEUs  
(Source: TNPA port statistics)  
Cape Town handles the highest volumes of landed coastal containerised cargo in South 
Africa per year. The highest number of TEUs at this port stood at about 31 000 in 2014. 
Since then the port has experienced a volume decline of about 30%. The reason for the 
decline remains unclear and requires further research. The estimated total for 2017 is 
about 20 840.30  It appears on this basis that Cape Town therefore receives an average 
of about 23 700 TEUs per annum from the coast. 
Richards Bay is not strictly speaking a container port, particularly for coastal shipping. 
Ngqura is focused more on transshipments and other high seas activity. It receives 
virtually no coastal trade. Port Elizabeth handles negligible coastal trade. It is geared 
more towards deep-sea activities. East London is not a deep-sea port of call for 
container ships.  It is not geared for container vessels. The port consequently 
predominantly serves as a feeder spoke port. 
Therefore, only Durban and Cape Town show appreciable activity of shipped 
containerised coastal cargo. Durban handles the highest volumes of the two source 
ports, as Figure 4.7 below shows. Its highest volumes in 2014 were a total of about 
 
30 The graph shows mid-year figures (June 2017). The estimated total of 20 840 TEUs is calculated on 
the basis of figures up to November. December figures had not been released at the time of finalising 
the graph. Therefore an average of the previous 11 months has been used for the 12th month.  
Richards Bay Durban Ngqura Port Elizabeth Cape Town
2014 547 6961 624 2625 30527
2015 651 6994 479 2030 20131
2016 202 6356 402 1996 23242










31 300 TEUs. Durban shipped volumes have been fairly consistent since. In the four 
years from 2014 to 2017, Durban has shipped an average of about 28 800 TEUs of 
containerised coastal cargo per year.31 
 
Figure 4.7: Shipped annual TEUs 
(Source: TNPA port statistics) 
Bearing in mind that the enquiry in this section seeks to determine what cargo moves 
along the coast, it is imperative to further differentiate further between full and empty 
container volumes in order to determine the loads of the full containers. The exercise 
is also important since full and empty TEUs attract different freight charges. Figure 4.8 
below depicts the respective categories. What becomes immediately clear from this 
exercise is that coastal sea transport carries comparatively higher volumes of empty 
than fully-loaded containers.  
Movement of large volumes of empty containers arises from container repositioning 
for feeder activity between cargo sources and cargo sinks. This phenomenon seems to 
reinforce the idea that feeder activity is the central business for South African coastal 
shipping and that as such trade between South African ports contributes relatively far 
less to coastal trade.  
 
31 The same basis used to calculate landed cargo above was used for shipped cargo in Figure 4.7.  
Richards Bay Durban Ngqura Port Elizabeth Cape Town
2014 0 31363 191 559 13376
2015 868 28867 141 298 9725
2016 0 28302 172 1173 4120










On the basis of the above, coastal cargo consists mainly of feeder cargo from domestic 
ports to sink ports outside of South Africa. The remaining portion of actual coastal trade 
equates to about 20% of the volumes shown below. 
 
Figure 4.8: Full and empty TEUs (2014-2017) 
(Source: TNPA port statistics) 
4.2.1.5 Actual cargo moving on the coast 
Attempts to disaggregate portions of coastal trade into feeder cargo and genuine coastal 
cargo were fraught with challenges. The manner in which ports collate data is deficient 
for this purpose. Transshipment container volumes are given, but not their destinations. 
Coaster companies were also not forthcoming with statistics that would make the 
exercise meaningful. The information on feeder cargo movement is generally kept 
confidential for marketing purposes. However, information regarding major 
commodities moving along the coast and their tonnages was made available. 
Table 4.2 below has been prepared on the basis of tonnage flows supplied by coasters 
showing average tons for the period 2015/16. As was shown in the previous chapter, 
the dominant coastal route runs within the Durban/Walvis Bay port range. Therefore, 
Table 4.2 below includes the port of Walvis Bay in order to provide a composite picture 
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Table 4.2: Major coastal commodities  
SOURCE COMMODITY TONS PER YEAR 
(EXCLUDING 
FEEDER)  
Durban Sugar  220 000  
Paper  20 000 






Walvis Bay Salt  30 000 
(Source: OACL) 
As seen in the previous chapter, agricultural products, namely sugar and paper, have 
sustained the route between Durban and Cape Town. Illovo Sugar and Tongaat Huletts 
in Durban remain the main producers of sugar in the country. SAPPI and Mondi 
plantations, on the other hand, utilise Durban as their shipment port as well. Demand 
for sugar supplies still emanates from Western Cape canneries and confectionery 
industries along the coast. These industries require significant amounts of sugar 
delivered to them on a regular basis and in amounts that road transport cannot cope 
with without substantially increased transport costs. The same applies to paper and 
paper products. Therefore, despite recent efficiencies achieved in the use of the road 
transport system, sugar and paper remain the staple cargo for coastal shipping. 
Malt and wheat are transported from the Western Cape to Durban and further inland to 
meet the demands of the breweries and related industries. In the 1980s, a large amount 
of salt from Walvis Bay was destined for the Durban basin. Therefore, it would virtually 
all be discharged in Durban. However, currently salt is discharged in consignments 
along the east coast between Port Elizabeth and Durban, largely for inland user 
destinations.32 
 
32 OACL data (note 2). 
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Historically, the Durban/Walvis Bay route suffers imbalanced trades. The westbound 
leg is thick while the eastbound leg is considerably less dense. Vessels from the east 
coast sail from Durban relatively full only to return almost empty.33  This is because 
sources of cargo are not evenly spread. Therefore, transportation of empty containers 
(repositioning) for feeder services plays a pivotal role as these containers fill up space 
on vessels returning to sources of production in Durban, for instance.34  
4.2.1.6 Synopsis of containerised domestic coastal cargo 
The above discussion points to five factors regarding containerised coastal cargo and 
cabotage implementation. First, South African coastal activity almost exclusively 
depends on feeder volume, which constitutes about 80% of the total coastal seaborne 
trade. Feeder services utilise ports on a range that is wider than South African borders.  
As such these services can be relocated to feeding hubs outside South Africa. The 
remaining 20% portion of containerised activity (which excludes feeder cargo) would 
be insufficient to support cabotage.  
Second, the bulk of coastal cargo volumes move between Durban and Walvis Bay. 
Walvis Bay is not a South African port, which means it cannot be subject to the 
cabotage regime of another sovereignty. Walvis Bay volumes would then have to be 
excluded from the domestic cabotage equation. Doing so would further reduce the non-
feeder portion of coastal cargo volumes on the route. As a result, trade on the route 
would be significantly hampered.  
Third, in the event that some arrangement with Namibia could be made for Walvis Bay 
to become a cabotage port, the Durban/Walvis Bay route is notoriously imbalanced. 
There is normally sufficient cargo for the westbound leg, while the eastbound leg barely 
loads any cargo. Therefore, cabotage implementation needs to bear this imbalance in 
mind. The imbalance in trade means that the correct number of vessels that should be 
employed on the route cannot be determined by simple reference to average space 
demand and utilisation in both directions.35 Another less difficult basis on which to 
decide tonnage will have to be developed. 
 
33 T. Jones, Coastal Sea Transport and Competition in South Africa (1985). 
34 OACL data (note 2). 
35 Jones (note 33) 45.  
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Fourth, the seemingly high volumes of containerised coastal cargo shipped and landed 
in Durban and Cape Town respectively are predominantly empty TEUs, as shown in 
Figure 4.9 below. The effect of this is that the coastal carrier on the dominant South 
African route would be forced to cater for an “empties trade” which might yield only 
50% of the value of standard freight for an FCL (full container load).36 
 
Figure 4.9: Full/Empty TEUs – main route 
(Source: TNPA statistics) 
Fifth, other South African container ports show very low coastal volumes. For instance, 
based on volumes handled at that port, Richards Bay should be excluded from a list of 
potential cabotage ports. Port Elizabeth, Ngqura and East London also show very low 
and sporadic coastal volumes and can likewise be left out of the cabotage equation. 
However, if the Durban/Cape Town cabotage route can be sustained (on any other basis 
that may be found outside of this study), ports in between Durban and Cape Town could 
be considered as ports of call subject to specified incentives, or alternatively on a 
marginal costing basis, since coastal vessels sail past these ports in any event.  
Therefore, the position in respect of both shipped and landed coastal containerised 
domestic cargo is that cabotage would have to depend on the volumes generated in 
 
36 Freight is chargeable when one carrier is carrying empty containers for another carrier. On 2 October 
2017 a prominent coastal carrier estimated freight of an FCL between Durban and Cape Town at about 
US$ 400 while an empty container was estimated at about US$150, depending on volumes quoted for 
and who the client was. Freight is also chargeable when a route experiences a trade imbalance, which 
occurs when containers remain at the port of discharge while required at the port of loading. A carrier 
usually charges freight to have the containers relocated. 
Full Empty Full Empty
Durban Cape Town
2014 17275 21049 21479 22424
2015 14933 22458 8467 20427
2016 13036 21622 6972 20390
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Durban and Cape Town. Coastal operators would have to be in a position to ship cargo 
from Durban and to land cargo in Cape Town. Vessels would then have to load empty 
containers to ports along the coast or to make a ballast voyage to Durban.  
In light of the above, it is therefore abundantly clear that cabotage cannot be sustained 
on the route between Durban and Cape Town because this route historically experiences 
imbalanced trades. Since this route is the country’s dominant route, it follows that its 
low volume performance indicates that cabotage implementation on the basis of 
domestic cargo would have to depend on the current tonnage equivalents. On this basis 
it would therefore be difficult to implement cabotage, especially where cabotage is seen 
as a catalyst for an expanded home fleet.  From a cargo point of view, the main South 
African route does not have sufficient cargo to be self-sustaining. It follows that the 
implementation of cabotage on the basis of the status quo cannot lead to increased 
tonnage under the South African flag. The incontrovertible conclusion regarding the 
first part of this chapter must be answered in the negative.  
Therefore, the policy seems to have missed two practical considerations. First, the 
policy does not identify the cargo that will drive cabotage. It has been shown that in 
South Africa such cargo does not currently exist. Second, the policy does not describe 
the route envisaged for cabotage, thereby leaving interested parties guessing whether 
cabotage will be applied domestically or regionally. It has been shown that there is still 
a considerable amount of work that should first be accomplished to justify SADC 
cabotage.  
Therefore, the policy fails to deal with practical considerations to justify cabotage 
implementation. In particular, the policymaker seems not to have accorded cargo 
sufficient weight as the cornerstone for cabotage implementation.  
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4.3 REGIONAL CABOTAGE 
The CMTP suggests a form of regional cabotage serviced by a national coastal carrier. 
With that in mind, this section is concerned with the assessment of the regional cargo 
base. It must be emphasised that regional strategic, political, legal and social 
considerations, although integral and important to SADC cabotage, will not be 
covered.37  The enquiry relates only to the status of regional cargo and focuses on the 
appraisal of trade flows to determine whether or not sufficient cargo exists for regional 
cabotage purposes.  
4.3.1 Limitations of regional cargo data 
Bearing in mind the nature of sources of information for regional cargo, there are 
instances in which it will be cumbersome to provide full details of certain vessels 
referred in the study. However, details relating to volumes and vessel routes will be 
disclosed. Broad cargo descriptions and general description of sources of such cargo 
will be given to avoid divulging precise details that might traverse commercial 
confidentiality boundaries. On the same basis, coastal carriers that provided cargo 
information for this section withheld the latest statistics. Therefore, the regional cargo 
analysis predominantly deals with information in respect of cargo carried over four 
years during the period 2010 to 2013.  
Furthermore, it was not possible to collate statistics from the countries to which South 
Africa exports. The relevant agencies of the respective countries do not have readily 
accessible cargo records.  With the exception of bulk salt exports from Walvis Bay, no 
regional data was made available in respect of other bulk and breakbulk cargo. 
Therefore, the study predominantly covers exports from South Africa to other ports in 
the SADC region.38  Nevertheless, the available information provides the study with a 
clear and sufficient basis on which reasonable inferences can be drawn.  
  
 
37 Detailed coverage of regional and continental imperatives for cabotage policy was discussed in 
chapter 3. 
38 South African agencies have no statistics for cargo moving in the SADC region. Therefore, the 
information discussed in this regard is derived from records of coastal shipping companies who operate 
vessels on the African eastern and western seaboards and the Indian Ocean Islands.  
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4.3.2 Regional cargo overview 
Regional cargo assessment covers the range of ports between Luanda to the west and 
Mombasa to the east. It also includes ports in Reunion, Mauritius and Madagascar.  
It appears from the statistical records of coastal operators that import volumes moving 
along the Southern African coast into South Africa are very low. The bulk of TEUs 
imported from the region are landed empty.39 The dominant ports for the majority of 
empty containers seem to be Beira and Maputo.40 Vessels from these ports often return 
to South Africa with an average of about 700 empty TEUs.41 Some of these containers 
come from as far up the coast as Djibouti and Lomu. For example, on 16 June 2017, a 
vessel from Beira carried 451 TEUs to Durban, 381 of which were empty. The vessel 
then sailed to Cape Town and discharged only 1 FCL.  On 29 May 2017, another vessel 
from Maputo discharged 842 TEUs in Durban, 805 of which were empty. The same 
vessel discharged 65 FCL in Cape Town. Information received from two different 
regional coasters confirm this trend. 
The two graphs below, Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11, show respectively the top eight 
regional countries to which South Africa exports and the types of cargo exported. The 
eight countries, in alphabetical order, are: Angola, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Reunion and Tanzania. However, the lion’s share of South 
Africa’s coastal cargo is exported mostly to four countries, namely Mauritius, Angola, 
Tanzania and, more recently, Kenya. Overall, a negligible amount of cargo goes 
elsewhere. On the information available, South African exports are generally shipped 
to the region from the port of Durban. 
 
39 However, these numbers vary and can reach close to a thousand empty TEUs per vessel on occasion. 
For instance, on 23 June 2017, one vessel landed 928 TEUs in Durban, of which 854 were empty. The 
same vessel discharged 55 FCL in Cape Town. 
40 This is shown from container statistics of a coaster that operates in the range of ports between Beira 




Figure 4.10: South African seaborne exports (Luanda to Mombasa) 
(Source: South African coastal operators) 
On average, Mauritius imports from South Africa about 14 000 TEUs a year. Angola 
and Tanzania import an average of about 13 000 TEUs and about 11 500 TEUs 
respectively. Kenya imported an average of about 16 500 TEUs in 2012/3 and about a 
thousand TEUs a year in each of the preceding two years. Other regional countries on 
average each import between 3 500 and 6 000 TEUs from South Africa per year. 
It appears that between the east and the west, the bulk of coastal containerised exports 
are concentrated on the south-eastern seaboard (Madagascar, Kenya, Tanzania and 
Reunion), while the single highest export destination is in Angola, on the south-western 
seaboard. Interestingly, the remaining countries (Namibia and Mozambique) have 
relatively lower seaborne export volumes from South Africa.42 However, because they 
are contiguous to South Africa, they present an ideal opportunity for regional cabotage, 
particularly since the coastal route passing along these countries already exists and is 
well established. Therefore, on the basis of the volumes in Figure 4.10 above, the 
position of these countries allows for a short sea-pendulum trade from South Africa to 
the east, perhaps up to Nacala, swinging back to Beira, Maputo, through South African 
ports to Lüderitz and Walvis Bay to the west and back again.  
  
 
42 Probably because seaborne transport in general faces steep competition from road transport that 









 2010 TEUs 12833 1031 6578 17329 3571 6361 4832 12482
 2011 TEUs 15259 1105 4422 14648 2812 176 3424 12338
 2012 TEUs 14091 16453 5792 13652 5634 6146 3892 12564
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The longer coastal route (for instance, between Luanda and Mombasa) may require the 
use of some of the shorter pendulum ports (such as Maputo, Durban or Ngqura) as 
transshipment ports to improve transit efficiencies and to create shorter sailings. 
Transshipment on these terms possesses potential to stimulate further coastal activity. 
4.3.3 Regional commodities  
Figure 4.11 below shows major export cargo shipped to SADC countries. Regional 
cargo flows effectively consist of four types of commodities. This assemblage may be 
regarded as typical primary cargo for regional cabotage. These are processed foods, 
paper (including paper products), chemicals and other goods from manufacturing 
industries. Chemicals are the most dominant exports across the spectrum of all sampled 
countries. 
 
Figure 4.11: Primary regional cargo exports – South Africa to SADC 
(Source: Local regional coastal operators’ statistics) 
































































Out of the eight regional sinks, Mauritius, Angola, Tanzania and Kenya are the only 
four that show overall cargo volume consistency. Others depict erratic trends. For 
instance, Namibia shows highest volumes of processed foods imports while showing 
negligible volumes in respect of other commodities. Namibia’s containerised cargo 
demand from South Africa is primarily in respect of a single commodity.  As such, this 
is not a diverse coastal trade. Therefore, in the event of a decline in the demand for 
processed foods from South Africa, for whatever reason, coastal trade between South 
Africa and Namibia could face a crisis.43  
Other relevant export volumes of processed foods land in Angola, Mauritius and 
Madagascar. Chemicals are exported fairly proportionally between Mauritius, Kenya 
and Angola. However, Tanzania shows the highest volumes of chemical exports. Paper 
exports to Kenya and Mauritius also make appreciable volumes. The category for ‘other 
manufacturing commodities’ is dominated by Angola, while other sampled countries 
share proportionally in this category. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined whether South Africa has sufficient coastal cargo on which to 
support cabotage. Based on TNPA cargo statistics, South Africa has three main cargo 
groupings: bulk, breakbulk and containerised cargo. After assessing the status of bulk 
coastal cargo, indications were that there are consistent supplies of petrochemicals and 
petroleum products on the coast, given the site of refining sources and the 
corresponding positioning of sink ports, where petrochemicals are mostly in demand. 
However, five vessels with a combined deadweight tonnage of about 117 500 
adequately cater for the movement of this cargo.  No further expansions can realistically 
be made to the coastal fleet unless bulk cargo volumes increase significantly. Any 
additions to current tonnages would rapidly lead to over-tonnage. 
Since the impetus for cabotage is to expand the domestic fleet, prevailing bulk coastal 
cargo volumes cannot be the basis on which to achieve the objective, particularly where 
fleet expansion beyond the existing five vessels would lead to coastal oversupply. It 
will be difficult to establish good justification for changing the prevailing order to 
 
43 Namibia’s proximity to South Africa means there is potential for the two countries to rely more on 
land-based transport modes to move their trades. Where costs are comparable, sea transport would 
most likely be the least preferred mode of transport.  
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substitute five private vessels flagged elsewhere with five domestically-registered 
vessels owned by nationals unless it could be shown that other more worthwhile 
benefits exist. So far, the gains can be seen as too insignificant to warrant full scale and 
probably costly overhaul of the current coastal carriage arrangement. Other sources of 
cargo would first have to be found to justify changes in favour of cabotage.  
Furthermore, oil majors hold a greater portion of petrochemicals. Therefore, cabotage 
would ideally have to incorporate strategies to encourage refining industries. Incentive 
schemes (instead of surreptitious coercion and state pressure) may therefore be useful 
methods adopted to drive policy changes. The domestically-registered coastal carrier 
would have to be convinced of the financial benefits of trading on the coast.  Similarly, 
incentives in the form of tax breaks and wharfage waivers, among others, might 
encourage local registration of appropriate tonnages, which in return would reciprocate 
by meeting certain imperatives relating to vessel manning, ownership or building of the 
vessels. 
With regard to breakbulk cargo, statistical review shows that South African ports 
handle relatively small volumes of breakbulk cargo. As a stand-alone cargo class, 
breakbulk cargo does not have any meaningful role to play in cabotage. It would remain 
relevant only as supplementary cargo, while a wider breakbulk cargo base is being 
developed. In any event, the type of vessels that typically ply the coast are suitably 
designed as multi-purpose carriers, albeit designed primarily for container carriage. 
They have sufficient capacity to handle current levels of breakbulk cargo volumes.  The 
likely scenario is that the breakbulk cargo base will remain the same and that this class 
of cargo would not constitute an important cargo component for cabotage. Therefore, 
as is the case with bulk cargo, current volumes of breakbulk cargo do not justify 
cabotage implementation, albeit for different reasons: bulk for not possessing the 
desired effect of stimulating the merchant flag fleet, and breakbulk for having low 
demand. 
The chapter then turned to the discussion of containerised coastal cargo. This category 
is divided into landed and shipped containerised cargo. The observation was that Cape 
Town receives most TEUs moving along the coast, while Durban handles the highest 
volumes of shipped cargo. Volumes in the other South African ports show paltry TEU 
activity. This means that the bulk of containerised coastal activity takes place in Durban 
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and Cape Town. That being the case, cabotage cannot be sustained on volumes 
produced solely by two (out of eight) of the country’s commercial ports. Furthermore, 
the relatively high volumes of containerised coastal cargo recorded in both Cape Town 
and Durban consists of empty TEUs. Empty TEUs generally attract half the amount of 
the standard freight rate. The assessment indicated that South African coastal trade does 
not generate sufficient volumes of full containerised cargo required to support cabotage 
implementation. On this basis, domestic cabotage would therefore not be feasible as a 
vehicle for an expanded domestically-flagged fleet.  
The enquiry then proceeded to whether cargo was available for the implementation of 
regional cabotage. SADC ports in the range between Mombasa to the east and Luanda 
to the west were assessed. It was observed that regional routes suffer considerable 
imbalances. In the case of SADC regional coastal trade, cabotage could be implemented 
only on the basis of South African exports to regional countries. Strategies would have 
to be developed to minimise the effects of the ballast return leg. Currently, regional 
cabotage would typically operate on the basis of a well-freighted South Africa outbound 
leg, while the inbound leg would be utilised to reposition the vessel (through freight 
from empty TEUs) for another round of exports.  
The chapter further identified four types of commodities exported to regional countries 
in substantial volumes. These are processed foods, chemicals, paper products and other 
manufactured goods. The sample used Durban as the South African port of export.  
These commodities are generally exported to Mauritius, Tanzania, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Reunion, Mozambique in the east, and Angola and Namibia in the west. There are, of 
course, other commodities that are exported to these and other regional countries in 
lesser volumes that could be utilised as supplementary cargo to the mentioned primary 
cargo. 
For a period of four years from 2010 to 2013, about 14 000 to 15 000 TEUs were 
shipped from South Africa to Mauritius and Angola while about 11 600 TEUs went to 
Tanzania per year. About 16 500 TEUs were exported to Kenya. These volumes show 
that a moderate cargo platform exists to operate a coastal vessel to carry about 1 100 to 
about 1 700 TEUs. Therefore, purely on the basis of cargo availability, it is feasible to 
implement regional cabotage either on a shorter coastal route between ports in 
Mozambique, South Africa and Namibia or on a longer coastal route on a range of ports 
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between Mombasa (via Reunion and Mauritius) and Luanda. It was suggested that the 
creation of a transshipment port, for instance in Durban, may be necessary to improve 
efficiencies for the longer route between Mombasa and Luanda.  
However, regional cabotage necessitates an elaborate plan that would bind other SADC 
countries to cabotage ideals, as expounded in chapter 3.  South Africa would not be in 
a position to implement regional cabotage by mere promulgation in its own parliament 
without the active participation of the other affected SADC member states. A system 
that would bind other sovereignties will have to be developed before regional cabotage 
can become a reality, even if cargo on which the policy can be implemented existed. 
Nothing has been done or proposed to coordinate SADC coastal states for cabotage. 
Challenges regarding potential misalignment of the CMPT with SADC and ultimately 
AU instruments were discussed in previous chapters. In the circumstances regional 
cabotage remains a mere idea.  
Therefore there is little or no cargo on which to form the basis for the implementation 
of cabotage, either domestically or regionally. Domestically, the cargo base is too small 
to justify operational change, particularly as changes will not lead to the growth and 
expansion of the domestic fleet. On the regional front, some cargo has been identified. 
However, cabotage implementation would first require regional integration to make the 
policy binding on all the SADC coastal countries. The CMTP, so far, pays lip service 
to less regional cabotage and the matter seems not to have been prioritised. 
Having looked at the issue of cargo in South Africa and in SADC and assuming 
cabotage implementation can progress past this issue, the next chapter provides an 
overview of restrictive coastal policies which different jurisdictions apply. The idea is 
to glean experience from worldwide cabotage practices on which a strategy for 




 CHAPTER 5: 
OVERVIEW OF WORLDWIDE CABOTAGE PRACTICES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having looked at cargo, this chapter assesses other factors that generally affect 
cabotage implementation. First, the chapter conducts an appraisal of the different kinds 
of cabotage regimes which various jurisdictions apply. In this regard, the discussion 
covers different cabotage approaches implemented by individual countries and those 
adopted in various regions. Second, the chapter gives an overview of the different 
mechanisms that are commonly applied to complement each type of cabotage in the 
respective jurisdictions and how these affect ship registration patterns in particular. The 
whole discussion is driven by the need to explore key concepts that South African 
policymakers must consider in developing strategies for cabotage. The chapter makes 
an observation that the measure of strictness or liberty which each jurisdiction adopts 
for its cabotage practice is dictated by specific conditions of the particular country 
rather than an objectively verifiable criterion applicable in all circumstances. 
A variety of factors may be critical for cabotage implementation. However, the chapter 
limits the discussion to two issues that are closely related, and which may sometimes 
be discussed interchangeably. The first relates to the type of cabotage, and the second 
is concerned with the form of ship registration that a jurisdiction adopts. The first issue 
establishes the approach each jurisdiction adopts based on its particular imperatives and 
the degree of latitude such imperatives can permit (ranging from the narrowest to the 
most permissive application). The second issue is founded on the fact that cabotage 
requires a merchant fleet as a prerequisite for its practice. Countries often use ship 
registration legislation to attract tonnage and bend its letter to accommodate the 
particular country’s priorities in accordance with its stage of merchant fleet 
development and service offering.  
In light of the above, it is therefore important to appreciate different formulations of 
cabotage restrictions that various jurisdictions apply. These will be evaluated with a 
view to gleaning the type that may be regarded as suitable for South Africa given the 
limited scope for cabotage implementation in the light of existing coastal trade volumes 
as detailed in the previous chapter. It must be emphasised that the type of cabotage and 
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the form of ship registration are distinct but very interdependent concepts. It is also 
important to bear in mind that the discussion deals with the probabilities of their 
application in South Africa since the policy has pronounced no clear direction on the 
subject. 
5.2 DIFFERENT FORMS OF CABOTAGE REGIMES  
A number of countries practise cabotage, but each country adapts the tone of cabotage 
to its own coastal market dynamics. For instance, the form of cabotage that a country 
chooses may be influenced by the stage of development of its merchant fleet; the type 
of commodity most prevalent on its coast; sources and ownership of such cargo; 
proximity and size of its port facilities relative to regional ports (especially if its ports 
handle significant numbers of transshipments); and its geopolitical positioning 
(particularly if its policies have regional significance), among other factors. These 
factors form the basis of the country’s cabotage practice, which is normally designed 
to produce specific outcomes. As a result, cabotage practice can be distinguished from 
one jurisdiction to another. However, what remains consistent despite different 
approaches to cabotage is that reservation of coastal trade for the national flagged vessel 
is commonly intended to stimulate shipping capacity and to expand transport service 
range; to mitigate the effects of adverse freight expenditures on the country’s balance 
of payments; and to ensure strategic deliveries in areas of maritime expertise and in 
education.1 
Apart from open cabotage, which simply means no cabotage restrictions, of which 
South Africa has been a prime example, this work identifies two forms or styles of 
cabotage: restrictive and liberal cabotage.  
5.2.1 Restrictive cabotage  
Usually restrictive cabotage imposes unconditional terms with regard to construction, 
ownership, crewing and flagging of vessels permitted to participate in the jurisdiction’s 
coastal trade. Therefore, in restrictive cabotage regimes, trading is reserved for 
nationally-built vessels, exclusively or predominantly owned and controlled by resident 
nationals and manned exclusively or by a high percentage of national crews. The 
 
1 Structure, Ownership and Registration of the World Fleet Ch 2 (2017), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/rmt2017ch2_en.pdf. (Accessed 8 February 2018). 
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requirements of this type of cabotage could mean that a domestically-built vessel, 
owned by a locally-registered company that is controlled by nationals but is flagged 
elsewhere, will be excluded from domestic trade regardless of how it is manned. As a 
result, this excludes from coastal participation even nationals whose vessels may be 
registered on the so-called national second register (expanded on in the following 
discussion). Restrictive cabotage is often seen in coastal markets in which there are 
substantial volumes of government-related cargo and in circumstances where the 
country already possesses a sizeable merchant fleet. In instances where some form of 
waiver can be obtained for foreign flags to participate in restrictive cabotage trades, 
formalities and criteria are onerous and laden with procedures that are usually not 
transparent. The result is that barriers to entry in these coastal trades remain too high 
for foreign vessels, effectively making it impossible for them to participate in coastal 
trades. Typical examples of countries that practise restrictive cabotage are the US, 
Japan and China (excluding Hong Kong). 
5.2.2 Liberal cabotage 
This type of cabotage generally excludes or diminishes the application of the 
requirements of restrictive cabotage or may temporarily suspend most restrictions for a 
period of time. Liberal cabotage allows foreign participation, often places no 
restrictions on where cabotage vessels were built, places least emphasis on crewing by 
nationals; and ordinarily does not select vessels on the basis of flag registration. The 
liberal approach often places competition above the development of an indigenous fleet. 
However, with this approach, foreign participation on cabotage trades is often 
introduced through licencing mechanisms. These mechanisms allow the designated 
authority, typically the transport ministry, to exercise discretion through waivers and to 
generally determine circumstances deemed appropriate for foreign participation. The 
usual prompts for waivers are factors relating to scarcity of resources such as tonnage 
shortages or lack of competent crews and low levels of capital expenditure for 
acquisitions, among other factors. In cases where the jurisdiction’s cabotage structure 
is underdeveloped, waivers become the norm. Waivers inevitably impose liberal 
cabotage on a jurisdiction that would otherwise practise restrictive cabotage if there 
was a choice.  
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However, waivers allow creation of avenues through which a jurisdiction can 
supplement shortages, provide suitable tonnages, or develop training for its crews, 
among others. Foreign involvement may be enlisted under strict conditions when and 
if justified by prevailing circumstances. However, specified conditions may often be 
attractive to foreign participants, while the jurisdiction itself in turn enjoys a measure 
of control over the manner in which foreign ships trade along its coast.  
Liberal cabotage is often seen in jurisdictions at the early stages of fleet development 
or where an already established merchant fleet exists but demand imbalances occur, for 
example, where under-tonnage or lack of suitable capacity for specific trades remains 
a challenge. In such circumstances, foreign interests may be granted permission to trade 
on the coast under some form of licence, either on the basis of a single engagement or 
for a fixed period of time, at the discretion of the designated authority. This practice 
does not normally require domestic registration of foreign interests under the national 
flag. India is a classic example of a country where this type of cabotage regime is 
practised, as will be seen in the discussion below. 
Predictably, if the country’s strategic thrust involves retention and transfer of maritime 
skills, the form of cabotage would reflect this in the requirements regarding the 
engagement of the crew. Crewing requirements normally oblige participation of 
nationals. However, depending on the degree of availability of suitable crews, it is not 
unusual for foreign vessels trading on the coast to have a relatively larger contingent of 
foreign crews. However, pivotal positions such as the master or first officer may 
continue to be reserved for nationals. Nevertheless, a jurisdiction may still require 
engagement of a particular minimal percentage of its nationals which, if not met, would 
mean that the foreign vessel would not be issued with a licence to trade on the coast. 
A cavalier application of waivers for manning foreign vessels can potentially divert 
from the objectives of cabotage where foreigners operate on a waiver license basis. A 
divergence of interests may arise since the licensed vessel commonly flies a different 
flag, which would often be a vessel registered under a flag of convenience (FOC). The 
foreign crew and remuneration arrangements often undercut what the national flag 
seeks to achieve with regard to working conditions and general wellbeing of its local 
crews. Therefore, in jurisdictions where protection of the rights of crew may be a 
sensitive subject, this would generally be reflected as a variable in the licence 
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conditions forming the basis of the waiver. The solution is normally to engage foreign 
crews on similar employment conditions to those applicable to local crews. This has 
the effect of discouraging foreign flags from employing non-nationals. 
There are instances in which restrictions regarding vessel ownership or shareholding in 
vessel-owning companies receive attention. Under liberal cabotage, national shares in 
the vessel (or controlling company) need to be only 51%. Therefore, the remainder of 
the shareholding represents the degree to which foreigners can then participate in 
cabotage trade. Ownership by nationals may also be recognised, particularly if one or 
two general rules have been substantially met. For instance, a vessel owned by a 
national, but which flies a foreign flag, may be allowed to trade on the coast. This 
mainly occurs if the foreign flag concerned is on the country’s parallel or second ship 
register. If the vessel has been built locally or is manned by national crews, this would 
further make it easier for the foreign flag to obtain a licence for coastal operations. 
However, waivers of this nature tend to be unpredictable; they usually depend on the 
requirement of the coastal state at the time of the issuing of the licence and may change 
soon after the particular need for them has been realised. They are therefore difficult to 
measure properly. Examples of these may be seen below in the discussion involving 
countries such as Greece, Norway and other European Union (EU) countries. 
Countries that have low volumes of coastal cargo often do not to implement cabotage. 
However, there are instances where high cargo volumes exist but cabotage does not 
apply. Owing to its flexibility and because liberal cabotage can accommodate moderate 
expressions of coastal restrictions, it is the regime of choice in a regional cabotage 
arrangement where a bloc of countries grant access to each other’s coastal trades in a 
mixture of coastal trades where some practice cabotage and others do not.  
Under liberal cabotage there is often no requirement that the vessel must be 
domestically built. It must simply be registered under the domestic flag of the 
jurisdiction where it is trading or under the domestic flag of the reciprocating country. 
Crews engaged on these vessels also come from various members of the bloc. However, 
in most instances, the master is required to be a national of the country where the vessel 
is trading. 
The broadminded approach of liberal cabotage in a regional context may be further seen 
in the fact that members of the bloc that practise restrictive cabotage in their respective 
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jurisdictions cannot compel those in the bloc who have no cabotage rules to apply 
restrictions to reserve their coastal trade for the rest of the bloc. Countries are also free 
to conclude bilateral agreements and to grant access to their coastal trades on a 
reciprocal basis to countries that are outside the bloc. Therefore, countries in the bloc 
may still be “vulnerable” to foreign competition away from their coast in circumstances 
where the country that does not restrict cabotage (but belongs in the bloc) is guaranteed 
trade within the bloc of countries that have cabotage restrictions. The classic example 
of this can be seen in the UK coastal trade. The UK has the highest coastal volumes in 
the EU but does not have cabotage restrictions. Countries in the EU bloc are therefore 
exposed to foreign competition in the UK in circumstances where UK-registered 
vessels enjoy cargo reservations, for example, on the Italian coast and elsewhere in 
Europe. 
The following discussion contains examples of jurisdictions of different forms of 
cabotage practices. 
5.3 OVERALL JURISDICTIONAL CABOTAGE PRACTICES 
This section evaluates legislative mechanisms for ship registration that different 
jurisdictions often adopt to implement and drive cabotage. Therefore, the evaluation 
entails different methods that jurisdictions apply to structure their ship registers. It also 
shows how such structuring translates into a particular form of cabotage. A broad 
sample of worldwide cabotage proponents is covered in the assessment to determine 
where cabotage is predominantly practised, by whom and in what form. The approach 
is intended to simplify the process of suggesting the type of cabotage and the 
corresponding form of ship registration that South Africa should adopt in view of the 
different requirements identified for vessel registration.  
A discussion is facilitated by reference to specific countries and a brief exposition of 
some of the dynamics experienced in each country and the type of cabotage regime that 
such dynamics produce. The intention is to appraise the various types of cabotage 
practices with a view to gleaning the type of cabotage suitable for South Africa. 
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5.3.1 Ship registration 
The registration of a vessel under a particular flag has the effect of subjecting that 
particular vessel to the laws of the country where it has been registered. The nationality 
of a ship is what determines which requirements relating to safety, crewing, working 
hours, taxation, and social security and pension regulations apply to the ship. 2 
Therefore, in the context of cabotage, domestic flag registration equates to a form of 
legal title a country possesses over the merchant fleet under its register. For this reason, 
domestic laws that govern ship registration ultimately determine who would be under 
such authority and for what purpose. Ship registration laws of a particular flag therefore 
often set the tone of the cabotage policy and become the measure through which the 
aims of the policy are often delivered. 
Bearing in mind the rationale for ship registration, South Africa aspires to become one 
of the world’s 35 maritime nations through aggressively promoting its ship register.3 
The following subsection therefore evaluates the overall commercial standing of each 
of the top 35 countries on the basis of deadweight tonnage it carries (actual freightable 
vessel space) and its world share. The idea is to gauge if there is any relationship 
between the country’s world standing on the one hand and its ship registration 
mechanisms and form of cabotage on the other. However, the discussion goes beyond 
just world standing, for reasons that will become more apparent below. 
5.3.2 World deadweight tonnage shares  
The leading 35 maritime nations that South Africa desires to be a part of, own about 
95% of world’s total deadweight tonnage. Only one of these countries is from Latin 
America and none is from Africa.4  The remaining share of about 5% is thinly spread 
among all other ship-owning nations. In the African context Angola, Nigeria and Egypt 
together hold about 1.23%,5 while South Africa holds 0.11% of the world’s share.6 The 
 
2 N.P. Ready Ship Registration (1998). 
3 See CMTP Policy statement p,51 and Draft Maritime Policy 2009 p,28. 
4 UNCTAD/RMT/2016 United Nations publication Review of Maritime Transport (2016), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2016_en.pdf. (Accessed 25 February 2018). The list 
includes inland states such as Switzerland. 
5 Ibid. 
6  Maritime Profile: South Africa (nd), available at 
(http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/MaritimeProfile/en-GB/710/index.html). (Accessed 
6 February 2017). 
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South African percentage share includes two domestically-flagged dry bulk carriers and 
42 vessels of various types registered under FOCs.7  
Table 5.1 below shows the list of the countries (leading countries) that own the lion’s 
share of registered world tonnage. Virtually all of these countries have two sets of 
fleets: one registered under the domestic flag, and the other registered offshore under 
FOCs. About 50% of the world’s tonnage share is in the hands of only five countries, 
namely Greece, Japan, China,8 Germany and Singapore.9 Ten of the leading countries 
are members of the EU.10 Greece controls the highest carrying capacity.11 
Sixteen of the leading countries have about 50% or more of their vessels registered 
under domestic flags.12 Ten13 of the sixteen are the so-called “developing countries”.14 
The other six countries are from the developed world, namely Singapore, Hong Kong 
(China), Norway, Netherlands, Italy and Canada.  
Table 5.1 shows the world ranking position of the 35 leading countries. It provides 
categorisation of each country with respect to: 
• Whether or not each of them practises restrictive cabotage; 
• Deadweight tonnage percentage under its domestic flag; 
• World share percentage of its total deadweight tonnage (combination of 
domestic and FOC-flagged tonnage); and  
• Each country’s developmental status. 
  
 
7 Grindrod Limited is a company registered in South Africa. It owns a fleet of 56 vessels, 14 of which 
have been chartered in. 
8 China owns the highest fleet number. The smaller vessels (under 1 000 gross tons) that are involved in 
Chinese cabotage trades boost the number of the Chinese fleet, which currently numbers 5 206. See note 
1, under ‘Vessels’. 
9 See http://unctad.org/ (note 1). 
10 Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway and UK. 
11 Greece has 308 836 933 deadweight tonnage under its control. See UNCTAD ‘World Fleet and 
Operation’ at http://unctad.org/ (note 1). 
12 Except for Monaco, which has no home-registered vessels. 
13 These are China, Thailand, India, Malaysia, Brazil, Vietnam, Indonesia, Russia, Iran and Kuwait. 
14 Singapore has only recently been graduated to ‘developed’ status. The assumption is therefore that its 
flagging ratio still reflects on its status as a developing country. Singapore was a developing country 
until 1997, after which it graduated to the status of a developed country. 
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Table 5.1: Thirty-five leading maritime nations and South Africa (by dwt) 
NO COUNTRY Cabotage 
Restricted 
Domestic-flagged % of 
total 
 % of world 
share 
Developmental Status  
Yes/No 
1. Greece Yes 22 17 DC 
2. Japan  Yes 13 12 DC 
3. China  Yes 47§ 8.7 LDC 
4. Germany Yes 10 6.9 DC 
5. Singapore  No 65§ 5.2 DC 
6. Hong Kong Yes 77§ 4.8 DC 
7. South Korea   Yes 20 4.4 DC 
8. US Yes 15 3.3 DC 
9. UK No 10 2.8 DC 
10. Bermuda Yes 2 2.7 DC 
11. Norway No 36 2.7 DC 
12. Taiwan  Yes 12 2.5 DC 
13. Denmark No 42§ 2.1 DC 
14. Monaco  No 0 1.6 DC 
15. Turkey  Yes 30 1.5 LDC 
16 Italy  Yes 68§ 1.3 DC 
17. Belgium No 35 1.2 DC  
18. India Yes 73§ 1.2 LDC 
19. Switzerland  Inland 8 1.1 DC 
20. Russia  Yes 38 1.0 LDC 
21. Iran  Yes 23 1.0 LDC 
22. Netherlands  No 41§ 0.97 DC 
23. Indonesia Yes 88§ 0.96 LDC 
24. Malaysia Yes 51§ 0.94 LDC 
25. Brazil Yes 24 0.88 LDC 
26. UAE Yes 4 0.86 LDC 
27. Saudi Arabia Yes 21 0.78 LDC 
28. France Yes 29 0.68 DC 
29. Canada Yes 27 0.55 DC 
30 Kuwait Yes 48§ 0.16 LDC 
31. Cyprus Yes 37 0.51 DC 
32. Viet Nam Yes 82§ 0.46 LDC 
33. Oman  Yes 0.8 0.40 LDC 
34. Thailand  Yes 75§ 0.38 LDC 
35. Qatar Yes 12 0.37 LDC 
No 
Rank 
South Africa No 5 0.03 LDC 
NOTES: DC = Developed country; LDC = Less-developed country; § = % of vessels under domestic flag above 40% of total 
(Source: extracted from UNCTAD Publications, 2016)  
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At a glance, the above table suggests some correlation between the stage of the 
country’s development and the percentage of domestic versus FOC-tonnage 
registration. Developed countries seem to flag more of their vessels under FOCs, while 
developing countries flag more at home.15 The view is further enforced by the widely 
held opinion that developing countries use cabotage as a means of stimulating domestic 
shipping and, in particular, as an instrument of increasing domestic flagged tonnages.16 
The domestically-flagged vessels are thereafter used to trade internationally. If that 
argument can be sustained, the observed trend would be crucial for South Africa, which 
is a developing country that trades with other developing countries, for instance, in the 
BRICS bloc.17 
However, an attempt to relate the size and strength of a country’s domestic fleet to its 
developmental status meets some challenges. A few developed countries show 
substantial tonnages under the home flag. Singapore, Hong Kong, Denmark, Italy and 
the Netherlands are typical examples. This suggests the existence of other factors that 
influence a country’s flagging patterns. The following section looks at cabotage 






15  Countries have been described according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) classification. 
However, the terms ‘Less Developed’ and ‘Developing’ countries have been used interchangeably. See 
Developing Country (nd), available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Developing_country#List_of_countries_that_are_graduated_developed_e
conomies_according_to_the_IMF. (Accessed 30 January 2018). 
16 See, for instance, A. Odeke, Protectionism and the Future of International Shipping (1984); and J.A. 
Sabatino Pizzolante Cabotage in the Andean Community: The Rebirth of the Merchant Marine? (2002), 
available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237555192_ 
Cabotage_in_the_Andean_Community_The_Rebirth_of_the_Merchant_Marine. (Accessed 
24 February 2018). See also T.A. O’Keefe Latin American and Caribbean Trade Agreements – Keys to 
a Prosperous Community of Americas (2009). 
17 South Africa’s Liner Shipping Bilateral Connectivity Index (LSBCI) for the year 2016 shows other 
developing countries such as China and Malaysia as its top trading partners. The LSBCI captures the 
overall quality of a liner shipping connection between pair of countries.  It therefore reflects the 
respective countries’ container trade ‘ties’ albeit that the emphasis is on the ‘effectiveness’ of the liner 
trade as opposed to the ‘intensity’. The LSBCI shows the maturing competitiveness of the liner shipping 
service between South Africa and each of these countries. See UNCTAD: Bilateral Liner Shipping 
Activity Connectivity since 2006 (2016), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/itcdtab74_en.pdf. (Accessed 7 February 2018). 
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5.4 INFLUENCE OF THE DEGREE OF CABOTAGE RESTRICTIONS  
A handful of countries that have appreciable numbers of vessels flagged both at home 
and elsewhere will be appraised to determine the extent to which cabotage restrictions 
apply in these jurisdictions and the level of such restrictions. The outcome will inform 
the overall picture of worldwide cabotage restrictions.  It will then be used to gauge 
whether certain approaches to cabotage restrictions influence the development of home 
registries, bearing in mind that the realisation of South Africa’s cabotage ambitions 
largely depends on the development of a viable domestic flag. Five categories have 
been created for this purpose.  
Two countries from each of the five categories have been examined to tease out the 
status of individual coastal practices in an attempt to discern if key features exist to 
cabotage restrictions that could be related to particular flagging patterns. The basis for 
grouping countries in this manner is twofold: first, to avoid burdening this work with 
the assessment of individual countries where consolidation is possible and thus avoid 
potential duplication; second, grouping countries promotes a wider consideration of 
factors that may influence coastal policies and consequently ensures a more diverse 
evaluation of how cabotage restrictions may influence ship registration patterns. As part 
of this diversity, countries that do not control the majority of world tonnage have also 
been included in the assessment. 
Table 5.2 below presents a list of countries derived from leading maritime nations 




Table 5.2: Cabotage manning and ownership restrictions  
















First category – 
Top 5 world tonnage leaders 
1. Greece  Liberal  100% Greek/ EU ownership, 
Greek captain, Certificate of 
Greek knowledge if Safety 
Officer is not Greek 
50% shares + Greek or EU 
nationals, Greek vessel 
management  
Yes 
2. Japan   Restrictive  100% Japanese subject to 
very strict conditions  
100% Japanese  No 
3. China   Restrictive 100% Chinese subject to 
very strict conditions 
100% Chinese  No 
4. Germany  Liberal German master and 50% + 
German/EU crew, Foreigners 
required to have safe 
manning certification issued 
in German  
50% shares + German or EU 
Company central office in 
German  
Yes 
5. Singapore  Open No Permanent residents and 
foreign nationals 
N/A 
Second category – 
EU countries outside the top 10 list  
6. Norway Liberal Non-EU members require 
work permits unless 
employed on EU vessels 
Six-tenths share ownership by 
Norwegian/ EU nationals, 
owner or vessel proven actual 
affiliation to Norway equates 
to ‘deemed nationality’, 
Company head office and 
board offices in Norway and 
chairman resident in Norway 
for 2 years +, ship’s economic 
activities and operation must 
be in Norway. 
Yes  
7. Denmark Open  No Two-thirds Danish/EU 
nationality or permanent 
resident with effective control. 
Company’s permanent 
presence in Denmark. 
N/A 
8. Belgium Open  No 50% + Belgian/EU ownership 
of the vessel. Require 
certification of technical 


















9. Italy Liberal 100% Italian/EU nationals,  
Non-EU crew to board 
Italian vessels subject to 
trade union agreements, 
Safety Officer must have 
knowledge of Italian 
50% + Italian/EU nationals Yes  
10. Netherlands Open  No Any person/ company from 
EU or Switzerland 
N/A 
Third category – 
Developing Countries on the top 35 list 
11. Brazil  Liberal Yes  Yes  
12. Russia Restrictive  Yes  Yes  
13 India Liberal Yes  Yes  
14. Indonesia Liberal  100% manned by Indonesian 
nationals  
50% + ownership of vessel/ 
company owning vessel. 
Yes  
Fourth category –  
OECD members outside the top 35 list  
15. Finland Yes  Yes 60 + share of Finnish/EU 
ownership. Foreign flags 
allowed, cabotage operations 
subject to Finnish authorities 
having the full right to specify 
the conditions as to use of the 
vessel 
Yes  
16. Iceland  Open  No Icelandic and EU nationals/ 
residents.  
Yes  
17. Ireland  Open  No EU Member nationals or EU 
company with principal place 
of business in EU 
N/A 
18. Sweden  Liberal Swedish captain and 50% + 
Swedish/EU crew 
50% + Swedish/EU nationals, 
EU company with principal 
place of business in EU, 
controlled in Sweden 
Yes  
19 Spain Liberal Spanish Captain and first 
officer and 50% minimum 
Spanish/EU crew  
Spanish/EU national, 
company representative 


















Fifth category – 
CAN  
 5% ownership of world fleet 
20. Bolivia Liberal  Yes   Yes  
21. Colombia Liberal Yes   Yes  
22. Ecuador  Liberal  Yes   Yes  
23. Peru Liberal  Peruvian captain and 80% of 
the crew, 30% + in respect of 
fishing vessels 
51% + Peruvian nationals 
domiciled in Peru, company 
must have principal place of 
business in Peru, have ‘real 
and effective headquarters’ in 
Peru, Peruvian board 
chairman, majority directors 
and general manager resident 
in Peru 
Yes  
24. Venezuela Open  No Foreign ownership of a 
Venezuelan vessel permitted 
subject only to the registration 
of the ship-owning company 
in Venezuela. Foreign vessels 
may also fly national flag 
under bareboat charter or lease 
N/A 
(Source: US MARAD18) 
The First category consists of the top five countries that control close to 50% of the 
world tonnage. These are Greece, Japan, China, Germany and Singapore. Greece and 
Singapore will be used as examples of this category. The Second category consists of 
EU member countries outside the top 10 of the leading countries. These are Norway, 
Denmark, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. These countries may also be categorised 
as developed countries. The examples in this category will be Denmark and Norway. 
The Third category is made up of developing countries on the list of 35 leading 
countries. These are China, India, Russia, Indonesia and Brazil. India and Indonesia 
will be used as examples. Incidentally, the majority of the countries in this category are 
South Africa’s trading partners in the BRICS bloc of nations. The Fourth and Fifth 
 
18 US MARAD By the Capes, Around the World – A Summary of World Cabotage Practices (October 
2001) in J.R.F. Hodgson & M.R. Brooks Canada’s Maritime Cabotage Policy (2001), available at 
http://maryrbrooks.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/CabotageFinal.pdf. (Accessed 19 February 2018). 
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categories are comprised of countries that fall outside the top 35 ship leading nations 
(at the bottom 5% of the world-tonnage ownership). The Fourth category consists of 
OECD members that are developed countries, namely Finland, Iceland, Ireland, 
Sweden and Spain. The examples will be Finland and Sweden. The Fifth category 
consists of developing countries Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
These countries are collectively called the Community of Andean Nations and are 
commonly known by the acronym CAN. Examples used in this category will be 
Venezuela and Peru. 
5.4.1 First category 
With the exception of China, the rest of the countries in this category are developed 
countries. Singapore graduated into the category in 1997.19 Three are from Asia and the 
other two are from Europe. Notably in this category, only China and Singapore possess 
more tonnages under the home flag than elsewhere. However, all these countries 
practise cabotage except Singapore. Cabotage restrictions in Japan and China require 
manning of vessels exclusively by respective nationals. China makes some exception 
that other nationalities may work on Chinese vessels with the approval of the 
authorities. In practice, however, Chinese vessels are manned by Chinese nationals 
exclusively, given the extent of formalities that the incumbent would have to navigate.20 
5.4.1.1 Greece 
Greece practises cabotage, but only in respect of non-EU vessels. Greece was the last 
member of the EU to liberalise cabotage policies on 1 November 2002.21 Before that 
date, Greece strictly protected its coastal trade against all foreign nationals. As a part 
of the EU, Greece permits only EU members to trade on its coast. Even for EU 
members, coastal operations are subject to conditions that must be met before Greek 
authorities can issue a licence permitting them to trade. Conditions include the 
requirement that the vessel seeking to trade in Greece must be authorised in flagged-
state cabotage trades, for instance. However, licence conditions are not set as 
 
19 Developing Country (note 15). 
20 Comparison Chart of Maritime Policies (20 June 2012), available at 
http://www.jpmac.or.jp/img/en/outline/Summary%20of%20the%202011%20Study.pdf. (Accessed 21 
February 2018). 
21 European Commission’s Fifth Report on the Implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime cabotage (2001-2010), 
22.04.14, 2 (EU Fifth Report). 
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preconditions to avoid breach of EU free-trade protocols to which restrictive adherence 
is required. These must be met while engagement regarding actual trade continues. 
Nevertheless, a vessel owner intending to operate in Greek waters must be issued with 
a licence by the Greek authority, which may be refused if the owner has not met the 
licence conditions. In any other case, only vessels under the Greek flag can operate on 
the coast. There is a requirement for the ship’s master to be a Greek national.22 Greek 
waivers do not apply except on a reciprocity basis with another flag in the discretion of 
the Minister of Merchant Marine.23 
5.4.1.2 Singapore 
Perhaps owing to the size of its coast, Singapore does not have restrictions regarding 
who may trade along its littoral waters. It therefore comes as no surprise that the 
Singaporean ship-registry laws24 do not discriminate against registration of foreign-
owned and locally-owned vessels. Conditions that are imposed seem to reflect a 
commercial rationale. For instance, vessels on the register must not be over 17 years 
old. This country’s commerce-orientated policy may partially explain its popularity.25 
Singapore therefore represents the only country in the top five tonnage-controlling 
nations that imposes no restrictions on its coastal trade. 
5.4.2 Second category  
This category deals with EU members on the list of top 35 nations (carrying capacity). 
The UK, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands and Iceland are EU members who 
do not have cabotage restrictions on their coast.26 However, of the six mentioned, only 
the UK has a sizeable coastal trade. 27 The European Commission Fifth Report28 shows 
 
22 J.R.F. Hodgson & M.R. Brooks Canada’s Maritime Cabotage Policy (2001), available at 
http://maryrbrooks.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/CabotageFinal.pdf. (Accessed 20 February 2018).  
23 http://www.maritimeadvocate.com/law_cases/the_evolution_of_greek_maritime_law.htm. (Accessed 
13 February 2018). 
24 Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships) Regulations, made under the Merchant Shipping Act 
(Chapter 179, sections 8, 44, 45, 216), available at 
https://www.mpa.gov.sg/web/wcm/connect/www/f81111eb-13af-4885-bb15-11948881f4bf/ms-
registration-of-ships-regs.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. (Accessed 13 February 2018). 
25 The Singapore ship registry ranks fifth in the world with over 127 000 dwt registered on it. See 
UNCTAD Publications for more details. 
26 See UNCTAD Publications 2014 and also EU Fifth Report (note 21), particularly with regard to the 
fact that Cyprus has Bilateral Agreements restricting cabotage. 13. 
27 Hodgson & Brooks (note 22). 
28 EU Fifth Report (note 21). 
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that Denmark possesses a comparatively moderate coastal trade,29 but that the size of 
its coastal market has been shrinking. Belgium and the Netherlands have low volumes 
of cargo on their coasts.30 This scenario seems to offer an explanation for the lack of 
effort to apply restrictive cabotage in these two jurisdictions. Expanding the EU view 
to include Italy, which imposes restrictions on coastal trades, also indicates a nexus 
between high coastal volumes and cabotage restrictions. Further, geography seems to 
play a pivotal role in this scenario. Italy’s restrictive approach probably finds its basis 
in the fact that Italy has a considerable coastline and a few small and large islands.  
Belgium’s non-restrictive approach, on the other hand, seems consistent with the fact 
that its coast is short, with excellent landside infrastructure. Italy’s annual coastal 
volumes were about 58.6 million tons in 2010. Coastal trade volumes for both Belgium 
and the Netherlands over the same period have never reached a million tons.31 In the 
circumstances, it is not unreasonable to conclude that substantial coastal volumes are a 
factor that justifies the existence of cabotage restrictions on the coast.  
Attention now turns to the two examples of the category. 
5.4.2.1 Norway 
Norwegian coastal trade is reserved to Norwegian nationals under Regulation No. 
3577/92, made under the Norwegian Act of 4 December 1992 No. 121 on Services in 
Maritime Transport. EU members trade freely on the Norwegian coast on the strength 
of Regulation No. 3577/92, issued by the EU Council of the European Economic Area 
(EEA), which prohibits EU member states from restricting access to each other’s trades. 
Norwegian annual coastal volumes were about 42.5 million tons in 2010. In the context 
of cabotage as the driver of flag building, only vessels that meet the restrictive criterion 
of the Norwegian ship register could carry these volumes. However, latest 
developments have seen a relaxation that permits a dilution of these rules. Norway does 
not have a single ‘home’ register for its national merchant fleet. It has the Norwegian 
Ordinary Ship Register (NOR) and the Norwegian International Ship Register (NIS). 
Vessels under the NOR must be owned by at least 60% Norwegian nationals or by EU 
 
29 Table 4.1: Cabotage Transport of Goods shows Denmark’s coastal capacity at about 14.1 million 
tons in 2010. The UK, the leader of the EEA coastal activity in volume terms, had about 71.3 million 
tons during the same year. 
30 EU Fifth Report (note 21), 22.04.14, 8. (See also ibid. 54.) 
31 Ibid. 
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members, but the company that owns the vessel does not have to be registered in 
Norway. Its head office must, however, be located in Norway. 32  The majority of 
directors and the chairman must be Norwegian and all of them must be resident in the 
country.33 On the back of this ship-registration arrangement, only tonnage from the 
NOR is eligible for Norwegian cabotage trades. 
NIS registration extends registration rights to nationals and foreigners alike, hence the 
exclusion from coastal trades. Therefore, Norwegian ownership in foreign-controlled 
vessels is not a prerequisite for eligibility for registration by the NIS. The NIS gives 
vessel owners the benefit of financial savings that would otherwise be available only 
under FOCs. Both foreign- and Norwegian-owned ships can be included in the NIS. 
The primary goal for the approach seems to stem from a desire to achieve the goal of 
maintaining a national fleet. The NIS mimics FOC conditions as close as possible. For 
instance, tax benefits include exemption from income tax for non-Norwegians 
operating NIS-registered vessel or where the NIS-registered vessel is owned by both 
Norwegian and foreign interests. Seafarers resident abroad (residents of Nordic 
countries excluded) are exempted from taxation. The only requirement is the 
appointment of Norwegians for vessel management of the foreign-owned fleet. 34 
Initially, NIS-registered vessels were excluded from coastal trades in terms of 
Regulations No. 802 of 1989. However, with effect from 1 January 2016, the rights of 
NIS-registered vessels were extended in certain circumstances in terms of Regulations 
of 8 October 2015 No. 1170, for example, if involved in specialised trades. The 
condition for coastal operations is that the master of the NIS vessel must be a 
Norwegian national or a national from the EU.35 
A combination of both these registers makes up the ‘national fleet’ by virtue of the fact 
that both the NOR and the NIS are Norwegian registers. The effectiveness of this dual 
system manifests itself in the fact that in 2016 the Norwegian domestic flag had only 
150 fewer vessels compared to Norwegian vessels flagged under various FOC 
 
32 Trade Areas NIS Ships (2016), available at https://www.sdir.no/en/shipping/registration-of-
commercial-vessels-in-nisnor/new-registration-nis/trade-areas-nis-ships/#Section_1_Application. 
(Accessed 13 February 2018). 
33 EU Fifth Report (note 21), 23. 
34 Trade Areas (note 32). 
35 Ibid. 
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registers.36 Norway issues licences to allow NIS tonnage to work on its coast to further 
national interests. However, Norway’s fleet registered outside the NOR and the NIS 
accounts for a higher number of vessels owned by Norwegians. Nevertheless, its 
domestic-flagged fleet represents about 46% of its total fleet, which indicates the 
strength of the attractiveness of its dual system of ship registration. 
5.4.2.2 Denmark  
The Danish market is generally liberal as a result of its affiliation to the EU and the 
World Trade Organisation. There are no cabotage restrictions on Denmark’s coast, 
although some restrictions exist with regard to ownership under the flag. Its coastal 
trade has shown moderate growth. Denmark recorded annual coastal cargo of about 
14.8 million tons in 2010.37 Its coastal trade has been open to any vessel regardless of 
its flag. The country’s domestic trade policy approach seems to be provided largely 
through a selection of bilateral agreements that give chosen countries a right to access 
its markets.38 For example, Denmark concluded a bilateral agreement with China as far 
back as 1974. The agreement was updated in the year 2000 to bring it in line with 
modern shipping standards. Denmark was also one of the EU countries that were 
involved when China entered into an agreement with EU members.39 Foreign nationals 
are allowed to register their vessels in the Danish domestic register provided that 
foreign seafarers receive terms equivalent to their Danish counterparts.40  
Denmark operates a dual system of ship registration through the Denmark International 
Ship Register (DIS), which is structurally similar to the NIS.  
5.4.3 Third category  
Cabotage policies of all the countries in this category do not allow free foreign coastal 
trading. With the exception of Indonesia, all these countries are South Africa’s close 
trading partners in the BRICS bloc of nations. Brazil, for instance, gives coastal trade 
preferences to Brazilian nationally-flagged vessels over FOCs by virtue of Law 
 
36 UNCTAD: Review 2016 reported numbers of Norwegian beneficially owned vessels to be at 858 
and 996 for domestic and FOC registration respectively.  
37 Ibid. 
38 International Relations (2015) European Commission/Danish Maritime Authority, available at 
http://www.dma.dk/themes/jointheDanishmerchantfleet/Sider/Internationalrelations.aspx. (Accessed 




9.432/97. Russia places the same restrictions with respect to its coast under Russian 
Government Resolution No. 404 of 24 May 2001. Foreign vessels may be engaged on 
the Russian or Brazilian coast only as an exception, to cater for the lack of appropriate 
tonnage or to provide for emergency towage services in the absence of domestic 
vessels.  
5.4.3.1 India 
Sections 406 and 407 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 regulate Indian cabotage. 
India handled about 117.78 million metric tons of coastal cargo for the 2016 financial 
year.41  Only Indian-flagged vessels or vessels chartered by Indian nationals under 
licence issued by the Director General of Shipping can participate in coastal activities. 
Standard exceptions apply. Foreign vessels will be permitted to carry cargo between 
two Indian ports in the absence of suitable Indian tonnage, or under licence. The 
Director General may grant a general licence, which allows the foreign vessel to trade 
only in some Indian ports and not in others. Alternatively, the authority may issue a 
licence that grants permission to trade over a specific period of time or on a voyage 
basis. The licence may have other applicable conditions. The Director General’s powers 
are such that licensing is flexible enough to allow this office a discretion to engage 
foreign vessels whenever it is deemed appropriate to do so. The wide powers that the 
Director General possesses have been applied to relax cabotage restrictions for a variety 
of reasons. For instance, cabotage has been recently lifted for a period, in one event, in 
order to attract container transshipment volumes. 42  In another involving vehicle 
transportation, the motivation was to reduce road and rail congestion through the 
utilisation of foreign-flagged RORO vessels, which diverted vehicular cargo volumes 
to coastal shipping.43  
 
41 Coastal Cargo Handled in India 2018, by Major Port (2018) Statista, available at 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/693091/coastal-cargo-volume-handled-by-major-port-india/. 
(Accessed 21 February 2018). 
42 The motivation for uplifting cabotage was to reduce operating times and therefore make it more 
attractive for mainline foreign vessels used in transshipment of containers destined for or coming from 
India at neighbouring Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Singapore. See India Relaxes Cabotage Protections for 
Container Shipping (11 March 2016), available at https://www.joc.com/port-news/asian-ports/india-
relaxes-cabotage-protections-container-shipping_20160311.html. (Accessed 13 February 2018). 
43 India Loosens Cabotage Laws (2015), available at 
https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/india-loosens-cabotage-laws#gs.ss7w=DM. (Accessed 
15 February 2018). 
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5.4.3.2 Indonesia  
Cabotage was reintroduced in Indonesia through Maritime Law No. 17 of 2008. 
Indonesian coastal trade accounts for about 7% of its total national freight and 
passenger trade.44 Coastal trade is open only to Indonesian Sea Carriage Companies, 
which must be established and licensed as such. The vessels of these companies must 
be owned (majority shareholding of at least 51%) and manned by Indonesian 
nationals.45 Indonesia also operates on a licence-based system that is controlled by the 
Minister of Transport on terms similar to those existing in other jurisdictions. The 
Minister issues what it calls a Shipping Company Business Licence, which must 
comply with certain rules.46 The issuing of licences is an indication that Indonesia does 
not have a restrictive cabotage policy. Where deemed expedient, the Indonesian 
Ministry of Transport (MOT) may issue a licence as provided for in the MOT 
Regulations allowing foreign vessels to participate in coastal trading in respect of a 
particular sector for a specified period.47 In the event that such time extension expires 
before the objective has been achieved for the licence, the MOT can reissue another 
MOT Regulation to extend the time, or add to or vary the initial regulation.48 Therefore, 
in Indonesia, a foreign ship-owning company in which Indonesian nationals have no 
shares and whose vessels are crewed only by foreign nationals can continue to operate 
on the Indonesian coast for an indefinite period until domestic capacity has been 
developed.  
 
44 The Report: Indonesia 2014 (nd) Oxford Business Group 273, available at 
https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/indonesia-2014. (Accessed 22 November 2019). 
45 Cabotage and its Impact in India (4 March 2015), available at 
https://www.clydeco.com/insight/article/cabotage-and-its-impact-in-indonesia. (Accessed 15 February 
2018). 
46 Ibid. 
47 The Ministry issued Regulation No 48 of 2011 to deal with tonnage shortages in the oil and gas sectors. 
Gerald Yee of Clyde & Co, Indonesia, argues that this type of licencing strategy allows for relaxation of 
cabotage conditions in cases of domestic supply shortages and restrictive application once domestic 
capabilities have recovered. See ‘Cabotage and its Impact in Indonesia’ available at Clyde & Co.com 
(note 45). 
48 For instance, MOT Regulation Number PM 100 of Year 2014 has seen several amendments: MOT 
Regulation Number PM 79 Year 2014; MOT Regulation Number PM 10 Year 2015 and MOT 
Regulation Number PM 200 Year 2015. Currently MOT Regulation Number PM 100 Year 2016 is in 
place. See SSEK Legal Consultants Indonesia Extends Cabotage Exemption, available at 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a8172147-3ccf-4f59-bc16-46df69aa69ec. (Accessed 
22 November 2019). 
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Indonesian and Indian cabotage systems represent a fairly liberal form of cabotage, 
which appears on the face of it to be quite restrictive, while in practice it is relatively 
lax. 
5.4.4 Fourth category  
This category consists of developed countries who are OECD members and who are 
not on the list of the leading 35 nations. Iceland and Ireland have no restrictions on their 
coast, whereas Finland, Sweden and Spain prohibit coastal operations by foreign 
vessels.49 Iceland and Ireland have very low levels of coastal trade volumes. Irish 
volumes have reached a million tons only twice in ten years between 2001 and 2010, 
while Icelandic volumes have never reached a million. Unsurprisingly, Spain’s coastal 
volumes seem comparatively high given the country’s coastal topography. Its annual 
coastal volumes were about 80.7 million tons in 2010.50 Coastal volumes for Finland 
and Sweden appear in the discussions below.  
5.4.4.1 Finland 
As a member state of the EU, Finland is regionally subject to EU Regulation No 
3577/92. Domestically, Finnish cabotage is regulated in terms of Law of 15.02.199/342 
read with the Law of 19.05.2000/440. The former governs transport operations under 
licence, while the latter deals with international combined transport. Finland’s coastal 
volume share is at an average of about six million tons per annum.51 Finnish cabotage 
restrictions do not apply to EU member states. All other coastal operations are reserved 
for vessels under the domestic flag or, in certain circumstances, under the Finnish 
second registry known as the National Flag List of Cargo Vessels in International 
Trade.52 Finland’s domestic flag requires 60% shareholding of ship ownership to be in 
Finnish hands.53 The innovation is that Finnish cabotage imposes no restrictions on a 
vessel registered outside Finland and outside the EU, provided such vessel was 1) built 
 
49 Hodgson & Brooks (note 22). 
50 Coastal Shipping Transport Volume in Spain 2006-2015 (2015), available at 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/436974/coastal-shipping-transport-volume-in-million-tonne-km-in-
spain/. (Accessed 25 July 2019). 
51EU Fifth Report (note 21), 22.04.14, 8. 
52 Hodgson & Brooks (note 22).  
53 Survey on Cabotage and on the Various Elements Needed to Fix Prices and National Terms 
Governing the Goods Transport Contract (2007), available at 
https://www.iru.org/sites/default/files/2017-01/cabotage-survey-Finland-en.pdf. (Accessed 
22 November 2019). 
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in Finland and was immediately registered in that register; 2) such second register is 
not an FOC; and 3) strong reasons can been shown that such registration will promote 
ship building and job creation in Finland. Permission to register in the second register 
is limited to the period of the charter, for instance.54  
5.4.4.2 Sweden  
Swedish cabotage is perhaps better explained from the perspective of the rules of the 
EU. Sweden regulates cabotage under the provisions of Council Regulation No 3118/93 
read with Regulation No 3315/94 of the EEA. The country’s coastal trade averages 
about 11 million tonnes per annum.55 Only Swedish vessels and EU member vessels 
can load and discharge cargo between Swedish ports. Foreign flags are completely 
excluded from participation. As a means of ensuring minimum operational disruptions, 
Swedish authorities reserve themselves the right to waive cabotage restrictions if 
suitable tonnage is not available domestically and cannot be sourced from other EU 
members. However, there are Swedish restrictions to which waivers do not apply. 
Swedish authorities require a Swedish master for every vessel that operates on the coast, 
and at least 50% of the crew must be Swedish or EU nationals for vessels that are 
registered on its second register.56  Therefore, vessels on the Swedish second register 
are obliged to adhere to these manning requirements as a prerequisite for cabotage 
participation. This seems to indicate that Swedish crew rights enjoy particular priority 
in the country’s cabotage policy. 
5.4.5 Fifth category  
This category consists of the Community of Andean Nations (CAN). The CAN 
countries are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Venezuela and Peru 
will be used as examples of domestic cabotage. CAN countries possess sizeable inter-
trade activity. In 2000 CAN was already generating about 7.5 million tons, 55% of which 
was coastal trade, a tenth of which was carried through inland waters.57  
 
54 https://www.traficom.fi/en/transport/maritime/ship-registration. (Accessed 16 February 2018). 
55 EU Fifth Report (note 21), 22.04.14. 
56 Hodgson & Brooks (note 22) 55. 
57 Ibid. 6. 
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Individual Latin American countries, like most developing countries, reserved cargo 
and restricted foreign flag participation to foster their merchant marines. 58  These 
mechanisms proved a success, in Chile and Brazil, for instance, where cargo 
reservations were followed by massive shipbuilding in those countries. The increase in 
national builds was also buoyed by the UNCTAD Liner Code of Conduct, which 
advocated the 40:40:20 Rule.59 However, cargo reservation penalised the consumer, 
who had to pay higher freights than would have been the case in an open market.60  
CAN sought to avoid the surge in cost. It therefore established a body through which it 
would retain a measure of flexibility in applying its exclusionary rules. CAN members 
bound themselves to the monitoring and compliance body, the CAATA (Comité Andino 
de Autoridades de Transporte Acuático – also known as the Andean Committee of Aquatic 
Transport Authorities). CAATA obliges members to liberalise their trades inter se in 
concert to ensure competition. CAATA Decision 288 prescribes that cargo originating from 
the sub-region may be carried only by vessels owned, chartered or operated by companies 
belonging to its member states.61 It does not prescribe how individual members should 
conduct cabotage with respect to third party states. However, Decision 314 obliges member 
states to develop policies to promote sub-regional fleets through practical measures that 
involve eliminating bureaucracy in ship-registration processes, the provision of long-term 
financial instruments for the acquisition of suitable vessels, establishing liberal legal 
frameworks, shipping-friendly labour and tax requirements, and encouragement of foreign 
investments.62   
5.4.5.1 Venezuela 
In Venezuela foreign vessels not registered under the domestic ship registry are not 
allowed participation in coastal trade except in transshipments and in the repositioning 
of their own empty coastal containers. Two pieces of legislation govern coastal 
shipping in Venezuela: The Law for Reactivation of the National Merchant Marine and 
the Law for the Protection and Development of the Merchant Marine. These laws allow 
foreigners 100% ownership of a Venezuelan vessel subject only to the registration of 
the ship-owning company in Venezuela. These foreign vessels are also allowed to fly 
 
58 Sabatino Pizzolante (note 16). 
59 O’Keefe (note 16). 
60 Sabatino Pizzolante (note 16). 
61 Ibid. 7. 
62 Ibid. 
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the national flag with 100% foreign ownership under bareboat charter or lease. 63 
Therefore, it seems that Venezuela offers some of the most liberal avenues to foreign 
interests who want to participate in cabotage trades, which incidentally include coastal 
cargo otherwise reserved for CAN members. Furthermore, vessels involved in cabotage 
trades are entitled to a 50% rebate in port dues and are exonerated from VAT and other 
taxes. However, despite an overtly foreign-friendly cabotage regime, vessel numbers 
on the Venezuelan national ship register remain low.64  
Commenting on Venezuela, Pizzolante65 argues that legislation intended to stimulate 
the merchant marine requires government to complement it with a set of clear policies; 
specific objectives; an update of related statutes (particularly employment legislation); 
the certainty of staple cargo; and, above all, ensuring a stable political environment.66  
5.4.5.2 Peru 
Peruvian cabotage is regulated under the National Merchant Navy Marine Reactivation 
and Promotion Law No. 28583 of 22 July 2005. In Peru, maritime transport may be 
conducted only by nationals or by nationally-registered companies. The Peruvian 
company must have its principal domicile and “real and effective headquarters” in 
Peru.67 The chairman of the board, the majority of directors and the general manager 
must be nationals and must be residents of Peru. The captain and 80% of the crew on 
board a Peruvian-flagged vessel must be nationals. Nationals may use foreign-flagged 
vessels for only six months. Manning restrictions extend even to fishing vessels, which 
must be manned by at least 30% of nationals.68 
 
5.5  SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS 
The proliferation of second registers has provided many countries with a method of 
developing their national merchant fleets. The mid-1980s saw the establishment of the 
Norwegian NIS, German GIS, Denmark DIS and the Italian IIS. France has its second 
 
63 Ibid. 9. 
64 Ibid. 14. 
65 Sabatino Pizzolante (note 16). 
66 Ibid. 15. 
67 OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Peru (2008), available at https://epdf.pub/oecd-investment-
policy-reviews-peru.html. (Accessed 22 November 2019). 
68 Ibid. 
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register in Kerguelen, Portugal in Madeira, the Netherlands in the Dutch Antilles, and 
Spain in the Canary Islands. The UK has quite a few locations for its second registries. 
They are in Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Gibraltar and the Isle of Man, and in other 
places. 
The relevance of these second registers is that they provide an avenue for national 
vessels registered outside the national register to participate in cabotage trades of their 
countries despite the fact that they do not meet national imperatives governing their 
(first) national register. Typical examples of countries 69 that allow participation of 
vessels in the second register in coastal trades are Australia, Canada, China, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden.70  Notably Greece, China, Japan and Germany lead the top 35 table (see Figure 
5.1 above). 
On the basis of the above overview it appears that globally, the form of cabotage and 
the level of its strictness largely depends on each country’s capacity (including the 
country’s economic strength) and what each deems beneficial to its citizens relative to 
its coastal resources. Depending on each country’s deemed priorities, its coastal 
resources are then directed towards shipbuilding, ownership and control, ship 
management, ship operations, employment, skills development and the retention of 
such skills. The importance of these factors in each country determines the degree of 
austerity of its cabotage which in turn influences how that country shapes its domestic 
register. There seems to be no one-size-fits-all approach. 
5.6 CONCLUSION  
The chapter set out to identify forms of cabotage practices. Two forms or types of 
cabotage were identified as the norm worldwide. These are restrictive and liberal 
cabotage. Open cabotage is not considered a form of cabotage. It is viewed as a 
fortuitous “form” of cabotage that often arises by virtue of a jurisdiction’s acquiescence 
to foreign coastal trade involvement rather than a deliberate policy position. In this 
context South Africa is considered to have no cabotage. 
 
69 Countries that do not practise cabotage but that allow participation in coastal trades on this basis 
have not been included. 
70 KX Li & J Wonham ‘Registration of Vessels – New Developments in Ship Registration’ (1999) 
14(1) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 137–154 137. 
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The chapter described how each form of cabotage operates. In particular, the chapter 
explained instances of restrictive cabotage practices and their degree of rigidity; and 
gave examples of countries where they are found. Liberal cabotage practices and 
mechanisms for their application were also explained. The emphasis was on the fact 
that liberal cabotage practices depend on waivers implemented under specific 
conditions usually predicated by tonnage demand and supply cycles of each coastal 
state. The chapter gave some focus to the EU concept of regional cabotage in light of 
the fact that the CMTP envisages SADC cabotage. 
The chapter then evaluated a broad sample of countries that practise cabotage and 
assessed the influences of the degree of the strictness of its cabotage principles (or 
absence thereof). An attempt was then made to relate the result to each jurisdiction’s 
cabotage practice in general and particularly its ship registration arrangements. 
Countries were presented in five categories. The two categories consist of countries that 
own the highest volumes of deadweight capacity in the world. These are mostly ‘first 
world’ countries. The third category comprises South Africa’s chief trading partners in 
the BRICS bloc and Indonesia. In order to make the sample more representative of the 
world’s total deadweight tonnage, countries that fall outside the list of the leading 35 
nations were also discussed. These countries mostly appear in categories Four and Five.  
A summary was then made which seems to indicate that the majority of the top 35 
coastal jurisdictions largely own tonnage under two forms of fleet registries: under the 
domestic flag or under the second register. The second register often offers terms which 
are relatively similar to FOC terms of operation and are better in comparison to those 
offered under domestic flag registers. Therefore, the degree to which each jurisdiction 
applies cabotage restrictions seems to determine which of the two forms vessel 
operators prefer. 
Consequently, second registries are often used to lure domestic owners away from 
traditional FOC registries over which the country has no influence. The second register, 
which the country controls, is then positioned as a means of retaining the fleet under 
the country’s authority. Once again, depending on the degree of strict cabotage applied, 
vessels in second registries are eligible to participate in cabotage trades as these are 
often typically owned by nationals, manned by local crews, often built locally and in 
general operated in a manner that promotes the same national interests as vessels under 
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the so-called “first register”.  However, to distinguish between vessels in the first and 
second registers, it would appear that the former are generally given preference in 
cabotage trades, while the latter are usually utilised to supplement tonnage shortages 
and therefore participate in cabotage trades provided certain conditions have been met. 
To conclude, there is no debate that South Africa is short on tonnage and related 
resources for cabotage implementation. Building the domestic fleet on the basis of a 
second register is not part of the policy. The country does not seem to have the potential 
for a second register in any event. The only practical option for South Africa remains 
in substantial acquisitions of tonnage, failing which the country will continue to depend 
on the involvement of foreign flags for its coastal operation well into the foreseeable 
future. Since acquisition of suitable tonnage cannot be achieved overnight, pragmatism 
calls for the operation of coastal trades using foreign flags while building the nationally-
registered merchant fleet.  Therefore, the scenario points towards the adoption of liberal 
cabotage because restrictive cabotage severely limits engagement of foreign-flagged 
vessels. With regard to regional cabotage, the perspective of the CMTP is that SADC 
cabotage will be born out of the South African fleet. On that premise, the only 
conclusion is that SADC cabotage cannot be realistically pursued until a South African 
domestic fleet has been established. Without a domestic fleet, it may simply be too 
early to consider regional cabotage.  
Chapters 6 and 7 will look respectively at restrictive and liberal cabotage. Each practice 
has been structured on the basis of the individual country’s specific priorities. The aim 
of the exercise will be to glean the benefits and challenges experienced in the particular 
jurisdictions. Nigeria and the United States will serve as examples of restrictive 




CHAPTER 6:  
STRICT CABOTAGE PRACTICES:  
NIGERIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
The preceding chapter dealt with an overview of global cabotage practices in various 
jurisdictions. It gave the reader the length and breadth of the elements of cabotage and 
the diverse approaches to its practice as well as the basis on which various individual 
jurisdictions or blocs of countries implement it in its strict or liberal form. This chapter 
provides specific accounts of the application of strict cabotage, which is the less 
common of the two forms of cabotage. Instances of liberal cabotage will be covered in 
the next chapter. 
CLASSIC FEATURES OF STRICT CABOTAGE 
 Strict cabotage typically translates to policies that: 
1. Ordinarily prohibit foreign participation. Where foreign participation is 
allowed, foreign shares in vessel-owning companies involved in cabotage are 
usually limited to the maximum of 25%.  Therefore, shares held in respect of 
each cabotage vessel must show a corresponding proportion of at least 75% in 
favour of local nationals (as there is sometimes a requirement that controlling 
shareholders must be resident nationals). 
2. Cabotage vessels must fly the domestic flag and must engage a minimum of 
75% of national crews on board at any given time.  
3. Cabotage vessels must be built and repaired locally with locally-sourced 
spares. Usually there are no exceptions in this regard.  If exceptions were to 
apply a minimum of 75% of local content would be required. 
These features are customary in strict cabotage jurisdictions. They may, however, be 
applied in varying degrees. It is possible to find a different weighting of each of these 
characteristics, which makes levels of restriction differ somewhat from one strict 
cabotage jurisdiction to another. For example, among the well-known protagonists of 
strict cabotage, which include the United States of America, Japan, Nigeria and Peru, 
the United States would perhaps reflect a higher degree of rigidity and restrictiveness, 
followed by Japan and Peru. Nigeria may arguably be as strict as the United States. 
However, its cabotage laws have yet to reach full application. Therefore, Nigeria may 
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be rated among the most stringent cabotage practitioners based on its policy documents, 
but the manner in which cabotage is applied in Nigeria renders it comparatively far less 
strict in practice than the other jurisdictions mentioned, as will be seen later in the 
discussion below. 
The chapter uses Nigeria and the United States as examples for strict cabotage. It also 
provides a background that deals with the coastal shipping frameworks of these two 
countries, to provide proper context. The reasons for choosing the United States and 
Nigeria as examples of strict cabotage were stated in the first chapter.  However, it may 
be worthwhile reiterating those reasons here.  
Nigeria has a clearly articulated legislative position on cabotage. The country is 
probably Africa’s strongest cabotage protagonist. Like South Africa, Nigeria has a long 
history of European shipping involvement and foreign coastal domination. Therefore 
Nigeria’s drive for coastal economic reform, which focuses on increased participation 
of indigenous people, resonates with the aspirations expressed in the South African 
maritime policy. Moreover, Nigeria and South Africa are both obliged to implement 
cabotage nationally, regionally and continentally in terms of Article 15 of the Revised 
African Union Transport Charter.1 Nigeria is therefore instructive for South Africa 
since it reached the first milestone of the Charter in 2003 when it enacted national 
cabotage legislation, as will be seen below.  
Any meaningful and systematic treatment of cabotage inevitably involves a discussion 
of United States coastal shipping, given that the country is probably the earliest 
jurisdiction to codify cabotage into law and remains among the strictest exemplars of 
cabotage in existence.2  Over the years the United States government has defended and 
continues to defend cabotage vigorously as a fundamental policy, despite a barrage of 
criticism levelled against it for not changing its stance.  
  
 
1 Article 15(1) of the Revised African Union Transport Charter (Charter) requires African States to 
promote Trans-African Cabotage at national, regional and continental levels. Article 15(2) encourages 
the establishment of shipping lines to carry intra-African trade. 
2 T Grennes An Economic Analysis of the Jones Act (2017) Mercatus Research, Mercatus Center 
Arlington, VA George Mason University 39. Grennes says the United States is regarded as possessing 
probably the strictest cabotage regime, followed by Japan and China. 
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6.1  NIGERIA 
Nigeria possesses a coastline of about 800 km and about 3 000 km of inland 
waterways.3 The major part of Nigerian coastal trade consists of oil and gas activity, 
which constitutes about 91% of the total coastal trade. 4  The remainder combines 
passenger and breakbulk cargo movements.  
6.1.1 Period from early 1960s to early 1990s  
A brief outline of Nigeria’s recent shipping history is necessary to understand its current 
framework.  Like other African states, Nigeria’s shipping context is embedded in its 
colonial past. Nigeria became a British protectorate in 1901 at the pinnacle of European 
expansion into Africa. The country gained independence about half a century later. In 
1962 the newly formed legislature of the Federation of Nigeria enacted the Merchant 
Shipping Act,5 which consolidated shipping practice in Nigeria in a manner that was 
not designed to benefit Nigerian indigenous people. The MSA dictated shipping 
business in Nigeria for over four decades. It covered a variety of Nigerian shipping 
issues. However, only three are covered in this discussion. These are cabotage, ship 
ownership and training and crewing. 
With regard to the first issue, the MSA introduced codified exclusivity rules for trade 
within Nigerian waters. Only a Nigerian ship, a Commonwealth ship6 or a certified ship 
could trade in or from Nigerian waters. 7  The restriction was not called cabotage. 
However, the MSA clearly required, as a prerequisite to trading on the coast, that a 
foreign vessel (other than a Nigerian-registered vessel or a Commonwealth vessel) had 
to obtain a licence to do so.  
The exclusive right to trade in Nigerian waters was closely connected to the ship’s 
national identity and was vigorously protected. Authorities were entitled to call for 
proof if they had “reason to believe that there [was] some doubt”8 regarding whether in 
fact the Nigerian-registered ship validly qualified to be registered in Nigeria. If the 
 
3 O.A. Savage-Oyekunle ‘Effect of the Cabotage Act 2003 on Nigerian Maritime Industry’, available at 
http://www.lasu.edu.ng/publications/law/oluremi_savage-oyekunle_bk_2.pdf. (Accessed 17 May 
2018). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Merchant Shipping Act 1962 No. 30 (“MSA”). 
6 A ship owned by a Commonwealth citizen or that is registered in a Commonwealth state. 
7 Section 5(1)(a) to (c) of Chapter 2 of the Act. 
8 Section 306(3). 
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master of such ship failed to produce proof within 30 days of the demand to do so, the 
ship was liable to forfeiture.9  Trade restrictions on the Nigerian coast were therefore 
classic cabotage practice.  
However, there were no requirements for vessels to be built in Nigeria, manned or 
owned by Nigerian citizens; nor was there any expectation regarding control or ship 
ownership (through majority board membership of the ship owning company or 
requiring establishment of company offices in Nigeria). However, contrary to practices 
observed in traditional cabotage trades, business related to the ship (agency, 
commercialisation, manning or any other activity ordinarily associated with the ship’s 
flag) was located outside of Nigeria, as will be seen below. 
The second issue concerned ownership. A ship could not be registered in Nigeria unless 
owned wholly by “persons qualified to own registered Nigerian ships”, 10  namely 
Nigerians as Commonwealth citizens and foreign citizens and their corporate entities 
established outside Nigeria, with headquarters typically in Europe.11 Owners of these 
vessels had a choice of registering such vessels either in Nigeria or in a Commonwealth 
state. The choice the owner made did not affect the rights of the vessel to operate in 
Nigerian cabotage trades. The ship enjoyed dual registration provided the ‘sharing’ 
Commonwealth state recognised dual registration.  Otherwise the ship would be only a 
Nigerian vessel.  
Section 307 of the MSA required registration of a vessel “if it is owned by Nigerians 
as citizens or as body corporates”, provided a Nigerian citizen or company already 
owned such vessel at the time the section came into force. 12  There was minimal 
indigenous Nigerian shipping participation under this arrangement. The classic 
examples were the shipping interests of Patrick Osoba (who had shares in the Finnish-
controlled and Finnish-registered ‘Nigeria Lines’ in partnership with Nordstrom and 
 
9 Section 307(4). 
10 Section 306(1): “… [A] ship shall not be registered in Nigeria under this Act unless she is owned 
wholly by persons of the following descriptions (in this Act referred to as ‘persons qualified to own a 
registered Nigerian ship’)– 
(a) Commonwealth citizens  
(b) Bodies corporate established under and subject to, the law of a Commonwealth country and 
having their principal place of business in a Commonwealth country.” 
11 Section 306(1)(a) and (b) (note 10). 
12 Section 307(5). 
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Co) and the Nigerian government’s own line, The Nigerian National Shipping Line Ltd 
(NNSL).  
The company started as a joint venture of three parties. The government, on the one 
side, held a 51% share, while Elder Dempster and Palm Lines held 33% and 16% of 
the shares, respectively.13 The NNSL had offices in Nigeria and Liverpool. It provided 
cargo services between the UK, Continent, Mediterranean and West Africa. 14  The 
company’s marine superintendent and deputy superintendent and engineer15 appear to 
have been the only foreigners. Otherwise, the board of directors, including the 
chairman,16 were all Nigerians by virtue of the fact that this was a state-owned entity.  
Apart from government officials, indigenous Nigerian citizens traditionally did not 
enjoy any real or meaningful cabotage participation in cabotage trade or shipping 
through vessel ownership, trade, ship building or through any activities that the coastal 
state normally provides. Therefore, with the exception of the NNSL, which became the 
singular exception, foreign interests dominated Nigerian cabotage trades.  
The third issue that the MSA dealt with related to restrictions against Nigerian 
participation in crewing and ancillary services. A prescribed system existed, governing 
who might be trained and who might be employed or otherwise engaged as a seaman 
in Nigerian waters. 17  Nigeria did not have an open employment market where a 
seafarer’s seafaring competence determined the suitability of his employability. All 
seamen were carefully ‘screened’ by a statutory office, which placed requirements that 
met state imperatives.18  Ironically, under the MSA, Nigerian citizens were not targets 
for apprenticeship or engagement on Nigerian-registered ships, in much the same way 
as Nigerian ship ownership was not intended for national owners. The design of the 
 
13 G.B. Bello-Olowookere ‘The Effects of Cabotage Regime on Indigenous Shipping in Nigeria’ 2011. 
Dissertation, World Maritime University. 
14 International Shipping and Shipbuilding Directory, Benn Brothers (Marine Publications) Limited, 
London 1969. 
15 Capt. J. Farrell and W.M. Potts, See International Shipping and Shipbuilding Directory (note 14) 
230. 
16 Ibid. 230. Directors of the board were N.O. Oyesiku,(General Manager), Lt. Col. V.L. Oduwaiye, 
G.N.O. Sefia, A.S. Alanamu, J.A. Adeyeye, P.O. Ahimie; and the chairman was Adekunle Ojora, who 
was at the helm until 1973. 
17 Section 17 made provisions for apprenticeship of boys by implication excluding girls while section 
20 established the Mercantile Marine Office (and its tentacles). Subsection (1) made these locations 
where “all the business within Nigeria connected with the engagement and discharge in Nigeria of 
seamen” was conducted.  
18 Superintendents were established and operated through the administratively intensive Mercantile 
Marine Office. 
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MSA permitted Commonwealth countries control over Nigerian cabotage trades 
through businesses that were registered outside Nigeria.  
In 1978 attempts were made to address some of the issues raised above through the 
draft amendments to the MSA. However, the proposed amendments never came into 
force.19 Four years later another significant amendment was made through the National 
Shipping Policy, completed in 1982. Its operation relied on the UNCTAD Code of 
Conduct, which was not ratified at the time. Therefore the statutory regime set by the 
MSA remained the order of Nigerian shipping business, despite various attempts to 
change it, until the late-1980s, when the Federal Military Government promulgated the 
National Shipping Policy Decree 10 in 1987 after ratification of the UNCTAD Code. 
The policy also established the National Maritime Authority (the NMA), which was the 
arm for the implementation of the new policy.20  
The period from the 1960s to the establishment of the NMA influenced the current 
Nigerian shipping framework, particularly from a political perspective. It meant policy 
makers would place significant emphasis on indigenous Nigerian participation in the 
construction of future coastal shipping frameworks. The consequence of this approach 
was the deliberate ousting of any considerations for foreign participation in coastal and 
inland water trades. Observations made from the time of preparation of the Nigerian 
cabotage framework, particularly from the early 1990s to 2003, reflect the attitudes 
referred to above. They are invaluable to the South African policy maker for reasons 
that will become more apparent below. 
6.1.2 Period from 1993 to 2003 
In 1993, recognising the need for a functional fleet for cabotage, the NMA established 
the Ship Acquisition and Ship Building Fund (SASBF), which was established to assist 
Nigerian citizens in acquiring ships as a means of expanding the Nigerian fleet.21  The 
recipients were nine indigenous private Nigerian shipping firms and two government-
owned enterprises. These entities received about US$92 million as loans. However, the 
SASBF was suspended two years later as a result of mismanagement and inappropriate 
 
19 L.N. Mbanefo Nigerian Shipping Laws (1993). 
20 Bello-Olowookere (note 13).  
21 Ibid. 
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spending and because some firms were not able to meet repayment terms.22 After that, 
from 1998 onwards, the NMA focused its efforts on the Cargo Sharing Policy. The 
policy dealt with international trade therefore will not be discussed in any detail here. 
In any event, it was abandoned in the year 2000 since it did not contribute to more 
Nigerian-owned tonnage.23 The collapse of the two mechanisms meant that Nigeria had 
not been successful in finding a stimulus to revive its coastal fleet. Therefore, the 
Nigerian government sought to introduce what it perceived as a more robust approach 
to dealing with foreign domination of its coastal trades. The Coastal and Inland 
Shipping (Cabotage) Act No. 5 of 2003 is set against this background. 
6.1.3 The Coastal and Inland Shipping (Cabotage) Act (“the Cabotage Act”) 
The Coastal and Inland Shipping (Cabotage) Act No. 5 of 2003, commonly referred to 
as the Cabotage Act, regulates modern coastal shipping and provides the authoritative 
shipping framework for Nigeria. It repealed the MSA and its subsequent amendments24 
and subordinated existing laws dealing with shipping to provide certainty in instances 
of conflict of laws.25 It is expressed in definitive terms and emphasises the legislature’s 
intention to indigenise shipping economic activities.26 This will be evident below in the 
discussion relating to the prerequisite for cabotage entry, application of waivers and 
funding arrangements.  
However, before delving into such discussion, it is important to note that the Cabotage 
Act prescribes clear lines of enforcement 27  and powers that allow acting on 
“reasonable suspicion” to prevent statutory breaches. These powers extend to the 
 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid.  
24 Section 53 provides that “[a]ny provisions of any existing laws with respect to the registration of 
vessels, ownership, size and type of vessel, participation in Nigerian domestic coastal and inland waters 
trade in whatever forms that is inconsistent with the provisions of this act is repealed in so far as it affects 
matters under this Act and in particular as set out in the schedule to this Act”. 
25 For instance, section 2(1), among other subordinate clauses, recognises the provisions of the MSA 
(see note 5) “… to the extent that the said Merchant Shipping Act is not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Act”. 
26 See also O.A. Savage-Oyekunle Rethinking the Administration of Justice (2011), available at 
http://www.lasu.edu.ng/publications/law/oluremi_savage-oyekunle_bk_2.pdf. (Accessed 17 May 
2018).  
27 Officers from the enforcement unit established in terms of section 30(1). 
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boarding and detention of vessels, confiscation and removal of items and crew without 
a warrant if it is believed any provision of the Cabotage Act has been contravened.28  
6.1.3.1 Prerequisites for coastal participation   
Section 3 of the Cabotage Act deals specifically with vessel participation in domestic 
coastal trades.29  The section allows coastal participation to vessels that meet the four-
tier criteria for strict cabotage. These relate to domestic flag registration, total 
ownership by citizens, locally-built vessels and complete restriction of foreign crews 
from domestic vessels. 
Only locally-built, domestically-registered vessels30 that are exclusively owned and 
manned by Nigerian nationals have access to Nigerian coastal trades. Only one 
exception exists for foreign vessel participation – the unavailability of suitable Nigerian 
tonnage to provide the required service. 
Section 23 imposes a strict requirement of 60% or more unencumbered shares for any 
vessel flying the Nigerian flag.  A stricter requirement exists for coastal participation. 
It is therefore important to draw a distinction between ownership percentages required 
for coastal participation (100%) and the domestic registration percentage (60%).  The 
difference in these requirements suggests outcomes that the legislator may not have 
intended.  
In light of the foregoing, the Cabotage Act also seeks to emphasise the importance of 
the oil and gas and related coastal shipping activities. Section 5, particularly, excludes 
participation in this trade of any person or entity other than a Nigerian or a company 
 
28 Section 31 states that “[w]here an enforcement officer believes on reasonable grounds that a vessel 
has contravened the provisions of this Act, the enforcement officer may stop and board the vessel, 
detain the vessel or its officers or both and, with a warrant, search the vessel and seize anything found 
in or on the vessel that the enforcement officer, believes on reasonable grounds shall afford evidence 
with respect to any contravention of this Act”. 
29 Section 3 provides that “[a] vessel other than a vessel wholly owned and manned by a Nigerian citizen, 
built and registered in Nigeria shall not engage in the domestic coastal carriage of cargo and passengers 
within the coastal territorial inland waters, or any point within the waters of the exclusive economic zone 
of Nigeria”. 
30 This includes a rebuilt vessel. In other words, a vessel that has to undergo significant refurbishments 
before trading in Nigeria will have to be refurbished in Nigeria unless the work is negligible. Otherwise 
it will not qualify for entry as a “vessel engaged in cabotage” in terms of section 22 read with section 
29. See also section 7(1) which provides: “In the case of rebuilding a vessel, such vessel, shall be 
eligible for cabotage services if the entire building including the construction of any major components 
of the hull or superstructure of the vessel is effected in Nigeria.” 
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fully owned by Nigerian nationals.31  Related coastal and port shipping services as well 
as engagement of any vessel regardless of type or size in coastal shipping activities is 
specifically prohibited unless performed by Nigerian nationals or by a company wholly 
owned by nationals. Therefore towage, dredging, pilotage and any other similar 
services are reserved exclusively for Nigerians.32 
However, the aforementioned requirements mean that a vessel built and registered in 
Nigeria and fully manned by Nigerians may not participate in the oil and gas trades if 
1% of such vessel is owned by a person other than a Nigerian citizen. The only avenue 
would be for Nigerians holding 99% of the shares to show that they are providing 
“unavailable tonnage in demand”. This approach may raise challenges if vessel finance 
arrangements require security for payment from Nigerian owners who cannot meet 
finance conditions without some assistance from outside the country. This and other 
related commercial issues provide context for the inclusion of trade-sensitive 
provisions in the form of waivers crafted as part of cabotage legislation, as will be seen 
in the following discussion. 
6.1.3.2 Waivers 
The waiver system considers practicalities in the provision of shipping services and 
accommodates certain business imperatives to ensure the provision of uninterrupted 
coastal services. Waivers are triggered especially where appropriate tonnage for a 
particular cargo is scarce or where there is an absence of suitably qualified personnel 
that meet strict cabotage requirements described above. The blueprint for waivers is set 
out in Parts III and IV of the Cabotage Act (sections 9 to 21). In this regard legislation 
provides room for some flexibility in the application of cabotage rules in order to 
prioritise trade activity without derogating from the provisions of section 3 of the 
Cabotage Act.  
 
31 Section 5 provides that “[a] vessel, tug or barge of whatever type other than a vessel, tug and barge 
whose beneficial ownership resides wholly in a Nigerian citizen, shall not engage in the carriage of 
materials or supply services to and from oil rig, platforms and installations whether offshore or onshore 
or within any ports or points in Nigerian waters”. 
32 In this regard, see sections 4 and 5 of the Act. In case of any ambiguity, section 6 states, rather 
superfluously, that “[a] vessel of whatever type or size shall not engage in domestic trading in the 
inland waters of Nigeria except as a vessel that is wholly owned by Nigerian citizens”. 
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In granting the waiver, the Minister33 may suspend strict requirements but may do so 
only in the manner prescribed. Foreign participation may be permitted on a joint venture 
basis.34  However, the majority of the shares in the joint venture must be in favour of 
the Nigerian component share. This is the only instance in which ‘dilution’ may be 
allowed. In all other instances, Nigerian nationals must exclusively own Nigerian 
shares in ship-owning entities.  
Section 15 of the Act provides another avenue for foreign participation through the 
grant of licences. However, the licence application must emanate from a person who is 
resident in Nigeria and must be made to the Minister on behalf of the would-be foreign 
participant. There is no direct access for the foreigner to make such application. A 
licence under this section attracts all waiver conditions under sections 9 to 11 of the 
Act. Therefore, the application can be granted only if no suitable Nigerian tonnage is 
available. 
Waivers also apply in respect of vessel manning. Nigerian-registered vessels must 
exclusively employ nationals. However, this requirement may be waived under section 
10 if a vessel owner cannot procure suitably qualified crews.35  A detailed discussion 
regarding the implementation of waivers is provided below. 
6.1.3.3 Cabotage Vessel Financing Fund 
The Cabotage Act places considerable importance on Nigerian total share ownership as 
a prerequisite to trading on the coast. Dilution of shares therefore would amount to 
instant disqualification unless a waiver applies. However, strict cabotage translates to 
difficulties in raising capital. In order to deal with this impasse, the Cabotage Vessel 
Financing Fund (CVFF) 36  was established under section 42 to provide financial 
assistance to citizens.37  Without the availability of local finance, Nigeria would not be 
 
33 ‘Minister’ refers to the head of the ministry responsible for shipping at the time. 
34 Savage-Oyekunle (note 3). 
35 Section 10 provides that “[t]he Minister may on receipt of an application grant a waiver to a duly 
registered vessel on the requirement for a vessel under this Act to be wholly manned by Nigerian 
citizens where he is satisfied that there is no qualified Nigerian officer or crew for the position 
specified in the application”. 
36 The Fund is reminiscent of the erstwhile SASBF of the early 1990s.  
37 Section 42(2) spells out the Fund objectives: “The purposes of the Fund shall be to promote the 
development of indigenous ship acquisition capacity by providing financial assistance to Nigerian 
operators in the domestic coastal shipping.” 
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able to insist on strict compliance with the Cabotage Act. Accessibility of domestic 
vessel finance therefore bolsters the Nigeria’s stance on cabotage. 
6.1.4 Challenges of Nigerian cabotage  
Nigerian cabotage has met with many difficulties and has been criticised.38  However, 
the only two challenges discussed here relate to waivers and vessel finance. These are 
the most relevant issues to South Africa given the stage of its cabotage policy 
development.  
6.1.4.1 Poor application of the waiver system  
The main criticism of the Cabotage Act has been the waiver system. Waivers were 
introduced in the Cabotage Act to deal with shortage of both tonnage and skills.39 The 
idea was for the Minister to exercise discretion to refuse waivers to foreigners as soon 
as Nigerians were in a position to offer the full spectrum of coastal services. In turn, 
waivers have been condemned on the basis that they defeat the purpose of the statute 
since the practice legitimises foreign involvement. Furthermore, continued foreign 
participation on the Nigerian coast is seen as hindering Nigerian participation.40 
There have been complaints that the Nigerian government has failed to show its 
commitment to implementing cabotage, especially in supporting NIMASA (Nigerian 
Maritime Administration and Safety Agency) to deal with truant ship owners.41 These 
complaints follow what appears to be flagrant disregard of the regulations relating to 
crewing. Nigerian vessels have been arrested for engaging non-nationals on their 
vessels while performing cabotage operations.42  It has also been reported that cabotage 
has been hindered because “some powerful individuals in government are trying to 
frustrate the implementation of the [cabotage] law”.43 
  
 
38 I.M. Erakhoba Nigerian Cabotage Regime: What Next? (10 October 2012), available at 
http://documents.jdsupra.com/403026b1-f004-467b-8066-5f53ef2707ac.pdf. (Accessed 23 May 2018). 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid. 
41 See G. Oritse Nigeria: Cabotage Law - Nimasa Begins Clamp Down on Non-Compliant Vessels 
(2018), available at https://allafrica.com/stories/201807180610.html. (Accessed 15 September 2018).  
42 Ibid. 
43 See Why Cabotage Act Implementation Failed (23 January 2018), available at 
http://thenationonlineng.net/cabotage-act-implementation-failed/. (Accessed 15 September 2018). 
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The problems stated above manifest more readily in offshore vessel operations where 
there is a prevalence of foreign vessel involvement. Concomitant waivers have been 
issued to oil companies on the basis that these companies require the right kind of tanker 
vessels and appropriate skills to meet stringent cargo specifications particular to the 
industry.44  Scarcity of suitable Nigerian tonnage has meant foreign companies so far 
predominantly meet the demand for the provision of specialised vessels. They control 
the majority of major trades while most of the vessels engaged in the remaining 9% of 
the trade are smaller locally-built boats with local crews presumably largely owned by 
nationals.45  In view of the above, the need for manning waivers will persist for as long 
as Nigeria continues to lack suitably qualified crews, especially for senior positions. 
Similarly, problems with cabotage will persist, particularly on offshore routes, until 
Nigeria can muster adequate and varied tonnage capacity under its flag to cover the full 
range of its coastal services.  
In 2013 about 84 chartered vessels obtained licences under the waiver system. 
Foreigners owned and operated double the share of vessel trade with 56 vessels, while 
local participation stagnated with 28.46  The figures indicate the extent to which Nigeria 
continues to lack capacity to service its own coast a decade after the Cabotage Act came 
into force, as well as the extent to which the Nigerian government’s lack of commitment 
to proper cabotage implementation has affected its course. 
6.1.4.2 Ineffective vessel finance models 
More than a decade and half later Nigeria has yet to see the fruits of its cabotage policy 
process that started in 2003.  Coastal traders unanimously agree that a gross lack of 
implementation of the statute exists.47 The Nigerian government has failed to ensure 
that the oil and gas industries support cabotage by ring fencing this cargo for coastal 
trades.48  Therefore, guaranteed funding for capital investment remains elusive and 




45 M. Igbokwe Nigerian Maritime Cabotage Policy & Law: The Case and Advocacy (2006). 
46 Department of Petroleum Resources, 2017. 




The CVFF has not provided the solution to this challenge. First, publication of its 
guidelines was delayed. Funding has generally not been accessible to shipping 
operators who are at the mercy of commercial banks, through whom the CVFF is run. 
Commercial banks allegedly also charge exorbitant interest rates for financing shipping 
capital assets, which operators find difficult to meet.50 In short, the Nigerian vessel 
finance model has been ineffective as an instrument for achieving the ideals of the 
Cabotage Act.  
6.1.5 Observations 
The Cabotage Act is couched in language that is undoubtedly meant to make Nigeria 
one of the strictest cabotage jurisdictions. The intention of the statute was always to 
catapult Nigeria into an era of total independence from foreign domination. Therefore, 
at the core of the statute was the idea that Nigeria would build its own ships, owned and 
operated by its people, manned by its crews and flagged in the country. However, the 
reality has been that Nigerian cabotage has had to depend on waivers because the 
country has not been able to produce appropriate tonnage to serve the oil and gas 
industries which form the core of its coastal shipping. 
In the circumstances, the prospect of seeing strict cabotage implementation on the 
Nigerian coast to date remains a distant reality. Nigeria coastal shipping still largely 
relies on vessels from elsewhere hence the country’s aspirations of restricting foreign 
domination from its coastal trade or of implementing strict cabotage in its proper form 
holds little promise. 
A fuller exposition of what South Africa needs to bear in mind in the development of 
its coastal policy with respect to Nigeria is dealt with in chapter 8.  
 
6.2 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The United States of America possesses possibly the most comprehensive historical 
codification of cabotage laws. American shipping policy on which cabotage has been 
 
50 Ibid.  
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driven and sustained can be best summarised in the statements of the country’s first and 
third presidents.  
In his Second Annual Address to Congress in 1790, President George Washington said: 
 I recommend it to your serious reflections how far and in what mode, it may be 
expedient to guard against embarrassments from these contingencies, by such 
encouragements to our own Navigation as will render our commerce and agriculture 
less dependent on foreign bottoms… 51  [T]he transportation of our own produce 
offer[s] us abundant means for guarding ourselves.52 
In a similar vein Thomas Jefferson, who was president of the US in the first decade of 
the 19th century, stated that:  
For a navigating people to purchase its marine afloat would be a strange speculation, 
as the marine would always be dependent upon the merchants furnishing them … We 
must, therefore, build them for ourselves.53 
Throughout the years, the US government has heeded these calls despite economic and 
political changes in and outside its borders, although the motivation and intensity have 
differed over time. America’s commitment to avoiding dependence on foreign vessels 
for trade at all costs resulted in the formulation of a plethora of statutes54 to achieve this 
shipping policy ideal. A substantial number of shipping statutes designed for the 
exclusion of foreign participation deal with both coastal and international shipping. For 
obvious reasons, the discussion here has been limited to those that impact on coastal 
shipping.  
6.2.1 Early US coastal restrictions 
Coastal trade protection seems always to have received priority in the US. The 
country’s first Congress enacted Chapter XI, the Act for Registering and Clearing 
Vessels, Regulating the Coastal Trade on 1 September 1789.55  Chapter XI imposed tax 
 
51 I. Heine The US Maritime Industry: In the National Interest (1980) Washington DC National 
Maritime Policy Council. 
52 W. Frankel ‘Jonesing for Shipping Reform: The Merchant Marine Act in the 21st Century’ (16 April 
2018) Claremont Journal of Law and Policy 3. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Heine (note 51) says there were already over 50 statutes aimed at promoting shipping by 1966. Many 
more were enacted for the same purpose after that. 
55 Maritime Law (nd), available at https://europeancrewcenter.com/maritime-law.html. (Accessed 
15 August 2018). 
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penalties on non-US-built and foreign-owned vessels in order to shelter the US trading 
industry from British competition in particular.56  The Cabotage Act of 1817, as its 
name suggests, prevented foreign flag interests from participating in domestic shipping 
operations.  The Subsidy Act of 1891, although directed at the development of the entire 
trading fleet, delivered high-speed vessels for the coast on the strength of government 
subsidies.  
Similarly the Shipping Act of 1916 was enacted for international trade. Its relevance to 
coastal trading was that the predicted ‘embarrassment’ that Washington cautioned 
against earlier occurred when the First World War started in 1914. The US did not have 
sufficient tonnage to transport its own trade both internationally and along the coast. 
Reliance on Europe, whose ships were called up for war duties, led to freight rate chaos. 
The US government was thereafter actively involved in shipbuilding of both foreign 
ocean-going and coastal trades. Over 1 400 vessels had been produced by the time the 
war ended. Therefore, wartime lessons provided fresh impetus for making the 
independence of the US merchant marine the lynchpin of the American economy, 
history, and even national identity.57  The effect was that, from that time onwards, the 
coast was reserved exclusively for American citizens operating American-built vessels 
that were manned by American crews.  
6.2.2 The Merchant Marine Act (“the Jones Act”) 
The Merchant Marine Act 1920, commonly known as the Jones Act,58 followed shortly 
after the First World War. One of its primary objectives was to deal with the post-war 
tonnage surpluses.59 However, its critical impact was that it formalised cabotage policy 
in the US. The Jones Act represents a consolidation of various US statutes reflecting 
American cabotage policy that for all intents and purposes has remained virtually 
unchanged for nearly 200 years. 
The modern version of the Merchant Marine Act 1920 provides under Title 46 of the 
United States Code (USC) 55102, that a vessel may not in any way participate in the 
movement of cargo by water or by land and water between points in the United States 
 
56 Frankel (note 52). 
57 Ibid. 
58 The Merchant Marine Act was named in recognition of its champion, Senator Wesley Livsey Jones. 
59 Heine (note 51) 5. 
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or between ports in the US via a foreign port.60 This law provides the basis on which 
foreign vessels are excluded from US coastal trades. A full rendering on how this 
legislation functions will be provided later in the discussion. It is appropriate at this 
stage first to set out the trade in respect of which the legislation applies. 
6.2.3 US cabotage trade coverage  
American domestic shipping is diversified and complex. It caters to 40% of the US 
population, particularly those who live in the 48 states (and the Columbia District), 
connected by marine highways and navigable waterways. Despite the expanse which 
coastal shipping covers, coastal cargo trade amounts to a meagre 2% of domestic freight 
transportation.61 
The US cabotage trade comprises three distinct services. These are Ocean, Great Lakes 
and inland waterways services. Unique features that each service possesses cannot 
generally be substituted for each other.62 Ocean-borne trade can be further divided into 
coastwise, intercoastal and non-contiguous shipping.63 Coastwise trade predominantly 
carries petroleum and dry-bulk products such as ores and coal. Intercoastal service 
operates between Atlantic and Gulf ports and those on the Pacific coast. Petroleum 
products form the dominant cargo of this service. Non-contiguous service connects 
mainland US with Alaska, Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Guam. It predominantly carries 
fuels, chemicals and general cargo. From the mainland, the trade carries raw materials 




60 Title 46 USC Code 55102 (b) provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter or chapter 121 
of this title, a vessel may not provide any part of the transportation of merchandise by water, or by land 
and water, between points in the United States to which the coastwise laws apply, either directly or via 
a foreign port, unless the vessel– 
(1) is wholly owned by citizens of the United States for purposes of engaging in the coastwise 
trade; and 
(2) has been issued a certificate of documentation with a coastwise endorsement under chapter 
121 or is exempt from documentation but would otherwise be eligible for such a certificate 
and endorsement.” 
61 C. Grabow, I. Manak & D. Ikenson The Jones Act: A Burden America Can No Longer Bear (28 June 
2018). 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 102. 
64 Ibid. 106. 
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The second domestic service operates in the Great Lakes. There are five Great Lakes 
that connect mid-continental US ports. These inland fresh waters give vessels access to 
the Atlantic through the St Lawrence Seaway. The Great Lakes trade has been mostly 
used in the transportation of iron ore, coal, and limestone. It also carries petroleum and 
other liquid cargo, albeit in comparatively lesser volumes to dry bulk cargo.65 
The third domestic service runs through the inland waterways system. It operates from 
North-eastern US to Pacific Northwest and from the Great Lakes to the Gulf inland 
waterways. This trade carries more cargo than the combined tonnages of both ocean-
borne and Great Lakes trades.66 Cargo on this trade consists predominantly of farm 
products, marine products, coal, non-metallic minerals and chemical and allied 
products.67 
Altogether dominant cargo on the American coast is comprised of mostly bulk 
products, typically petroleum, iron ore, grain, crushed rock, decorative stone and coal. 
Containerised movement is mostly dominant in the non-contiguous ocean trades, in 
particular in the Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico services.68 The combined total of 
domestic cargo handled per annum amounts to about one billion tons.69The Department 
of Transport Maritime Administration (MARAD) provides trade volume reports up to 
2014. The 2014 report divides the Tank Vessel Trade (liquid bulk) into Crude Carriers, 
Product Tankers and Tank Barges.70 
Apart from cargo trades, US domestic transport also has a strong passenger service 
element. In 2010 this trade was estimated at close to 50 million passengers transported. 
Such activity translated into domestic business and coastal trade participation of about 
223 ferry operators in 39 states.71  
 
65 Ibid. 109. 
66 Ibid. 111. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Domestic Shipping: US-Flag Waterborne Domestic Trade and Related Programs (nd), available at 
https://www.marad.dot.gov/ships-and-shipping/domestic-shipping/. (Accessed 9 August 2018). 
69 Ibid. 
70 The Report reveals that for the year 2014 the aggregate domestic market figure for qualifying Jones 
Act Crude Carriers was 21 million tons, 31 million for Product Tankers and 86 million for Tank Barges 
while volumes for Product Tankers and Barges for the Inland waterways trade alone was estimated at 
about 117 million metric tons. See MARAD Trade Statistics (nd), available at 
https://www.marad.dot.gov/resources/data-statistics/#trade-stats. (Accessed 16 August 2018). 
71 Ibid. 
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6.2.4 The US cabotage fleet 
The Jones Act covers a fleet of about 38 000 vessels, a substantial number of which are 
barges and tugboats. Only about 91 of these vessels are eligible for trade on the coast.  
The Jones Act typically prescribes four primary requirements that apply to all vessels 
operating between US ports. In order to participate in American cabotage trades, a 
vessel must be registered under the US flag, owned by US citizens, manned by US 
crews and built in the US.72 These requirements have been strictly applied to practically 
every ocean-going ship, passenger ship, barge, ferry, tugboat and small service ship.73 
The US fleet carries a large variety of trade cargo, as has been shown. It also has title 
to virtually any type or form of cargo that originates in or moves along the US coast 
regardless of its value. The net cast over what constitutes ‘coastal cargo’ spreads wide 
enough to cover sewage sludge and materials dredged for landfill use.74  
6.2.5 Waivers and exceptions  
On the strength of Title 46 USC 501, the Secretary of Defense may grant waivers.  
However, waiver determination is, as a general rule, the prerogative of Homeland 
Security. 75  Therefore, the practice is for the Secretary of Defense to request the 
Secretary for Homeland Security to issue a waiver. The hierarchy is perhaps a reflection 
of the notion that the Jones Act apparatus preserves US security as a priority before 
serving as means of supporting defence efforts. 
  
 
72 Frankel (note 52). 
73   The US Code Title 46 Subtitle V Part D Chapter 551 defines the term “merchandise” to include: 
“(1) merchandise owned by the United States Government, a State, or a subdivision of a State; and 
(2) valueless material. 
“Requirements: Except as otherwise provided (in this Act) a vessel may not provide any part of the 
transportation of merchandise by water, or by land and water, between points in the United States to 
which the coastwise laws apply, either directly or via a foreign port, unless the vessel– 
(1) is wholly owned by citizens of the United States for purposes of engaging in the coastwise trade; 
and 
(2) has been issued a certificate of documentation with a coastwise endorsement or is exempt from 
documentation but would otherwise be eligible for such a certificate and endorsement.” 
74 Grennes (note 2).  
75 See, for instance, the waiver issued by Acting Homeland Secretary Elaine C Duke: Waiver of 
Compliance with Navigation Laws (28 September 2017), available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0928_AS1_Jones-Act-Waiver.pdf. (Accessed 
21 August 2018). 
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Waivers are seldom granted and any consideration for a waiver is in fact subject to 
MARAD, which must be satisfied that no suitable US tonnage is available to perform 
the task in respect of which the granting of the application for the waiver is sought.76 
In determining whether or not to recommend a waiver, MARAD is also under the 
obligation in each instance of waiver application to “identify any actions that could be 
taken to enable qualified United States flag capacity to meet national defense 
requirements”.77  Waivers can be withdrawn at any time.78 
Over time, relatively less cumbersome forms of waivers have been designed for specific 
industries. A recent and fairly popularly used waiver system appears from the 2006 
Jones Act amendment. It allows small passenger ship charterers to operate on the coast, 
provided they carry no more than 12 passengers.79  Similarly, it must be shown that 
granting these waivers will not adversely affect US shipyards and operators.80  The 
applicant’s task is difficult. For example, a charterer would have to prove that the 
application will not prejudice protected industries in which it is not a participant.  
Nevertheless, the bulk of waivers granted over the last two decades related almost 
exclusively to disaster management cases. For instance, waivers were granted to deal 
with the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005; cleaning operations during 
the Gulf of Mexico BP oil spill in 2010; Hurricane Sandy in 2012; and Hurricanes 
Harvey, Irma and Maria in 2017 (although the Trump administration gave only a ten-
day waiver). The only non-weather-related waiver in recent times was granted in 2011, 
to deal with the oil crisis. The Obama Administration allowed 48 foreign tankers to 
move oil from Louisiana and Texas to Northeast refineries.81 
 
76 46 USC 501(b) provides: “When the head of an agency responsible for the administration of the 
navigation or vessel-inspection laws considers it necessary in the interest of national defense, the 
individual, following a determination by the Maritime Administrator, acting in the Administrator’s 
capacity as Director, National Shipping Authority, of the non-availability of qualified United 
States flag capacity to meet national defense requirements, may waive compliance with those laws to 
the extent, in the manner, and on the terms the individual, in consultation with the Administrator, 
acting in that capacity, prescribes.” 
77 Title 46 USC 501(2)(A). 
78 46 USC 501(3)(c) states that “[t]he authority granted by this section shall terminate at such time as 
the Congress by concurrent resolution or the President may designate”. 
79 Grennes (note 2) 8. 
80 Frankel (note 52). 
81 Grennes (note 2) 9. 
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In any other event, the US policy on cabotage has been strictly applied, without 
exceptions. 
6.2.6 Challenges of American cabotage 
6.2.6.1 Decreasing and aging fleet  
Viewing the American coastal fleet as a subset of the US flag fleet gives the proportion 
of the fleet eligible for trading on the American coast its proper context. The US share 
of the world fleet tonnage has declined sharply over time. In 1960 the US had 2 926 
domestically-flagged vessels representing 17% of the world’s total share of merchant 
fleets.  However, in 2016, the US only had 789 vessels flying the US flag, representing 
about 3.47% of world share.82   
Thomas Grennes argues that only 91 of the above vessels are eligible for coastal 
trading.83 About 75% of the container flag fleet is older than 20 years and about 65% 
of its total is over 30 years old.84 The overall average age of the US fleet in 2016 was 
33 years compared to the world fleet average age of 13 years.  Similarly, the age of US 
tankers does not look good. On average, US tankers are at least five years older than 
the average world tanker fleet.85  
The Jones Act was designed to increase the US fleet for trade, to support the US military 
during times of conflict and, by extension, to stimulate coastal shipping. However, 
statistics relating to both the age and number of the US fleet do not support the argument 
that the Jones Act contributes towards fleet expansion, security or coastal shipping. 
Unsurprisingly, foreign-flagged vessels carried more than a quarter of Desert Shield 
and Desert Storm supplies to Saudi Arabia, while the US flag fleet carried only 12.7% 
of equipment and supplies in that war. The difference was carried by the military itself. 
A similar deployment pattern was again seen during the Gulf War in 2003. The US flag 
fleet handled 6.3%, while foreign flags handled almost three times that amount of 
 
82 See Structure, Ownership and Registration of the World Fleet Ch 2 (2017), available at 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/rmt2015ch2_en.pdf; and also Table 1-24: Number and Size 
of the U.S. Flag Merchant Fleet and Its Share of the World Fleet (23 May 2017), available at 
https://www.bts.gov/archive/publications/national_transportation_statistics/table_01_24. Accessed 
16 January 2019). 
83 Grennes (note 2) 11. 
84 Grabow et al (note 61). 
85 Ibid. 
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cargo.86 Therefore US cabotage has failed to support wartime efforts or to promote US 
security.  
6.2.6.2 US shipbuilding decline 
The American shipbuilding industry has also declined. The country has been left with 
only three shipbuilders of large commercial vessels, namely NASSCO, Philly Shipyard 
and VT Halter.87 Of the three domestic shipbuilders, only NASSCO manufactures 
vessels for both the military and commercial industries. The other two firms focus on 
commercial vessels only. Thomas Grennes states that the three shipyards cannot be 
commended for high productivity. He says they have produced only 40 large 
commercial vessels in a decade-and-a-half between 2000 and 2016. 
The disparity in the focus of these shipbuilding firms means that of the little available 
home-grown shipbuilding capacity, more is available for building commercial vessels 
than for building ships for military and security purposes. The skill acquired in building 
commercial vessels may not necessarily be used in building military vessels. As a 
result, the scenario undermines the argument that the Jones Act contributes to security 
and increases shipbuilding capacity.88  
Moreover, US shipbuilders have been accused of being uncompetitive and inefficient. 
US Shipbuilders charge uncompetitive prices between US$190 million and US$250 
million for coastal and feeder vessels that would cost US$30 million in foreign 
shipyards.89 The latest military builds also serve as an example of inefficiencies of the 
US shipbuilding firms. For instance, the Gerald R Ford is a nuclear-powered US Navy 
aircraft carrier that was commissioned in 2017. It cost US$12.9 billion and sets the 
record as the most expensive vessel ever built. It was delivered late.90 Similarly the 
Zumwalt was also delayed and was significantly over budget.  Its final price of US$4.24 
 
86 Ibid. 
87 The National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO), which is a division of General 
Dynamics, is the largest. NASSCO has yards in Norfolk, San Diego, and Mayport, Florida. VT Halter 
is based in Pascagoula, Mississippi and Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia. See Grennes (note 2) for a 
detailed discussion. 
88 Grennes (note 2). 
89 Grabow et al (note 61). 
90 Ibid. 
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billion meant its budget (which could build 32 similar vessels outside the US) could 
build only two vessels in US shipyards.91 
What causes further criticism is the fact that the shipbuilding industry thrives on the 
premise of the ‘US-built’ requirement of the Jones Act under circumstances that barely 
recognise present-day manufacturing and distribution realities. The Jones Act requires 
that coastal vessels be substantially built in the US. However, American shipyards 
outsource components abroad to such an extent that it becomes difficult to describe a 
vessel as categorically US- or foreign-built. Sometime a vessel’s construction can be 
better reflected as ‘US-assembled’, particularly because shipyards commonly import 
ship design, main engine and other parts from other countries.92 This is reflected, the 
argument continues, in the fact that a vessel meets the Jones Act requirements if all of 
its major components 93  and superstructure are made in the US and not the entire 
vessel.94 Essentially, the argument is that in light of the dilution of the ‘US-built’ 
requirement, it would be more sensible to exempt cabotage operations from the 
requirement of American-built vessels.  
A further anomaly is that NASSCO partners with Daewoo Shipping Engineering of 
Korea. Philly is a subsidiary of Norwegian Aker ASA, which trades its shares on the 
Oslo stock exchange. Despite this blatant bastardisation of the US-built requirement, 
Philly Shipyard publicly advertises that it has supplied more than 50% of the Jones Act 
vessels.95  
6.2.6.3 High freight rates 
The primary issue with the Jones Act as a whole is that it induces high freight rates 
which in turn impact negatively on consumer prices. The objectionable effects of the 
Jones Act may be evident in various market distortions.  Colin Grabow highlights the 
anomalies in coastal transport distribution. He observed: 
  
 
91 Ibid. 14. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Any part in excess of 1.5% of the vessels steel weight (or 7.5% in case of rebuilding) is deemed a 
major component. See C.G. Papavizas Public Company Jones Act Citizenship (2015) 30(2) Tulane 
Maritime Law Journal 383–437 (Summer). 
94 Grabow et al (note 61). 
95 Grennes (note 2) 17. 
 145 
Although 38 states and the District of Columbia are connected by navigable 
waterways and marine highways, and nearly 40 percent of the US population lives in 
coastal counties, coastal shipping of cargo between US ports in the Lower 48 states 
comprises a negligible 2 percent of domestic freight.96 
Largely, the market for coastal shipping often redirects to other modes of transport or 
to sources of shipping outside the country. Farmers have at times flown livestock to 
avoid paying high shipping freights.97 States such as Maryland and Virginia import 
most of their bulk salt requirements (for road ice treatment) from Chile and Mexico 
using the Panama Canal as they find it cheaper to do so than to buy salt from Ohio 
mines using South Louisiana ports, where they would have to pay much higher freight 
rates.98 Grain for feeding cattle and crop fertiliser have sometimes been imported from 
Canada rather than through New Jersey Port because of high freight rates associated 
with coastal shipping.99 Similarly, North Carolina farmers import soybean meal from 
Brazil using foreign vessels, although the US remains the world largest soy producer 
and second largest soy exporter.100 These are just some of the market distortions Jones 
Act freight rates have produced.  
Exorbitant freight rates have likewise affected the coastal passenger trades. Cruise ship 
passengers pay higher rates between Washington and Alaska. As a result, cruise ship 
voyages originate in Vancouver, Canada. This in turn stifles cruise ship development 
in Washington.101 
However, the trade that the Jones Act freight scourge affects the most is the non-
contiguous trade. The burden of the Jones Act falls on these trades because of their 
exclusive reliance on sea transport. There are no pipelines, trucks or trains to provide 
alternative transportation means.102  Therefore, the economic benefit of repealing the 
 
96 Grabow et al (note 61) 19. 
97 Grennes (note 2) 19 recorded that Hawaiian ranchers resorted to chartering a 747 weekly from 
Keahole Airport to get their cattle to the mainland US more cheaply as it was less expensive to use an 
airline than to use coastal shipping. 
98 Grennes (note 2). 
99 Ibid. 30. 
100 Ibid. 31. 
101 Frankel (note 52).  
102 Grennes (note 2) 26. 
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Jones Act to the residents of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Alaska and Guam has been estimated 
at about US$ 5 billion to US$ 15 billion.103   
Vessels employed in the non-contiguous trades are old. The World Economic Forum 
reported that of the 25 US-flagged coastal containerships 20 were built three decades 
ago.104  The oldest of these is a steam-powered vessel105 that was built in 1968. The US 
coastal fleet constitutes 10% of the total capacity of container vessels employed on the 
US coastal trades.  The fleet’s advanced age translates to massive maintenance costs 
that are exacerbated by general operational inefficiencies associated with reliance on 
old technologies.  These costs are passed on to shippers most of whom can choose other 
modes of transportation. However, shippers in non-contiguous territories such as 
Hawaii have no option but to use shipping.106  
In Puerto Rico, for instance, the effects of the Jones Act have largely contributed to 
inflated living costs. Freight for a 20-foot container of household cargo from the East 
Coast to Puerto Rico costs about US$3063, when the same shipment to Santo Domingo 
costs US$ 1504 and US$1687 to Kingston.107 Partly as a result of this, the cost of living 
in Puerto Rico has been estimated at 13% above the second highest urban area in the 
sample of 325 US suburban areas. Puerto Rican supermarkets recorded 21% higher 
costs than supermarkets in mainland US.108   
Several studies have been conducted on the effects of the Jones Act on the country as a 
whole. JF Francois and others 109  examined the consequences of US cabotage 
restrictions on the US economy. Applying general equilibrium models of the US, the 
authors analysed the impact of the Jones Act on a range of services such as trade, 
 
103 Ibid. 
104 See World Economic Forum Reform Jones Act to Grow Economy (nd) Hawaii Free Press, available 
at http://hawaiifreepress.com/ArticlesMain/tabid/56/ID/8823/World-Economic-Forum-Reform-Jones-
Act-to-Grow-Economy.aspx. (Accessed 16 January 2019). 
105 See ship details of the MV Horizon Challenger (nd) Marine Traffic.com, available at 
https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:13276/mmsi:-
6812211/imo:6812211/vessel:HORIZON_CHALLENGER. (Accessed 16 January 2019). 
106 Ibid. 
107 M.B. Hill The Sinking Ship of Cabotage: How the Jones Act Let Unions and a Few Companies 
Hold the Economy Hostage (7 April 2013). 
108 Grennes (note 2). 
109 J.F. Francois, H.M. Arce, K.A. Reinert & J.E. Flynn ‘Commercial Policy and Domestic Carrying 
Trade’ (February 1996) 29(1) The Canadian Journal of Economics 181–198. 
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production, welfare, agriculture, steel, as well as upstream and downstream services of 
these sectors. The study revealed that 
the Jones Act effects a transfer from US consumers of [maritime] transportation 
services to US maritime carriers, allowing domestic shippers to charge rates 
substantially above comparable world prices. Estimates of the size of this transfer 
range in the billions of dollars.110  
Francois et al concluded that the Jones Act repeal would cause a US industry surge of 
about US$1.5 billion in the water sector, US$158 million in petroleum, US$103 million 
in chemicals, US$91 million in air transportation, US$50 million in steel, US$40 
million in plastics and US$32 million in lumber.111 
The authors also highlighted the fact that 
the Jones Act provides indirect protection to the ship building and maintenance and 
repair industries. These industries are upstream suppliers to the Jones Act fleet that 
benefit from the downstream protection. Thus while the basic argument that the Jones 
Act ensures a merchant marine fleet for defence purposes may lack merit, the 
secondary argument that it benefits domestic shipyards, also important in time of war, 
does [have merit].112  
The secondary argument deserves merit on the basis that “the Jones Act does protect 
about 1 800 jobs in shipyards (shipbuilding and repair), while ensuring an additional 
$160 million of domestic activity in these sectors”.113 However, such job protection 
costs the economy about US$3 billion.114 
In light of the above, US cabotage policy through the Jones Act is substantially more 
expensive than world shipping rates and burdensome to the US economy as a whole. 
Essentially, the overall costs exceed the overall benefits of continuance with the Jones 
Act. Simply put, a small group of shipping interests (shipbuilders, seafarers and ship 
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owners) benefit from the Jones Act, while the general body of American consumers 
absorbs losses that it causes.115 
6.4 SUMMARY OF STRICT CABOTAGE 
Strict cabotage means that the coastal state reserves itself full rights to engage a fleet of 
its own choice for all shipping activities taking place along the jurisdiction’s coastline. 
The coast is viewed as an extension of its inland industries that deserve protection from 
foreign penetration. Therefore, vessels plying trade in domestic waters must be built, 
repaired and flagged domestically. Most importantly, such vessels must be owned and 
manned by nationals. 
The most common drivers of strict cabotage relate to security; protection of home 
industries and general domestic market insulation; job creation and skills transfer; flag 
fleet stimulation; and vessel ownership. In this setting, factors relating to economic 
efficiencies (including savings and streamlined processes), foreign direct investment, 
robust competition and other factors play a subservient role. As a result, the main 
characteristic of strict cabotage is the exclusion of all foreign participation in the 
economic activities of the coastal state.  
It must be remembered that first, commercial realities compel strict cabotage 
practitioners to rely on waivers. The Nigerian experience is a classic example in this 
regard.  Second, capital shortages and a lack of suitable expertise, particularly in 
developing economies, dilute the nature of strict cabotage, because countries like 
Nigeria do not have the capacity to implement cabotage without any foreign 
involvement. The difficulty with implementation is especially pronounced at the start 
of cabotage policies. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
Continued lack of expertise and capital shortage to supplement tonnage forces 
compromises manifest in the practical implementation of cabotage. The result, as seen 
in Nigeria, is that the country struggles to achieve the chief aim for enacting cabotage, 
which was to promote involvement of nationals in cabotage trades and shipping in 
general. In Nigeria, foreign participation accounts for more than half of the total of 
 
115 Grennes (note 2) 31. 
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participants in cabotage trades. Instead of alleviating the status quo ante Cabotage Act, 
waiver implementation forced by the lack of capital, shortage of appropriate expertise 
and poor waiver enforcement legitimises the modern version of foreign domination of 
the Nigerian coast. 
In light of the above, Nigeria serves as a perfect example of a jurisdiction that has 
written strict cabotage into law, but that essentially practises liberal cabotage. Foreign 
interests dominate coastal trades in Nigeria and therefore ultimately its coastal policy 
cannot be correctly described as strict cabotage, despite what the Cabotage Act 
envisioned.  
By contrast, the US has managed to sustain cabotage over a significant period of time. 
Notably, the US is a developed country with a long history of ship ownership. Its 
cabotage operates on the back of one of the largest economies in the world. Its cabotage 
requirements are less strict then those of Nigeria. US cabotage rests on four pillars. 
Cabotage is reserved strictly for US-flagged vessels that are 75% owned by US citizens, 
operated by at least 75% US citizens and 100% built in the US. Therefore, the US 
allows a margin of 25% percent foreign participation, albeit only in respect of its 
manning and ownership requirements. In order to protect its shipbuilding industry and 
its repair dockyards, no foreign involvement is permitted. These land-based activities 
will not be shared with foreigners. 
The US has a strict code for the implementation of its cabotage policy. There are very 
few instances in which the US has invoked waivers or permitted exceptions to its 
cabotage law to allow foreign vessel participation. Exceptions have seemingly been 
reluctantly granted exclusively to assist in emergency disaster management, for 
instance, to facilitate aid relief and to lessen the impact of oil spills on the environment 
and to alleviate chronic energy shortages. In those cases, foreign participants have been 
granted waivers, but strict conditions have been attached. In any other case, cabotage 
implementation remains restricted and is closely monitored by multiple administrative 
agencies such as the Coast Guard and the Federal Maritime Commission, who ensure 
adherence to its code to the letter. 
The above seems to suggest that strict cabotage functions well primarily in an 
environment that possesses a suitable skills base and sufficient government capital 
funding for investment in its coastal fleet; and where there is strong administration 
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process of government policies. Therefore ex facie, strict cabotage seems more suited 
for developed countries than it is for developing countries like South Africa. 
A detailed account of the observations made from the US experiences insofar as they 
relate to South Africa will be canvassed more fully in chapter 8. The next chapter looks 



















CHAPTER 7:  
LIBERAL CABOTAGE 
This chapter deals with specific instances of liberal cabotage using coastal practices of 
Australia and New Zealand as examples.  
FEATURES OF LIBERAL CABOTAGE  
The nature of liberal cabotage makes it relatively more difficult to define than is the 
case with strict cabotage. However, as a starting point, its chief character is that it is not 
rigid. Liberal cabotage is variable. Therefore its characteristics may be distinguishable 
from one jurisdiction to the other. More significantly, within a single jurisdiction its 
fluidity may cause its features to vary according to what policymakers in that particular 
jurisdiction deem expedient at the particular time of putting it in place.  
Regardless of how it may be defined, in liberal cabotage: 
1. Foreign participation is permitted and sometimes encouraged. 
2. Foreign shareholding in ship-owning companies involved in cabotage trades 
may be offered above 25%.  
3. Requirements regarding engagement of national crews are not onerous (50% 
national crew or less) especially if local or negotiated employment rates apply 
equally to all crew while the vessel operates on the coast.  
4. However, senior positions on board coasting vessels e.g. master and chief 
engineer, are generally reserved for nationals.  
5. Ordinarily there is no requirement for cabotage vessels to be built and repaired 
domestically.  
6. Cabotage vessels must fly the domestic flag. However, secondary registries 
that support the domestic flag are created. 
7. Vessels on bareboat charter to nationals are permitted to trade on the coast for 
the duration of the charter. 
8. Foreign-flagged vessels have a right to transport transshipment cargo along 
the coast. 
9. Ordinarily there are no direct government subsidies for the flag fleet, but 
finance programmes exist to stimulate cabotage in general.    
10. Stakeholder views are a major part of its formulation.  
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The above list is not meant to be exhaustive. 
The flexible nature of liberal cabotage presents itself in varying degrees of intensity 
from one jurisdiction to the next. The position in which a particular jurisdiction 
eventually settles is often a product of great controversy borne out of divergent views 
between various stakeholders regarding how it should apply. Issues relating to whether 
cabotage should be adopted and if so the measure of its applicability are commonly 
debated between government, shippers, ship owners and labour. Depending on interests 
that are at stake, the degree of liberality that becomes the eventual choice, be it very 
liberal (virtually no cabotage) or very controlled (closest to strict cabotage), often 
reflects a point of settlement reached between stakeholders after considerable debates. 
Classic portrayals of these debates have been seen in Australia and New Zealand, 
evident in the liberality variations of their cabotage regimes. 
On the one hand, Australian materials comprise the latest debate on cabotage and offer 
important insights into how a relatively more controlled form of liberal cabotage works. 
On the other hand, materials on New Zealand present an overview of the most recent 
debate on cabotage reintroduction that led to a significantly far less controlled form of 
liberal cabotage. Therefore a discussion that combines Australian and New Zealand 
literature presents a broad coverage of the issues pertaining to liberal cabotage from 
one end of the spectrum to the other.  This coverage provides a sound basis on which 
to evaluate variations of cabotage for its development and implementation in South 
Africa. 
7.1 AUSTRALIA  
The Commonwealth of Australia, as it is formally known, is an island continent 
comprising mainland Australia, the island of Tasmania and smaller islands,116 with a 
coastline length of about 36 000 km.117 The country is completely surrounded by water. 
Trade with its neighbours, near or far, depends solely on seaborne carriage. 
The Australian coastal shipping framework, like South Africa, has its foundations in 
the country’s colonial history. During the 19th and the early 20th centuries it was 
 
116 Australia (nd), available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia. (Accessed 19 July 2018). 
117 Australia’s Coastline (nd), available at https://www.australiaforeveryone.com.au/coastline.html. 
(Accessed 19 July 2018). 
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expected of colonies such as Australia to emulate the fiscal and constitutional policies 
of their British masters. As such, Australia, although not legally bound to adopt a 
similar approach, followed an open coastal policy analogous to that of Britain. All six 
Australian colonies (as it was then composed) had an open coastal policy as provided 
for under the Merchant Shipping (Colonial) Act of 1869 (UK).118  
After the colonies were federated, an urgent need arose to change coastal policy to 
prioritise trade, defence and labour imperatives. 119  Dominance of foreign shipping 
interests, reliance on foreign-controlled tonnage and the need to curb “the employment 
of non-whites crews on ships” operating on Australian routes120 also heightened the 
urgency for policy changes.121 
Interestingly, the principal factors debated at the beginning of the 20th century 
pertaining to national security, seafarer employment and low freight rates remain the 
basis for many coastal policy commissions seen in Australia to date. Generally, the 
perception over the years has been that possession of a sizeable and efficient domestic 
fleet provides an effective safeguard for national security, industrial and trade 
prosperity.122  
7.1.1 The Navigation Act 1912 
The Navigation Act 1912 formulated the legislative basis for Australian cabotage. It 
defined ‘coastal trade’ as the loading of passengers and cargo at any Australian port for 
carriage to any port in Australia.123 It demarcated parameters within which foreign 
participation was prohibited. 124  The Navigation Act provided exceptions and 
exemptions under which foreign participation was permissible. Foreign operators could 
obtain licences to operate on the coast provided they met Australian crew wage 
 
118 M.L. McConnell, ‘Cabotage and the Colonial Corset: The Great Australian Bind’ (1988) 4 ANZ 
Mar. L.J. 1–16 3. 
119 McConnell (note 3) argued that the newly Federated Australian Commonwealth perceived the 
Japanese as a security threat.  
120 McConnell (note 3). 6 citing J. Bach A Maritime History of Australia (1976). 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 The definition applied to discharge operations as well. 
124 For practical reasons, British mail ships were exonerated from the licence provision until the 
railway system connecting Western and Southern Australia was completed. See McConnell (note 3) 
14. 
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conditions and manning levels and were not receiving financial assistance from their 
governments or any form of subsidy from elsewhere.125  
Therefore, the Navigation Act set the Australian coast aside as a local operation for 
local interests. However, it is important to note that from the very beginning, Australia 
did not create a barrier against foreign participation or against foreign direct investment. 
The three basic conditions for licensing were designed to level the playing field 
between Australian operators and prospective international participants operating on 
the Australian coast.  
The first two requirements, relating to crewing conditions and levels of manning, meant 
that international operators involved in shipping on the Australian coast adopted 
Australian labour-related practices that were mandatory for Australian operators. 
Likewise, the third requirement, which prevented subsidisation of foreign participants, 
was appropriate in the circumstances. In its absence, foreign operators would otherwise 
have had a competitive advantage over Australian operators because of financial 
assistance received to cover capital and/or operational costs. Foreign government 
subsidies would have led to a pricing differential in favour of the foreign operator, for 
instance. The importance of placing these conditions in the first place seems to have 
been lost on Australia over time, as will be seen later in the discussion. 
Although security and preservation of local skills were important to the formation of 
the policy governing the Australian coast, the real basis for the commencement of 
cabotage was largely economic.126 Cabotage was founded on the desire to build an 
Australian merchant fleet and on the protection of Australian seafarers from low-paid 
crews. The approach, although regarded as dated compared to international shipping 
norms of the time, was warranted, given the stage of institutional development of the 
country in the mid-1920s. 127  In particular, Australia could ill afford to exclude 
international participation on the coast, especially in the early 20th century, because 
Australia had no merchant fleet. Its merchant marine was essentially British vessels 
 
125 Ibid. 13. 
126 Ibid. 16, citing the Report of the Royal Commission on the Navigation Act 1923/24 (1924) 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia in Shipwreck Databases Western Australian Museum 




registered in Australia.128 However, dependence on British shipping interests continued 
to plague Australia even when the country had its own fleet, as will be seen. 
7.1.2 Attempts to amend coastal policy  
The Navigation Act went through various amendments over time that mostly 
represented adjustments to meet periodic imperatives either to bring the policy in line 
with other policies or a changed political climate. However, more significant changes 
were made to the statute from the 1950s.129  Unfortunately, those changes did not bring 
about a significant growth in the coastal fleet despite a noticeable growth in coastal 
shipping activity.  
At its peak during the 1970s, coastal shipping carried 52% of coastal trade but thereafter 
started to decline. 130  A commission appointed in 1976 produced the Report on 
Australian Maritime Legislation. The commission’s conclusions were that Australia 
had one of three choices to help stimulate its coastal trade. The first option was to look 
for the most efficient and most affordable seaborne method of transporting cargo. The 
second option was to insulate shipping from competition completely, leaving the 
economy to absorb the impact of doing so. The last option was to combine the first and 
second options and to come up with a compromise that would avoid protectionism 
while preventing unfair competition.131   
The government decided to promote coastal competition and therefore chose the middle 
path with some variations, purely as a practical step. The decision to do so was forced 
on Australia by the fact that more than half a century had passed, and the merchant 
marine and coastal shipping operations remained under British control. The Navigation 
Act served only to promote that monopoly.132 The scarcity of indigenous tonnage meant 
more foreign vessels plied the coast and their continued presence worsened the 
conditions for the establishment of the Australian fleet. Vessels under licence could 
operate on the Australian coast whether flagged in Australia or flagged elsewhere. 
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These were subject to Australian rates of pay and other cabotage conditions.  However, 
tonnage shortages led to a practice that allowed foreign vessels to trade on the coast 
under a permit system.133   
Vessels issued with a permit did not have to comply with Australian labour practices 
or cabotage restrictions in the same way vessels that operated under licence did. The 
idea behind the imposition of three conditions (Australian crew wages, manning levels 
and no foreign subsidies) on which Australian cabotage was based had been forgotten. 
Differential pricing became inevitable between operators. The effect was that vessels 
that operated under licence competed poorly against foreign vessels operating under 
the permit system. In turn, this hampered investment in the Australian licensed coastal 
fleet.134 
The Australian government appointed the Crawford Committee in 1982 to evaluate the 
cause of the flagged fleet stagnation.135  The Committee made observations relating to 
the Australian fleet both domestically and internationally. Unsurprisingly, the 
Committee observed that the Australian coastal fleet was disadvantaged because it was 
competing with subsidised fleets with low-paid crews while its own environment 
required Australian fleets to pay higher wages and to grant longer leave days, which 
sometimes meant that owners had to employ double crews as a result of six months on-
six months off leave agreements.136 
The influence of the findings on domestic shipping led to renewed government 
involvement. Efficiencies derived from efforts directed at the Australian national fleet 
benefited the domestic coastal fleet as well. For instance, the Capital Grants Act of 
1987 led to new investments in the Australian-flagged fleet making it possible to retire 
the old fleet.137 However, notwithstanding financial investment shortly thereafter, the 
modal share of shipping dropped to 35% of coastal trade and hopes of reviving the 
home fleet continued to suffer. 
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In 1996 yet another body, the Shipping Reform Group, was formed to investigate 
options to revive Australian shipping. This body focused on reflagging and the 
establishment of a second register while retaining cabotage conditions. However, there 
was no resolution. Prominent coastal cargo interests such as the Sea Freight Council of 
Western Australia were adamant that cabotage thwarted the development of the 
petrochemical industry. They argued that cabotage removal would result in a savings 
of about $22.5 million a year.  BHP (formerly BHP Billiton) agreed, adding that (at the 
time) it had cost 33% more to move iron ore from Port Hedland (Western Australia) to 
ports in New South Wales (Eastern Australia) on an Australian-flagged bulk carrier 
than to deliver iron ore to Korea on a similar-sized vessel.138 
7.1.3 Recent developments  
In the last decade, Australia has experienced serious depletion of its fleet, to such an 
extent that in 2010 there were no container vessels operating under its registered flag. 
The country’s logistical chain totally depended on unlicensed foreign operators trading 
in foreign-registered vessels to transport containers to land-based modes on the back of 
the permit system.139  
The scenario is not entirely unexpected, given that modal patterns over the last 50 years 
have shifted in favour of road transportation, particularly because of its door-to-door 
offering. 140  This generally leaves coastal shipping with a modal share consisting 
predominantly of low-freight bulk cargo that may not be suitable for road haulage.141  
The continued decline of the coastal fleet has been attributed to exorbitant capital and 
operating costs of the Australian-flagged vessels. These costs are generally regarded as 
comparatively higher than those of foreign operators on the permit system and are 
higher than road haulage costs.142 Furthermore, costs of operating an Australian-crewed 
vessel (excluding fuel) constitute an estimated 38% of total operating costs, while costs 
on foreign-crewed vessels, calculated on the same basis, were about 13%.143  Under 
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these conditions, the Australian-flagged vessel is not well placed to compete with a 
foreign-owned vessel.  
7.1.4 Latest cabotage position in Australia 
Australia recently introduced a new coastal regime to deal with some of the challenges 
stated above. The Navigation Act 2012 repealed the Navigation Act 1912. The old 
statute has been rewritten to reflect contemporary seafaring trends, to modernise 
measures relating to environmental protection and to deal with conditions of 
employment of Australian seafarers.144  Provisions relating to coastal trade145 have 
been assigned to another piece of legislation, the Coastal Trading (Revitalising 
Australian Shipping) Act 2012 (Coastal Trading Act), which has perhaps afforded 
Australia the opportunity to deal with issues relating to seafarer employment separately 
from issues connected with fleet revitalisation for the first time in a hundred years.146 
The Coastal Trading Act provides that ‘coastal trade’ ordinarily refers only to the 
transportation of cargo between Australian States 147  and not within States, 148  and 
excludes transshipment trade cargo.149  The implication is that cabotage does not apply 
in respect of cargo movements between two ports located in the same State and that 
any cargo moved between States for consolidation for shipment elsewhere outside 
Australia does not form part of coastal trade for cabotage purposes.  
Similarly, the Coastal Trading Act focused on tonnage utilised in coastal trade. It does 
not apply to vessels working offshore or to vessels that provide pilotage, towage and 
salvage services nor does it apply to vessels involved in recreational activities.150 
 
144  Australian Legislation, available at http://www7.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/bill_em/nb2012133/memo_0.html. (Accessed 2 August 2018). 
145 In particular, Part IV – Coasting Trade, sections 284 to 293 of the Navigation Act 1912. 
146 However, the usual Australian labour statutes remain applicable to seafarers on the coast. These are 
for instance, the Fair Work Act 2009 (as amended August 2012), the Occupational Health and Safety 
(Maritime Industry) Act 1993 and the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992. These and 
other labour laws are ordinarily labour friendly and consequently drive operational costs upwards. It is 
therefore difficult to conceptualise a meaningful method of dealing with labour and national ship registry 
issues separately when both are governed by the same legislative framework. 
147 The reference relates to the eight Australian States, namely New South Wales, Queensland, South 
Australia, Victoria, Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania and Western Australia. 
148 However, an owner may choose to be bound by the Coastal Trading Act in terms of section 12 
although trading within the same State. 
149 Coastal Trading Act 2012 section 7(1)(a) to (c) and section 2(b)(ii). 
150 Ibid. section 10. 
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However, crucial provisions introduced by the Coastal Trading Act relate to the new 
system of granting licences. It abolished distinctions between licensed coastal operators 
and operators under the permit system (previously single voyage or continuous voyage 
permits). With effect from 1 July 2012, coastal operators could apply for one of three 
licence options.  
The first option is a general licence. It is issued only in respect of the domestic fleet 
under the Australian General Shipping Register (AGSR). The general licence provides 
unrestricted access to coastal trade for a period of up to five years, renewable. Operators 
issued with this licence must show that each seafarer working on each vessel151 while 
on the coast is an Australian or a permanent resident, or is permitted to work on that 
vessel through some formal process.152 Continued validity of the general licence is 
conditional upon the assurance that each seafarer on the vessel is an Australian citizen. 
The position highlights unequivocal preference for Australian seafarers to work on 
board Australian vessels, which has been attached as a condition of licence. 
The second option is a temporary licence. A vessel registered under the AGSR cannot 
be issued with a temporary licence. A temporary licence provides coastal trade access 
to vessels registered under Australia’s second register, the Australian International Ship 
Register (AISR), and to vessels registered elsewhere.153  A temporary licence allows 
coastal trade for one year only. An operator who applies for a temporary licence must 
state the type of cargo intended for carriage and the port of loading and port of discharge 
in respect of such cargo, among other conditions.154  
The third option is the emergency licence.  This licence, in a similar way to the other 
two, grants the operator access to coastal trade for the purposes of carrying cargo and 
passengers and not merely the provision of services ordinarily connected to 
emergencies.  However, the applicant must specify details of the emergency, cargo to 
be carried, the number of voyages to be undertaken to complete the task and the loading 
and discharge ports for the cargo. Perhaps more importantly, the applicant must state 
where the vessel has been registered. Depending on vessel registration, the applicant 
 
151 Ibid. section 21(b).  
152 Ibid. section 13. 
153 Ibid. section 40. 
154 Ibid. section 35, read with section 40. 
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must give reasons why a vessel registered under the AGSR cannot perform the 
emergency service sought in the application.155 
The new licensing system seems to have been designed to eliminate the unsatisfactory 
position which permitted foreign vessels access to coastal trade through single voyage 
and continuous licences. The reasons for discontent emanated from the fact that, among 
other things, foreign vessels were not obliged to employ Australian seafarers, were not 
compelled to comply with Australian tax laws and generally made no contribution 
towards the advancement of Australian coastal shipping. They were seen as a stumbling 
block in the development of the Australian merchant fleet in particular. 
Therefore the Coastal Trading Act seems to have been directed at re-establishing the 
notion that Australian coastal trade should be preserved first and foremost for 
Australian interests, although foreign participation will not be precluded, provided that 
such participation occurs in a manner that caters to Australian coastal policy priorities.  
7.1.5 Potential further amendments to Australian cabotage legislation 
However, the debate regarding foreign participation and the adoption of cabotage as a 
means of developing the Australian merchant fleet seems far from being settled. Two 
years after the Coastal Trading Act, another proposal in the form of the Shipping 
Amendment Act, Bill 2015 (the Bill) was presented to parliament to challenge new 
legislation. In particular, the Bill proposed reintroduction of foreign participation.  
Arguments that have been raised in support of the Bill mostly relate to comparatively 
higher freight costs in cabotage trades than freight available in trades where foreign 
vessels participate freely. For instance, the thrust of the submissions against cabotage 
was that it was cheaper to import sugar from Brazil to Melbourne (where most soft 
drink manufacturers are located) than it was to transport sugar from North Queensland 
to Melbourne.156  Cane growing was the sector of agriculture affected the most by 
higher freight rates that Australian-registered vessels charged for moving sugar along 
the coast. 
 
155 Ibid. section 64(2)(b) and (c). 
156 Matthew Canavan – Nationals Party Whip in the Senate, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xad4q_b3Zec. (Accessed 18 July 2018).  
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Another argument in favour of passing the Bill was based on the statistical observations 
of coastal volumes, freight rates and coastal share following a stricter policy against 
foreign participation. At the end of the financial year 2012/13, Brett Whiteley argued 
that a decline of about 22% in coastal freight volumes was directly related to the 
introduction of the Coastal Trading Act in 2012.157  Further, over the same period, 
average freight rates increased from about AS$18/ton in 2011 to about AS$29.70/ton 
in 2012, which translated to an increase of about 63% following the introduction of the 
Coastal Trading Act. 
Against this background, the object of the Bill was to redirect focus from cabotage and 
consequently away from merchant fleet building to competitive coastal services and the 
best utilisation of available coastal tonnage regardless of whether it was foreign or 
not.158 The Bill proposed the repeal of provisions relating to general, temporary and 
emergency licences.159  The suggested alternative is to allow any person who has a legal 
or beneficial interest (other than banks and capital investors) in a vessel to apply for a 
coastal shipping permit, irrespective of the flag of the vessel.160 The permit would be 
valid for a period of 12 months. 161  It would refer to one vessel, 162  but could be 
transferred to a third party ‘transferee’ on application.163  
Interestingly, the Bill required employment of only two Australian senior crew 
members164 on board foreign vessels engaged in coastal trading. Otherwise, the Bill 
made no provisions for the employment of Australian seafarers. It also made no 
distinction between vessels registered in the AGSR, the AISR and vessels registered 
 
157 Brett Whiteley MP, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iN87nh3Tjz8. (Accessed 
18 July 2018). 
158 Section 3 of the Shipping Amendment Act, Bill 2015 (‘the Bill’) stated as its object provision of 
“… a regulatory framework for coastal shipping in Australia that:  
(a) fosters a competitive coastal shipping services industry that supports the Australian economy; 
and  
(b) maximises the use of available shipping capacity on the Australian coast”. 
159 The Bill section 10 read with section 19. 
160 Ibid. section 13. 
161 Ibid. section 11(6). 
162 Ibid. section 18. 
163 Ibid. section 25. 
164 Ibid. section 38(2) requires employment of at least two Australians “for the whole of the period for 
which the permit is in force:  
(a) either the master or the chief mate; and  
(b) either the chief engineer or the first engineer”. 
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elsewhere. A vessel that has been issued a coastal shipping permit would be required 
to undertake to trade on the coast for a maximum period of 183 days (6 months). 
So far, the Bill has not yet been passed into law. In the event that it becomes statute, 
the proposed coastal shipping permit system would effectively abolish cabotage. Once 
again, an avenue would be reintroduced through which foreign vessels could ply the 
Australian coast and typically offer freight rates that vessels registered under the AGSR 
could hardly compete against. Not only would such a step further the development of 
the AGSR; it would also create permanent dependence on foreign tonnage, which in 
turn would reestablish exclusion of Australian participation from coastal shipping, 
which Australia has struggled with for more than 100 years. 
7.2  SUMMARY  
The hallmark of Australian coastal policy, for a long time, has been the permit system. 
Today, foreign participation predominantly occurs through registering vessels under 
the Australian flag directly or through its second register or, more infrequently, through 
the granting of emergency licences.  By virtue of the fact that Australia seems 
permanently tied to foreign vessel participation on the coast, the tone of its cabotage 
policy remains unequivocally liberal.  
At the outset of its cabotage practice, Australia adopted liberal cabotage that allowed 
foreign vessels on the coast provided they were first, not subsidised; secondly, paid 
Australian prescribed crew wages; and thirdly, observed stipulated manning quotas. 
However, the approach did not contribute to the development of the Australian coastal 
fleet. The country continued to depend on British vessels to lift Australian coastal 
cargo. Whenever Australia imposed stricter policies to reduce foreign participation, it 
negatively affected coastal freight rates.  
Australia has spent the best part of the last 50 years setting up one commission after the 
other to find a solution that would secure foreign coastal participation and 
simultaneously rejuvenate the country’s struggling fleet. The task has not been easy 
and not much has been gained from various administrations’ repeated attempts.  
For instance, in an attempt to deal with the advantage foreign operators usually have 
over their local counterparts, Australia obliges foreign vessels to pay crew wages that 
local labour union arrangements recognise. This obligation means foreign owners lose 
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the low operating cost advantage that ordinarily enables them to offer lowered coastal 
freight rates. However, the consequence is that incentive for foreign investment in 
Australian coastal shipping is likewise lowered. Again, this undermines further 
participation of foreign operators. 
Nevertheless, the Australian cabotage paradigm presents some measure of levelling the 
playing field between foreign and local coastal operators. However, Australian 
shippers’ choice of service providers remains somewhat limited compared to what it 
would be if foreign participation were allowed. Ultimately, the shipper is denied access 
to cheaper coastal freight rates. 
7.3 NEW ZEALAND 
New Zealand is an island country with a landmass of about 265 000 square kilometres 
and a coastline spanning over 15 000 kilometres.165 It is considerably smaller than 
Australia, its closest and largest trading partner. New Zealand consists of two main 
distinct landmasses, namely the North and South Island. It has a population of about 
4.7 million people. The North Island, although comparatively smaller, is more densely 
populated than the larger South Island.  The Cook Strait separates the two main 
islands.166   
The country has six leading container ports.167 Four of these are located in the North 
Island including Tauranga, which is the largest container port in New Zealand. New 
Zealand’s largest bulk coastal cargo consists of petroleum products and cement.168 
Loading of bulk commodities occurs at ports nearest to production centres in much the 
same way that handling of petrochemicals occurs on the South African coast. The ports 
of Whangarei and Taranaki in the North Island cater for petroleum products. The 
 
165 New Zealand, available at http://www.geoatlas.com/en/maps/countries-4/new-zealand-1045 
(Accessed 29 June 2018). 
166 About 3 677 200 people live in the North Island of New Zealand while the South Island recorded a 
population of about 1 115 800 in June 2017. Auckland city alone is home to about a third of the 
estimated 4 million of the country’s population. See Auckland (nd), available at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auckland (Accessed 29 June 2018).  
167  In the order of the highest containers handled to the least (for the period 2016/7) these are 
Tauranga, Auckland, Lyttelton (port of Christchurch), Napier, Otago and Wellington. Largest New 
Zealand Ports, available at https://www.championfreight.co.nz/largest-nz-ports. (Accessed 4 July 
2018). 
168 Tauranga, Auckland, Wellington and Napier, while Otago and Lyttelton are located in the South 
Island.  
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handling of cement, which is the second largest bulk cargo, is shared between 
Whangarei and Westport in the South Island.169 
Furthermore, New Zealand has shown strength and capacity to develop as a major 
transshipment hub for the South Pacific despite its relatively small size. New Zealand 
ports handle a significant volume of transshipment cargo, particularly through Taranaki 
and Port Nelson. In 2014, 90% of cargo handled in Taranaki was transshipment cargo, 
while Port Nelson handled 40%.170 
Given New Zealand’s physical features, it is not surprising that 99.5% of its overall 
trade is carried by sea.171  Its geography and location of its dominant cargo encourages 
active inter-port trade across the two main islands. Thus the dispersion of cargo sources 
(centres of production in the South Island) and sinks (especially in Auckland) seems to 
suggest cabotage as the obvious coastal policy choice for New Zealand. However, the 
study shows the complexity of making such choice. The discussion below sets out the 
New Zealand coastal shipping picture through a brief history of early cabotage operated 
under the New Zealand flag, the changes that took place during the mid-1990s, and the 
current cabotage position. 
7.3.1 Cabotage reservation for flagged vessels (early 1900s to 1980s) 
New Zealand early history shows that the coast had a few dominant and predominantly 
British operators. However, at what may be referred to as the pinnacle of New Zealand 
coastal trade (by number of ships under the New Zealand flag), the coast had about 
seven dominant operators, especially during the late 1960s to early 1970s. Among these 
were Anchor Shipping & Foundry Co. Ltd and Canterbury Steam Shipping Co. Ltd, 
which operated on the coast with agencies in ports such as Bluff, Lyttelton, Wellington, 
Auckland and others. Holm and Co. Ltd serviced the New Zealand coast, Rarotonga 
and Chatham Islands. Northern Steamship Co. Ltd operated on the west coast between 
Onehunga to Lyttelton, Timaru, Dunedin and Bluff. Parry Brothers Ltd provided 
coastal bulk services. Union Steam Ship Company of New Zealand Ltd provided 
 
169 New Zealand Ports and Freight Yearbook 2016 (2016) Deloitte, available at 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nz/Documents/finance/2016-Ports-and-Freight-
Yearbook.pdf. (Accessed 29 June 2018). 
170 M. Thompson & J. Cockerell Cabotage in New Zealand and Australia: A World of Difference 
between Neighbours? (2015), available at https://www.clydeco.com/insight/article/cabotage-in-new-
zealand-and-australia-a-world-of-difference-between-neighbo. (Accessed 7 September 2018). 
171 Ibid. 
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passenger and cargo coastal services on both the New Zealand and Australian coasts. 
Pearl Kasper and Shipping Co. Ltd provided inter-island and coastal services. The New 
Zealand Government Marine Department does not appear to have had any trading 
vessels in its possession at the time except for the usual fleet for fisheries, rescue and 
research.172 
For a period, only domestically-registered vessels could trade on New Zealand’s 
coast.173  However, New Zealand did not practise strict cabotage.  Foreign vessels were 
allowed coastal participation provided they were registered under the New Zealand 
flag.174  Furthermore, in the usual fashion, ministerial waivers were granted to foreign 
vessels to provide coastal services that domestically-registered operators did not have 
capacity to perform.   
In the late 1960s to early 1970s, New Zealand coastal operators had a combined fleet 
of about 73 vessels. The Union Steam Shipping Company175 of New Zealand owned 
about 45 of these vessels. At one stage, the USSC was the biggest shipping company 
in the southern hemisphere and New Zealand’s largest private sector employer.176  It 
had offices in London and a London Board of Directors while having branch offices in 
New Zealand. USSC operated on the New Zealand coast, New Zealand/Australian 
coast and in the Pacific Islands. Although vessels trading on the New Zealand coast 
were required to fly the New Zealand flag, there were no restrictions regarding 
ownership of vessels or on vessel-owning companies operating on the coast. As a result, 
British interests owned and controlled the lion’s share of the New Zealand-flagged 
vessels.177  
With time, however, the fleet decreased. By 1983 New Zealand had a coastal fleet of 
19 vessels and 10 operators. Coastal activities involved the carriage of general cargo, 
passengers, petroleum products, vehicles, cement and other cargo totalling about 
 
172 International Shipping and Shipbuilding Directory (1969) Benn Brothers (Marine Publications) 
London, UK Limited.  
173 R.Y. Cavana Coastal Shipping Policy in New Zealand: The Case for an Empirical Cost Benefit 
Analysis (1994). 
174 M.R. Brooks, Liberalization in Maritime Transport (2009). 
175 The Union Steam Ship Company of New Zealand has been abbreviated as “USSC”. 
176 Union Company, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_Company. (Accessed 7 January 
2019). 
177 P&O of Britain owned the Union Steam Ship Company of New Zealand Limited. See Cook-Strait 
Ferries Changed the Nature of Shipping in New Zealand (13 August 2012), available at 
http://static.stuff.co.nz/files/FerryTaleCelebration.pdf. (Accessed 20 November 2019). 
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7 million tons. The economic benefit of these activities was estimated at about 1 000 
direct employment opportunities with a related wage bill of about $70 million and a 
further indirect shore-based employment and support services pool that coastal 
shipping provides.178 
As part of major economic reforms in the early-1990s, the New Zealand government 
introduced the Transport Law Reform Bill. The Bill contained clause 240, which sought 
to allow foreign vessels free rein on the New Zealand coast. Submissions were made as 
part of the process regarding whether or not cabotage was to remain policy. Robert 
Cavana179 provided a detailed report on these submissions. Various submissions were 
made, among others, that coastal services were very competitive, reliable, and cost 
efficient. Cavana attributed such competition and improved coastal services to 
deregulation of the road transport industry that took place in 1983 which, he stated, 
prompted efficiency and competitiveness in coastal shipping.180  
The thrust of the argument for retaining cabotage was that the nature of cabotage 
required that it be viewed as a domestic transport operation.181 In other words, the 
approach to coastal operations must be to look at it as one would a local firm. On this 
basis, coastal operators wanted the government to give coastal operating firms 
protection ordinarily expected by and afforded to other transportation modes. They 
argued, for instance, that foreign airlines had no right to operate on New Zealand 
domestic routes. Similarly, foreign road hauliers that do not pay tax (especially if 
subsidised by home countries) and who employ cheap labour would have an unfair 
competitive advantage over domestic hauliers, which would not be allowed in the 
country.182  Therefore emphasis was placed on the fact that any firm operating in New 
Zealand using its own labour, not obliged to comply with New Zealand legislation and 
not obliged to follow domestically recognised business practices, would not be 
permitted to trade in New Zealand. It followed, the argument continued, that foreign 
vessel owners must similarly not be allowed to operate on the New Zealand coast.183  
 
178 Ibid. 
179 Cavana 1994 (note 58). 
180 Ibid. 173 reports 27% freight reduction for voyages between North Island Auckland port and South 
Island Lyttelton over the period from 1988 to 1992 and 47% freight reduction of ferry rates for almost a 
decade following road transport deregulation. 




Cabotage protagonists further argued that the suggested approach to coastal operations 
was in line with that of other maritime nations. Therefore, there were no grounds on 
which New Zealand coastal operations should be treated differently.184 
The conclusion that came out of these submissions was that the potential cost to New 
Zealand of withdrawing cabotage appeared considerably greater than the benefit of 
keeping the policy.185  The recommendation was therefore for the government first to 
conduct an appropriate cost benefit analysis to compare the potential advantage of 
opening the coast to foreign vessel competition with the benefit of keeping the status 
quo. The government ignored the recommendation and proceeded to liberalise the New 
Zealand coast without conducting the cost benefit analysis. The effect of liberalisation 
appears below under ‘New-era cabotage’.  
7.3.2 Maritime Transport Act 1994 
The New Zealand government enacted the Maritime Transport Act 1994, which 
abolished cabotage with effect from 1 February 1995. The relevant provisions 
regulating coastal shipping conduct are found in section 198. The provisions reserve 
carriage of coastal cargo186 for three categories of vessels: first, New Zealand-registered 
ships;187 second, foreign vessels on demise charter to New Zealand based operators 
who employ New Zealand crews or other crews, provided the employment contracts 
fall under New Zealand labour laws;188 and third, a category which extends coastal 
participation to foreign-flagged vessels.  
However, in order to order to trade on the New Zealand coast, foreign vessels must 
meet two conditions. First, a vessel calling at a New Zealand port must not have 
commenced its voyage in New Zealand and its final destination must be outside New 
Zealand. Second, the vessel may perform coastal services only as an ancillary part of 
 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid. 171. 
186 Maritime Transport Act 1994 (‘MTA’) section 198(6) defines coastal cargo as including “passengers 
who initially board vessel at a New Zealand port for carriage to and final disembarking at another New 
Zealand port; or goods initially loaded at a New Zealand port for carriage to and final unloading at 
another New Zealand port…”. 
187 In terms of section 8 of the Ship Registration Act 1992, vessels that may be registered are those that 
are solely owned by nationals or that nationals own in the majority with non-nationals and vessels that 
are owned by permanent residents.  
188 MTA (note 71) section 198 (1)(b) provides as follows: “… a foreign ship on demise charter to a New 
Zealand-based operator who employs or engages a crew to work on board the ship under an employment 
agreement or contract for services governed by New Zealand law.”. 
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the operation. The main service must remain the carriage of ‘international cargo’, the 
definition of which specifically excludes upliftment and discharge of coastal cargo.189   
Section 198(1A)(a) deals with some elements of foreign vessels’ coastal operations. It 
stipulates that foreign vessels may load or discharge coastal cargo only at a New 
Zealand port where international cargo would be loaded or discharged in New Zealand.  
However, any possible limitation to foreign vessel trading in New Zealand is vitiated 
by the next provision. Subsection (1A)(b) allows foreign vessels to load and discharge 
cargo at a port in New Zealand where the vessel was scheduled to pass by without 
having to perform international operations.190  
Therefore, international vessels in transit have permission to load cargo from one New 
Zealand port for discharge at another New Zealand port virtually without any 
formalities. With respect to cargo itself, foreign vessels also have permission to load 
‘international cargo’191 from one port in New Zealand to another port in New Zealand 
for consolidation purposes. A foreign vessel in its transit through New Zealand may 
therefore carry any type of cargo irrespective of its origin or destination. Given that no 
distinction exists between genuine coastal cargo and transshipment cargo, international 
cross-carriers have a right to operate on the New Zealand coast.192 
Furthermore, the Minister has the power in terms of section 198(2) to waive all 
restrictions relating to coastal trade in the absence of New Zealand vessels, vessels 
under charter to New Zealand-based operators and vessels en route to elsewhere.  
Furthermore, the Minister may in any event authorise the carrying of coastal cargo by 
any vessel regardless of its flag affiliation, manning practices, where it was built, 
allegiance to New Zealand, or any other reasons. Ministerial waiver also does not 
require proof that the proposed service would not be available from any of the vessels 
in the combined pool of the New Zealand fleet including vessels on demise charter to 
 
189 MTA (note 71) section 198(1)(c)(i) and (ii). 
190 MTA (note 71) section 198(1A)(a) and (b) provide that a foreign vessel “may only load and unload 
coastal cargo– 
(a) at a New Zealand port at which it loads or unloads international cargo; or 
(b) at a New Zealand port that it is scheduled to pass in the course of its continuous journey”. 
191 The definition of international cargo in section 198(6)(b)((i) and (ii) of the MTA (note 71) includes 
goods initially loaded at a New Zealand port for carriage to and unloading at a foreign port and vice 
versa. The same principle applies to carriage of passengers.  
192 R.Y. Cavana A Qualitative Analysis of Reintroducing Cabotage onto New Zealand’s Coast (2004) 
31(3) Maritime Policy Management 31(3) 179 –198. 
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New Zealanders and foreign vessels transiting New Zealand waters.193  Section 198(2) 
provides the minister with blanket discretion to bypass any kind of formality ordinarily 
associated with cabotage. 
As such, virtually any vessel may trade on the New Zealand coast either under putative 
restrictions in terms of section 198(1) of the Act or under no restrictions at all on the 
basis of ministerial waivers. 
7.3.3 New-era cabotage (period after 1995) 
This section highlights the result of abolishing cabotage in New Zealand.  The almost 
instantaneous upside of abolishing cabotage was seen in freight rate reductions. As a 
result of increased competition and marginal costing, freight rates reduced by up to 
50% for transportation of cargo between the North and the South Islands. 194  In 
particular, freight rates for the Auckland-Lyttelton voyage decreased by about 25%. 
Freight rates for northbound cargo showed a relatively smaller reduction compared to 
freight rates for south-bound traffic because international lines normally travel south 
when leaving New Zealand.195 Nevertheless, downward freight rate adjustments were 
substantial even for northbound traffic. 
Since deregulation, the coast has also experienced an average container volume 
increase of about 5% per annum since 1995.  One major coastal operator, Pacifica 
Shipping, reported a 100% general cargo volume increase in 2000. 196  Bulk cargo 
remained unaffected because the oil industry continued to utilise specialised tankers on 
the coast and traditionally charters in foreign vessels to supplement their fleets during 
peak seasons.197   
Significant freight cost reductions that New Zealand achieved in the aftermath of the 
scrapping of its older form of cabotage were made possible by the fact that firstly, 
international carriers charge marginal costs for carrying coastal cargo. Secondly, 
considerably lower operating costs were passed on to New Zealand shippers and 
thirdly, some of the foreign operators were operating on the back of government 
 
193 Vessels falling under section 198(1) of the MTA (note 71). 
194 Cavana (note 77) 186. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid.  
197 Ibid. 187. 
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subsidies from their home countries.198 New Zealand coastal operators, on the other 
hand, had to set their freight rates on the basis of local currency, particularly bearing in 
mind that bunker costs remain sensitive to US dollar fluctuations. In addition, these 
operators had to pay local taxes, had an obligation to meet legislated minimum wage 
requirements and had to ensure general compliance that international carriers did not 
have to carry as a cost.199   
Unsurprisingly, the New Zealand shipping industry began to struggle. At the end of the 
millennium, New Zealand had no domestically-flagged vessels carrying international 
trade.200 Local operators were confined to coastal services only. In 2000 the New 
Zealand government had to revisit its position once again. It commissioned what was 
termed the Shipping Industry Review team to chart a course to revive New Zealand 
participation in shipping. However, the government sought a strategy that would 
preserve coastal infrastructure and permit continued access and competition.201  Given 
that at the time New Zealand shipping trade was confined to coastal shipping, the debate 
inevitably revolved around the reintroduction of cabotage. Robert Cavana provided a 
paper on the debate. Some of his observations are set out below. 
Notably, at the beginning of the new millennium, the position was not remarkably 
different from what it was in the early 1980s.  In 2000, New Zealand had nine coastal 
operators controlling a total of 21 vessels.202  Eleven of these were registered under the 
New Zealand flag, while virtually all the other vessels on the coast were registered 
under FOCs. Not much had changed in the range of cargo that these vessels carried 
along the coast prior to cabotage removal except that coastal cargo had increased. 
Petroleum products formed the highest percentage of coastal cargo volumes loaded in 
New Zealand at about 3.7 million tons. Cement was about 0.7 million tons.203  General 
cargo carried was about 200 000 TEUs per annum, 80% of which formed the genuine 
 
198 Ibid. 180. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid. 179. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 184. 
203 Ibid. 
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cabotage portion.204 International operators captured between 7% and 9% of coastal 
trade.205 
A noteworthy observation was that international lines used New Zealand more for 
transshipments than they did for the sole purpose of moving cargo between ports within 
New Zealand.206 It was not unusual for different container lines to call at different ports 
and collect containers for other lines and deliver them at Auckland for transfer to 
passing vessels destined for overseas terminus. However, transshipment and ‘hubbing’ 
activities resulted in coastal volume increases of about 5% per annum from 1995 for 
the next ten years.207  
A further observation was that coastal containers accounted for about 2.4 million tons 
per annum. Similar to the South African case, data given does not disaggregate between 
genuine coastal container volumes (originating from and destined to New Zealand) and 
transshipment volumes. Furthermore, the debate around cabotage related almost 
exclusively to containerised cargo, while bulk commodities remained virtually 
unaffected. It will be recalled that bulk shippers traditionally engage specific tonnage 
for their cargo and charter in more vessels in times of tonnage under supply. Therefore 
bulk cargo traders supported reintroduction of cabotage provided the definition of 
cabotage cargo was modified to exclude coastal bulk cargo.208 
Broader conclusions derived from the Shipping Industry Review revealed that 
typically, two interest groups dominate the cabotage debate. One group would normally 
promote job preservation, creation and stimulation of ‘home industries’. This group 
normally places less weight on the cost of cabotage. In New Zealand local domestic 
ship owners and domestic transport operators, maritime worker’s unions and other 
transport sector associations represented these interests. Their support is based, among 
other things, on the conviction that cabotage would provide employment opportunities 
for seafarers and related services. However, cabotage was seen only as a short-term 
 
204 Ibid. 
205 Cavana (2004) (note 77) estimated this figure at up to 7% while other sources estimate it at higher 
percentages of up to 9%. See Cavana 2004 (note 77) in J. Sankaran Freight Logistics in the New 
Zealand Context (2000) International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 145–
164. 
206 Cavana ((2004) (note 77) 185. 
207 Ibid. 186. 
208 Ibid. 192. 
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solution while searching for a more permanent solution for the future. No suggestions 
were put on the table regarding what that solution would look like. 
The other group normally prioritises lowered costs and service efficiency and seem to 
be driven less by the need to prioritise development of local maritime industries if the 
method adopted would not translate to lower average freight rates. The group places 
significant weight on the potential development of other industries that could benefit 
from lower transportation costs. In New Zealand, international operators, 
manufacturers, ports, boards, other primary producers and their associations presented 
the latter view. This group almost unanimously agreed that reintroducing cabotage 
would have a serious overall negative impact on the economy. In particular, they argued 
that cabotage leads to increased freight rates.209   
7.3.4 Contemporary New Zealand coastal stance 
In the meantime, the country’s failure to attract new domestic operators and the lack of 
local interest in coastal trade continue unabated. In 2003, New Zealand’s key domestic 
operator, Pacifica Shipping, removed two of its vessels from service, citing “the impact 
of tax-free overseas ships” on the New Zealand coast.210 Pacifica had a fleet of four 
RO-ROs before cabotage was abolished. Pacifica, which enjoyed a 30% coastal market 
share, had been reduced to a single ship company by 2015.211 The company has since 
been bought by China Navigation Company, the new prospect for success of the New 
Zealand coastal trade. The coastal fleet continues to decline despite volume increases 
from 45 000 TEUs per quarter in 2012 to 60 000 TEUs per quarter in 2015.212   
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7.4  SUMMARY 
In the mid-1990s New Zealand abandoned cabotage that was, for all intents and 
purposes, fairly liberal in nature. What followed was a form of cabotage that could 
hardly be described as cabotage in the traditional sense.  Given its degree of liberality, 
particularly with respect to the freedom with which foreign vessels were allowed to ply 
the coast, New Zealand cannot be properly categorised as a cabotage jurisdiction. The 
manner in which its coastal operations have been conducted since 1995 permits 
virtually any vessel to trade on its coast. 
As is the norm in jurisdictions where foreign vessels are permitted to trade, New 
Zealand recorded significant decreases in average freight rates and its coastal volumes 
increased substantially.  Existing domestic operators such as Pacifica Shipping thrived 
as coastal volumes increased. 
However, the prosperity period seems to have been short-lived for local operators. 
Increased competition from international passers-by who could operate on marginal 
costing began to decrease average coastal freight rates to a point that was below what 
local operators could sustain. The result was that even leading coastal operators began 
to decrease the sizes of their fleets. Domestic operators were no longer able to compete 
with their subsidised foreign counterparts, who also had no obligations to pay 
prescribed crew wages, for instance. As a result, the New Zealand coastal industry 
became an unsustainable venture for local operators. One after the other, local operators 
either reduced their fleets or were forced out of coastal trade.  
By virtue of the very liberal cabotage provisions of section 187 of the New Zealand 
Coastal Shipping Act, trading conditions continue to favour foreign operators. At 
present, foreign operators such as China Navigation Company have taken full 
advantage of the trading conditions on the New Zealand coast. Among other things, the 
absence of a suitable domestic fleet entitles authorities to call for capacity from any 
available foreign operator. Therefore, the liberality of New Zealand’s cabotage as set 
out in section 187 of the Coastal Shipping Act gives foreign vessels carte blanche access 
to the coast.  However, the consequence of virtually unfettered prevalence of foreign 
tonnage on the New Zealand coast seems to stunt the development of local coasting 
firms. The result has been the scarcity of domestic capacity, which in turn fosters 
engagement of foreign vessels. Regardless of shortage of locally registered tonnage, 
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the degree of liberality of New Zealand cabotage reduces costs and thus stimulates 
trade. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
Similar to the way in which restrictive cabotage practices began, liberal cabotage has 
in one way or another evolved from early British colonial concepts of coastal shipping 
governance. Motivated by the desire for independence, each former colony seems to 
have adapted its coastal policy thereafter in line with its trade, economic interests and 
social gearing requirements at each stage of coastal policy development.  
However, liberal cabotage, as its nomenclature suggests, is flexible in nature and as 
such, the manner and tone of its implementation allows adaptation that accommodates 
evolving political, social and economic imperatives. Liberal cabotage also seems to 
indicate a shift in the landscape of the cabotage debate. The modern trend seems to be 
covering a much wider array of issues. 
In general, observations from both Australia and New Zealand include the following. 
• First the size, shape, location and whether the country is an island or not is 
irrelevant. The geographical positioning, especially of New Zealand, with its 
north and south configurations, instinctively but deceptively suggests a classic 
scenario for cabotage. However, it is evident from the above discussion that 
geography by itself does not equate to a perfect opportunity for cabotage.  
• Second, liberal cabotage is usually applied in varying degrees. The degree of 
liberality of cabotage depends on policy objectives of each government 
administration. Particularly in Australia, for 100 years, there has not been a 
single administration that has committed itself to one consistent and sustained 
form of liberal cabotage. Sometimes, liberal cabotage driven through a 
reliance on waivers has increased the domestic flag, but at times, a less liberal 
approach has had to be adopted.   
• Third, each jurisdiction has its own boundary prescribing the extent of 
liberality of each cabotage. For example, in New Zealand, industry-wide 
consensus seems to be a line not to be crossed. The liberality of New Zealand 
cabotage seems to have been consistently matched with New Zealand’s 
policies governing other industries. The degree of cabotage liberality has been 
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determined after wider consultation with industry to ensure cabotage is not 
incongruent with industry requirements. Consequently, the degree of liberality 
of New Zealand’s cabotage has been relatively consistent with developments 
in other economic industries, particularly those that depend on coastal 
shipping. 
Therefore, consultation and consensus seem to be central to liberal cabotage policy in 
New Zealand. Having said that, there has been an instance where government has been 
presented with reports calling for a proper market analysis and it has simply proceeded 
to remove cabotage without conducting such an analysis. However, it may have been 
opportune for the government to do so, given that it thereafter adopted a very liberal 
form of cabotage, perhaps indicative of its sensitivity to industry needs. In any event, it 
was generally agreed that the policy would be revisited in due course. 
The next chapter reflects on both restrictive and liberal cabotage regimes and evaluates 
lessons considered instructive for South Africa cabotage policy development. 
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CHAPTER 8:  
LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA  
This chapter gives context to observations gleaned from the United States, Nigeria, 
Australia and New Zealand with regard to the development of cabotage in South Africa. 
Principally, the chapter analyses findings deemed instructive for South Africa from the 
above countries. Wide-ranging observations can be made from the previous chapters. 
However, the discussion will be confined to factors that provide direct lessons for 
formulating the South African cabotage policy. 
To provide an overview, the chapter begins with a brief outline of the South African 
basis for cabotage expressed in the CMTP. It is important to stress from the outset that 
this section does not deal with the basis for the South African framework for maritime 
transport development in general. It deals with the specific basis for cabotage within 
such framework. Although the maritime framework and cabotage are related, they are 
severable. This chapter therefore seeks to respond to the fundamental question: with 
the CMTP in place, what is the probable course for cabotage in South Africa, bearing 
in mind the cabotage experiences of the US, Nigeria Australia and New Zealand?  
BASIS FOR CABOTAGE UNDER THE CMTP 
The desired outcome of the CMTP is to achieve a transformed and effective coastal 
shipping and cabotage market.1 A list of reasons for the need to transform has been 
given. However, the main reason for introducing cabotage is “to promote South African 
ship ownership to serve national and regional economy” [sic].2  The CMTP also seeks 
to ensure a level playing field between local and foreign coastal participants. The 
prevailing view is that, unlike their South African counterparts, foreign vessels 
participating in coastal shipping in South Africa are subsidised, do not pay levies (on 
fuel and spares) and mostly flag their vessels under low or tax-free regimes.3 These 
factors are said to weigh potentially heavily against the development of a domestically-
owned and controlled coastal shipping industry and to militate against domestic fleet 
development in general.4 The advantages of coastal shipping are then stated at clause 
 
1 CMTP Policy Statement 8 48. 
2 See ibid paragraph (c). 
3 CMTP Policy Statement 8 (note 1) clause 168. 
4 Ibid. clause 169. 
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171. Notably, the reasons given for transformation do not directly address why there 
should be cabotage. 
Against an unclear basis for cabotage, it may be appropriate to start with how not to 
approach cabotage. An approach to coastal market control that ‘indigenises’ ship 
ownership, fleet development and coastal shipping poorly presents what cabotage is 
about. It presupposes that cabotage depends predominantly on nationally-built vessels, 
indigenous ownership, employment of indigenous crews and domestic flagging.  This 
basis obscures the reasoning for implementing maritime cabotage. As suggested in the 
first chapter, properly defined, cabotage refers to the jurisdiction’s prerogative to 
engage a shipping fleet of choice over its coast in a manner befitting its economic and 
social imperatives. The reason for implementing cabotage must therefore be based on 
state sovereignty and economic and social benefit.5 As such, the exercise of sovereignty 
must be subject to the economic and social benefit of the state. It is only after 
determining what factors would stimulate the economy and lead to social upliftment 
and whether those factors can realistically be achieved that the jurisdiction can 
implement cabotage.  
The approach of the CMTP suggests that domestic ownership and domestic fleet 
development naturally boost the economy and contribute to social development. The 
argument advanced here is that if approached in this way, cabotage implementation in 
South Africa will overlook cabotage variations that do not place emphasis on ship 
ownership and fleet development and which may, in fact, offer better economic and 
social development benefits.  
Bearing the above in mind, the analysis of the sample of countries studied looks at 
whether cabotage implementation in those countries points to any potential economic 
and social benefit in the South Africa context. In other words, regard being had to the 
lessons from the specific jurisdictions under discussion, would cabotage potentially 




5 A. Akpan, Maritime Cabotage Law (2019). 
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8.1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
There are numerous observations that can be made regarding the American coastal 
policy with respect to South Africa. In the main, lessons from the US point to the fact 
that cabotage is a policy that is exceedingly difficult to implement successfully. 
Ordinarily cabotage creates economic inefficiencies and increases freight costs. The 
gains are relatively small and the cost is too high.  
Observations regarding the US relate to three issues. First, the benefit that South Africa 
seeks in implementing cabotage differs markedly to what underlies the basis for US 
cabotage. Second, geography of the US coastal trade that sustains cabotage bears no 
comparison to the South African coastal trade. Third, cabotage appears too expensive 
for a developing country such as South Africa. Overall, these reasons project the US as 
a poor comparator for modern South Africa largely because the Jones Act was passed 
almost 100 years ago in an unequivocally different economic and social climate to 
today. The reasons are dealt with in turn below.  
8.1.1 The basis for US cabotage 
The reason for the United States cabotage arose from the need to provide the US 
defence force with a support fleet in war times. To date, matters relating to cabotage 
fall within the domain of Homeland Security.6 Historically, the US sought cabotage to 
benefit natural security, given the global hostilities that prevailed at the time. The First 
World War resulted in expedited US-built vessels for use in war to support the US 
military fleets. There was no real use for this massive tonnage under the US flag after 
the war. As a result, the US enacted the Jones Act to deal with vessel oversupply.7 
Consequently, tonnage was transferred to domestic ownership and utilised for 
nationally-flagged vessels on the coast. The size of the US fleet that existed greatly 
influenced the manner, pace and evolution of US trade along the coast and led 
eventually to the establishment of the US cabotage policy. 
  
 
6 Cabotage waivers are issued by the Homeland Secretary. See 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0928_AS1_Jones-Act-Waiver.pdf. (Accessed 
21 August 2018). 
7 I. Heine The US Maritime Industry: In the National Interest (1980) 5. 
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The exclusion of foreign merchant vessels was a natural result of this process. 
Indigenising coastal fleets was not the cornerstone of US cabotage. Cabotage was a 
response to deal with over-tonnage. The conversion and refurbishing of war time 
vessels was state sponsored. It was therefore logical that aid from the fiscal purse should 
benefit US citizens exclusively.  Similarly, these vessels were financed in the US and 
were therefore registered under the US flag and commensurately manned by US crews. 
Even then, the strategy that informed engagement of US-manned vessels was largely 
informed by security benefits associated with such practice rather than a sheer desire to 
exclude foreign crews.8 A large part of the benefit that the US sought in cabotage was 
to deal with vessel oversupply that resulted from decommissioned warbuilt tonnage. 
However, motivation for cabotage on the basis of support for the maritime and 
shipbuilding industry was only a subsequent phenomenon that serves to shield certain 
sectors such as US shipbuilders, crews and owners. 9  Unlike in South Africa, US 
cabotage was established to protect existing industries as opposed to establishing new 
ones. 
It is also noteworthy that US unionists and shipbuilders insist on the argument that 
foreign-flagged vessels have an unfair advantage because they operate under less 
stringent laws and regulations, have no obligations to pay minimum wages and receive 
production subsidies.10 Therefore, the argument continues, cabotage is necessary to 
level the playing field. As seen above, this is precisely the argument stipulated in the 
CMTP to motivate for cabotage. 
However, the US and South Africa’s original basis for cabotage cannot be equated. 
They are diametrically opposed to one another. South Africa does not have a fleet under 
its domestic flag, while the US had over-tonnage at the beginning of its cabotage 
regime. Based on this factor alone, US cabotage is not a useful reference point for South 
Africa. The US was a comparatively well-established and relatively old superpower in 
a post-World War armament race at the commencement of its cabotage. By contrast, 
South Africa is a young state in the 21st century with no looming external threats or 
 
8 Ibid.  
9 J. Frittelli Cargo Preferences for U.S.-Flag Shipping: Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress (2015), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44254.pdf. 
10 Ibid.  
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overarching defence needs that require its urgent commitment to substantial vessel 
capacity. South Africa’s priority is not to eclipse Europe or any country for that matter.  
Unlike the US, South Africa cannot build shipping capacity on the grounds of military 
expansion, support for the military or on mere political motivation.  Furthermore, the 
South African maritime industry exists but is relatively small to command the support 
that warrants its preservation. Instead, South Africa is making efforts towards the 
establishment of its maritime industry rather than its preservation. Even then, South 
Africa’s shipbuilding industry does not deal with large vessels (commercial or military) 
like the US does. South Africa builds tugs and other smaller craft and has a vibrant 
albeit not colossal crewing and ancillary services sector. South Africa has no domestic 
ownership status. Therefore, its basis for cabotage must show that implementing the 
policy will benefit the economy and result in social development. Potential benefit for 
cabotage must be well established and placed in the context of modern global markets 
that are remarkably different in shape and in size from what the US experienced at the 
commencement of its cabotage practice. 
8.1.2 Geography of the US domestic coastal trade 
The US experience has much to offer South Africa with regard to the ‘physical shape’ 
of the country’s trade. In the US geography has a tremendous influence on the 
sustenance of cabotage trades. Coastal shipping holds a 2% modal share of the US 
coastal freight compared to 71% and 10% that road and rail respectively carry (the 
remainder is shared among air, pipeline and other modes).11 The meagre 2% share 
occurs despite the fact that the US has a sizeable population, an extensive coastline, 
long waterways and a hive of coastal activity. This points to the fact that the success of 
coastal shipping does not depend on nor can it be assumed to exist on the basis of 
population distribution patterns or merely on business activity along the coast alone. 
Coastal patronage depends on modal efficiencies and competitive pricing. Coastal 
market shares will mirror the extent to which different modes of transport offer quick 
and affordable services to the user. 
  
 
11 Demand: Freight Transportation Modal Shares: Scenarios for a Low Carbon Future (2013), available 
at https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/55636.pdf. (Accessed 23 September 2019). 
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If the US did not have cabotage, trade to US territories would be subject to competition 
with the obvious benefit of lower freight rates. Puerto Rico, in particular, shows the 
highest freight rates in the trade from which cabotage operators benefit handsomely at 
the expense of Puerto Ricans. 12   Effectively, competition to the US territories is 
subjugated by two factors. First, US territories virtually depend on shipping as the only 
reasonable mode of carriage of cargo. This means, regardless of the coastal policy, 
intermodal competition does not exist on these trades. Second, trade to US territories 
enjoys a legislative sheath protecting it from international shipping competition. 
Without cabotage restrictions, Hawaii, for instance, would have access to the Pacific 
trade, which is one of the busiest routes in the world.13 
Therefore, it is clear from the above that non-contiguous cabotage trades play a very 
important role in supporting US cabotage. Consistent with their relative distance to 
other US states, Alaska and Hawaii carry the highest coastal share at 67% and 34% 
respectively.14 Other US modes of transport (that the Jones Act does not prohibit) 
cannot compete with shipping in these trades. It has already been shown that the 
shipping modal share along the coast amounts to a trifling 2% despite the US vast and 
complex waterway system and large populations strewn along its long coast. 15 
Therefore, cabotage in the US is propped up (over and above the prevention of 
alternative waterborne alternatives) and buoyed by the lack of alternative modal 
transport to service non-contiguous territories effectively.  
South Africa cannot be compared to the US with respect to its geography. South Africa 
has a relatively small cabotage trade advantage. Details on the available South African 
markets have been given from which it is clear that South Africa has no meaningful 
captive market that would solely rely on coastal shipping and has no inland waterways. 
So far, the best benefit for South African coastal shipping occurs in respect of low-
value cargo shipped between Durban and the Cape. On all other routes, coastal shipping 
 
12 C. Grabow, I. Manak & D. Ikenson The Jones Act: A Burden America Can No Longer Bear (28 June 
2018) Policy Analysis No 845 Cato Institute. 
13 T. Grennes An Economic Analysis of the Jones Act (2017). 
14 W.W. Olney Cabotage Sabotage? The Curious Case of the Jones Act (2019). 
15 Grabow et al (note 12) 19. 
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faces firm modal competition bolstered by market anomalies, especially in road 
transport.16 
8.1.3 The high costs of sustaining US cabotage 
As seen in chapter 6, the principal objection to US cabotage is that it induces high 
freight rates which in turn impact negatively on consumer prices. Joseph Francois 
estimates that the repeal of the Jones Act would boost US industries by about 
US$1.5 billion in the water sector, US$158 million in petroleum, US$103 million in 
chemicals, US$91 million in air transportation, US$50 million in steel, US$40 million 
in plastics and US$32 million in lumber.17  
The impact of exorbitant coastal carriage costs is felt in both the freight and passenger 
markets although the effects seem more prevalent in the transportation of cargo. 
Various domestic industries, particularly input industries, have forcefully argued that 
without access to cheaper foreign shipping, producers have to pay more to transport 
cargo domestically. For example, US cabotage makes products such as foodgrains, 
scrap metal, raw salt, soya, etc., prohibitively expensive, which stifles domestic trade.18 
The effect of high transportation cost, especially on non-contiguous trades, cannot be 
overstated. Using Puerto Rico as an example, William Suarez19 explains that 
… a 100-pound (45.4 kg) bag of fertilizer in the US is around $3.50, but in Puerto 
Rico due to the freight cost it is between $0.10 and $0.14 per 50 pounds (22.7 kg) 
over the original cost. As a result, the importer is paying around $0.22 extra just for 
bringing the produce from the US. It means that the basic price of 100 pounds (45.4 
kg) of this fertilizer will start at $3.72. However, the importer should add its expenses 
and profit, almost 9% of the cost ($0.37); therefore, the consumer will be paying 
easily $4.10. Certainly, this is not a big deal for a casual consumer, but the $0.60 
means money for a regular farmer.20  
 
16 See T. Jones Coastal Sea Transport and Intermodal Competition in South Africa (1985), for a fuller 
discussion on landside market imperfections in South Africa. 
17 J.F. Francois, H.M. Arce, K.A. Reinert & J.E. Flynn ‘Commercial Policy and Domestic Carrying 
Trade’ (February 1996) 29(1) The Canadian Journal of Economics 181–198. 
18 Ibid. 
19 W. Suarez Cabotage as an External Non-tariff Measure on the Competitiveness on SIDS’s 
Agribusinesses: The Case of Puerto Rico (2018) XXX(III) Centro Journal 172–207. 
20 Ibid. 196. 
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As a result, producers in the farming industries often resort to sourcing input products 
from outside the US.   
The underlying causes of high coastal trade costs are multifold. Their effects on freights 
are interwoven. However, at the heart of the causes of high costs are cabotage 
requirements normally associated with strict cabotage. This section discusses two 
requirements of strict cabotage found particularly in the US which directly contribute 
to high costs: first, the exclusive coastal utilisation of US-built (and -repaired) vessels; 
and second, the compulsory engagement of US crews on vessels trading on the coast. 
Observations in this regard are hereafter extrapolated for South Africa.  
8.1.4 Coastal utilisation of US-built vessels 
The ‘US-built requirement’ can sometimes be confusing when discussed in respect of 
cabotage because, strictly speaking, it forms part of the argument for shipbuilding 
which does not always necessarily relate to cabotage. However, in the US, where strict 
cabotage requires US-built vessels, the requirement falls squarely within cabotage 
because a vessel that is not built in the US cannot participate in US coastal trades. The 
discussion below has been constructed on that basis. 
During the 1940s, in the early cabotage stages, the US had 64 privately operated 
shipyards and 8 naval shipyards that built large merchant ships.21  However, from the 
middle to the end of the 20th century, shipbuilding prowess moved from the West to 
the East, particularly to China, Japan and Korea. On the one hand, Asia has since the 
1950s offered competitive shipbuilding prices. On the other hand, the US has not been 
able to reduce costs of building vessels. Therefore, insistence on the ‘US-built 
requirement’ has over time made building vessels in the US extremely expensive as a 
consequence of the exogenous rise of Asian shipbuilding industries.22 
As shown in chapter 5, currently the US has only three shipyards: NASSCO, Philly 
Shipyards and VT Halter. None of these shipyards is owned and controlled exclusively 
by US citizens. At the heart of US shipbuilding decline is the fact that it is much cheaper 
 
21 Olney (note 14). 
22 Meanwhile Asian shipyards have reached new heights of efficiency and production levels. It is 
unsurprising that the largest container vessel, the MSCGülsün, was built by Samsung Heavy Industries, 
Geoje Shipyard, South Korea with a  record 23 756 TEU capacity. It sailed for the first time on 8 July 
2019 .  
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to build a ship in Asia than it is in the US. A large merchant vessel will cost about 
US$220 million to build in the US,23 while the same vessel will cost US$22.7 million 
in Asia.24  To trade on the coast, the US coastal operator is obliged to purchase a US-
built vessel priced at about eight times more than a similar-sized vessel built in Korea. 
The unabating competitiveness of the Asian shipbuilding market makes US 
shipbuilding exceedingly expensive. The price differential is passed on to US coastal 
shippers in the form of higher freight prices.25  
Responding to exorbitant shipping costs, US shippers have resorted to other modes of 
transport. As a result, waterborne movement of cargo along the Atlantic, Pacific coasts 
and Great Lakes region has declined by 61% between 1960 and 2014.26  Over the same 
period, barge usage has increased by about 365% despite the declines in actual coastal 
cargo volumes. The reason for this is again the cost of building ships. A shipyard in the 
US can build 15 barges for the cost of a single US-built coastal vessel.27 Furthermore, 
barges normally require a crew of 6 to 12, while crews number 21 to 28 on board for a 
typical coastal tanker.28 
Predictably, over time, the burden of high shipbuilding prices has contributed to the 
overall lack of competitiveness of US coastal shipping services. In the process, coastal 
operators have been forced either to reduce their service offering or to abandon the 
coastal market altogether. A glaring regression of the development of the US coastal 
fleet exists. In 2000 the US had 193 cabotage compliant vessels. The number of such 
vessels had reduced to 92 by 2016, which represents a staggering 52% plummet in just 
a decade-and-a-half. The average age of the 92 vessels is about 30 years.29 The decline 
clearly shows that coastal operators are either moving their vessels out of coastal trade 
 
23 The largest vessel built in the US is the Daniel K Inouye, which was built in 2018 for US$ 210 
million. It is the first of four (together US$929 million). It has a TEU capacity of 3 600. It took three 
years to build.  Notably, Daniel Inouye (who died in 2012) was a strong Jones Act supporter. See A. 
Gomes New Matson Vessel is Largest Containership Ever Built in US (29 November 2018), available 
at https://www.ttnews.com/articles/new-matson-vessel-largest-containership-ever-built-us. (Accessed 
27 September 2019). 
24 Olney (note 14) 9. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Revitalizing Coastal Shipping for Domestic Commerce (2017), available at 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/index.html. (Accessed 28 September 2019). 
27 Ibid. 7. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Olney (note 14) 11. 
 185 
or staying in the trade without ordering new US-built vessels after old vessels have been 
scrapped.  
For instance, Matson Navigation Company Inc (Matson) operated the Hawaii route 
with a fleet of 10 vessels. In 2018 Matson bought four vessels constructed by Philly 
Shipyard. The new fleet replaced seven steam-powered vessels built about 40 years 
ago. The four vessels also meant Matson could put the remaining three diesel engine 
vessels built in the 1980s on reserve.30  Effectively, once all the new US-built vessels 
were launched, Matson’s operations to Hawaii reduced to less than half of its previous 
service capacity. Notably, without the US-built requirement, Matson could have used 
Korean shipyards to replace its entire fleet of 10 with similar-sized container vessels 
for US$ 300 million (assuming US$30 million31 for each 3 600 TEU capacity vessel). 
Instead, Matson paid US$929 million for only four vessels to preserve its right to trade 
off the US coast.32 Inevitably Hawaiian shippers will have to shoulder the high costs 
that flow from price disparities of Matson new orders.  
8.1.5 Engagement of US crews  
US operating costs account for 70% of daily operating costs for a US crewed container 
ship compared to 28% for a foreign-flagged vessel. The single cause of the difference 
is the employment of US crews.33 Although the finding relates predominantly to US 
international vessels, John Frittelli argues that it remains relevant for the coast because 
coastal operators draw crews from the same pool.34 Another exercise conducted to 
compare average daily operating cost of a foreign-flagged vessel and US vessels 
estimated such costs at about US$6000 and US$22 000 respectively. 35   This cost 
calculation is over and above the construction cost discussed above. 
Labour is therefore the primary cost on US coastal vessels. An additional cost comes 
from crew sizes, which are regulated by a 1915 statute, when vessels were not 
automated.  These requirements vary depending on the type of the vessels. Generally, 
they require a higher number of crew members than would ordinarily be the case if 
 
30 See Gomes (note 24). 
31 Grabow et al (note 12). 
32 Gomes (note 24). 
33 Revitalizing Coastal Shipping (note 26) 13. 
34 J. Frittelli Shipping US Crude Oil by Water: Vessel Flag Requirements and Safety Issues (21 July 
2014), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43653.pdf. (Accessed 22 November 2019). 
35 Ibid. 
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modern crew numbers were required.36 Considering that at least 75% of the crew37 on 
board a US coastal vessel must be US citizens, substantially higher US coastal operating 
costs do not come as a surprise. 
8.1.6 Extrapolating for South Africa 
Despite the non-comparable size and the point of commencement of US cabotage, the 
US remains instructive to South Africa. Overall the US scenario shows that cabotage 
presents serious challenges regardless of the country’s economic strength. The 
struggles of one of the biggest economies in the world provide a clear narrative of how 
cabotage can have an overall effect of reducing domestic shipments, which negatively 
affects consumer prices. 
South African policy makers should note that cabotage founded on the domestic-built 
requirement prohibit cheaper alternatives (from Asian shipyards), translates to coastal 
operations that depend on inefficient and ageing vessels and leads to reduced coastal 
fleet capacity. Furthermore, because the domestic-built requirement also stifles 
domestic shipments, it increases domestic prices.38 As a corollary, the scenario explains 
why it was possible to propagate Asian cabotage, especially in China and Japan, on the 
basis of exclusive use of domestic-built vessels.  
The US analysis provides classic evidence that cabotage premised on domestically-
built vessels can be expensive outside Asia. South Africa can therefore ill afford to 
require cabotage on the basis of South African-built tonnage. Furthermore, bearing in 
mind the purpose of cabotage expressed in the CMTP, it is unlikely that the exclusion 
of foreign-built vessels from cabotage trades will result in increased coastal 
participation, which in turn can be a stepping-stone for economic growth and social 
development. Instead, building vessels domestically could burden coastal operations 
and lead to a decline in coastal shipments, which in turn could drive up consumer prices. 
In addition, exclusive employment of South African crews could lead to increased 
operational costs, particularly as a result of a higher wage bill. In South Africa, 
domestic crews would in all likelihood be part of unionised labour, as they are 
 
36 Grennes (note 13). 
37 Report to the Congress: Foreign Direct Investment in the United States (1973) Volume 6 Appendix J 
– Taxation US Department of Commerce. 
38 Olney (note 14) 29. 
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worldwide. Potentially, coastal operators could be locked into long-term wage contracts 
that do not move downwards in times of a negative freight market, with obvious 
consequences to coastal operations. 
In summary, implementation of strict cabotage would mean that vessels would have to 
be built in South Africa and would have to be manned largely by South Africans. 
Building vessels in South Africa would likely cost more than ordering vessels from 
Asia because, among other things, South Africa does not possess the economies of scale 
on which countries like Korea and China manage to reduce shipbuilding rates. It would 
therefore be more prudent for South Africa at least to begin its quest of owning vessels 
with foreign-built vessels while perhaps building capacity to compete with Asian 
shipbuilders at a later stage. 
Engagement of high numbers of national crews on nationally-flagged vessels normally 
requires government subsidies, which result in inflated crew wages across the board.39   
Coastal operators draw crews from the same pool (coastal and foreign-going crews) 
and therefore are obliged to pay equal wage rates to coastal and foreign-going crews 
despite differences between them, such as limited geography of coastal vessels (limiting 
economies of scale), high operating costs, domestic-built costs and unionised wage 
scales, among other factors. 
The cost of retaining coastal practices of this nature is borne by many consumers and 
therefore dispersed. Ultimately, strict cabotage has only a few beneficiaries, namely 
vessel operators, ship builders and seafarer labour unions.  
8.2 NIGERIA 
This section reviews two observations with respect to Nigeria. The first relates to the 
principal differences between Nigerian and South African coastal cargo base and their 
respective operations. The second observation is concerned with how Nigeria applies 
waivers.   
8.2.1 Nigerian coastal trade: distinguishing features 
The Nigerian coastal trade is unique in comparison with coasts of the other countries in 




Nigerian coast enjoys significant volumes of offshore liquid bulk cargo. Second, 
shipping controls virtually the entire coastal modal share. These features are explained 
below in turn. 
The first unique feature of the Nigerian coastal traffic base is that it is buoyed by 
significant volumes of oil, gas and bitumen deposits found off and along the coast of 
Ondo, Lagos, Ogun and Edo. 40  In 2007, these deposits were estimated at about 
22.5 billion cubic metres of crude oil, 3.5 trillion cubic metres of gas and 42.7 billion 
cubic metres of bitumen.41 Oil and gas alone constitute about 91% of the volumes that 
move along the Nigerian coast. 42 The remaining 9% consists of container, passenger 
and breakbulk activities.43  
Therefore, unlike in South Africa, the coastal trade route between the shore and 
production centres is created by the existence of natural commodities within Nigerian 
territorial waters and will last as long as production continues to exist. Currently, there 
are no predictions that Nigerian natural resources are approaching imminent depletion; 
hence the Nigerian coastal base may be expected to continue well into the foreseeable 
future.  
The second distinguishing feature of the Nigerian coastal traffic base is in the 
geographical location of the country’s cargo sources. Access to these locations requires 
utilisation of supply vessels (anchor-handling tugs, floating production, storage and 
offloading facilities, crew transportation and accommodation and other methods that 
service platforms and rigs) between the landside and the offshore location. Supply 
vessels are the only mode of transport that can operate in this trade. Therefore, the 
coastal shipping transport servicing offshore centres experiences no intermodal 
competition. This trade pattern can be seen in the South African ship-to-ship bunker 
trade that Linsen Nambi, for instance, services utilising locally registered tonnage. Such 
 
40 See Bitumen Deposit States in Nigeria, available at https://www.finelib.com/about/nigeria-natural-
resources/bitumen-deposit-states-in-nigeria/153. (Accessed 30 September 2019). 
41 I.E. Okon & J.O. Edem The Impact of Cabotage Law Implementation on Nigeria’s Indigenous 
Shipping Industry: A Study of the Onne Sea Port, Rivers State, Nigeria (2019) 8(7) International 
Journal of Development and Sustainability 388–403.  
42 O.A. Savage-Oyekunle Effect of the Cabotage Act 2003 on Nigerian Maritime Industry (2011), 
available at http://www.lasu.edu.ng/publications/law/oluremi_savage-oyekunle_bk_2.pdf. (Accessed 
17 May 2018). 
43 Ibid. 
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trade does not impact on transport costs because it is service exclusively by waterborne 
transport. It therefore does not interfere with the shipper’s modal choice. 
Apart from offshore to oil rig and ship-to-ship operations, South African coastal traffic 
depends largely on the transportation of containers. A large portion of this containerised 
traffic consists predominantly of transshipment cargo. Moreover, ‘genuine’ coastal 
container volumes consist of empty TEUs. The South African coastal traffic base is by 
no means exclusive to coastal shipping. It is exposed to major modal competition from 
both rail and road transport.44   
With regard to the transportation of non-containerised cargo, South Africa possesses a 
relatively consistent traffic base of petroleum products compared to other components 
of its coastal trade. However, production of petroleum products, to a certain degree, is 
limited by refinery capacity and demand along the coast. In Nigeria, centres of high 
demand are located on the coast (Lagos). In South Africa, high-demand centres are 
located inland (Gauteng), where road, rail and pipelines compete. The size of the South 
African coastal traffic base is considerably smaller than that of Nigeria. South Africa 
typically requires five vessels to transport petroleum products at any given time. Such 
capacity cannot be increased without the risk of over-tonnage.45 
To summarise, Nigeria possesses a much larger coastal cargo base. Its base is also 
different save for some similarities in offshore services.  Nigerian coastal shipping faces 
no modal competition and thrives on the back of substantial volumes of natural cargo 
sources found and largely consumed on the coast. However, the South African coastal 
traffic base is significantly smaller and is subject to modal competition. Refineries are 
its major source, from where petroleum products are carried for distribution to a few 
coastal centres. Transportation of petroleum products is already well catered for by 
current tonnages. As such, there are no immediate prospects of growing tonnages on 
the strength of the available cargo. Nevertheless, the Nigerian experience indicates for 
South Africa significant benefits for the reservation of offshore and ship-to-ship 
 
44 Refer to chapter 4 for a detailed account of the South African coastal traffic base and its limitations. 
45 However, South Africa is building some offshore capacity for petroleum product in the Mossel Bay 
vicinity. There is also potential for the servicing of offshore facilities, or ship-to-ship oil transfers could 
be explored. The scope and extent of these developments is not clear at this point. In any event, there are 
no indications so far that South Africa intends to make offshore activities part of its cabotage plans. 
 190 
services for cabotage. The CMTP provides for this position. The rational seems sensible 
especially because reserving this trade for cabotage poses no threat to transport costs.   
However, outside of the offshore ship-to-ship bunker trade services, the Nigerian 




As explained in chapter 5, the US and Nigeria practice strict cabotage. In exceptional 
circumstances, strict cabotage ordinarily reserves the right to the coastal jurisdiction to 
waive some or all of its sacrosanct requirements relating to flag, ownership, where a 
ship was built, and manning. The Cabotage Act pronounces strict cabotage in Part II, 
sections 3 to 8, and provides for waivers in Part III, sections 9 to 14.  
Section 3 of the Nigerian Cabotage Act requires vessels trading on the coast to be 
owned and manned by Nigerians. It also requires such vessels to be built and flagged 
in Nigeria. However, unlike the US, Nigeria lacks appropriate tonnage to carry its 
coastal cargo. As a result, Nigeria has been compelled to issue waivers. The practice 
then allows coastal participation of foreign-built, foreign-flagged and foreign-owned 
vessels that employ foreign crews.  
The record of indigenously-owned vessels on the coast shortly after the Cabotage Act 
was enacted speaks for itself. Only 11 out of the 245 vessels were owned by Nigerians 
on the Onne oil and gas trade route, while Apapa port recorded only 44 of 222 tankers 
in Nigerian hands.46  The overall percentage of the total carriage of coastal petroleum 
products provides an even clearer picture of indigenous participation over the same 
period. Nigerian-owned tankers carried petroleum products of about 97 041 tons, which 
amounts to 3.4%, while foreign-flagged vessels carried 96.6% through waivers. 
Further, West Africa Offshore chartered 15 foreign-flagged vessels and only one 
Nigerian-flagged vessel for coastal operations. Only 45 of the 183 crews employed in 
those vessels were Nigerians.47   
 
46 Okon & Edem (note 41). 
47 Ibid. 
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One would be tempted to expect a virtually flawless cabotage regime in Nigeria, given 
its cargo base, the location of sources and the coastal modal monopoly waterborne 
transport enjoys over other modes of transport. However, Nigeria has experienced 
tremendous challenges despite these advantages. Nigerian commentators lament the 
position. They argue that the Minister responsible set weak conditions for obtaining a 
waiver licence to admit foreign-flagged vessels to the coast. Furthermore, the manner 
in which the waiver system has been applied creates a proliferation of foreign firms 
who dominate the provision of coastal services.  
The common position among Nigerian scholars is that waivers are a practical part of 
any cabotage implementation. Nevertheless, the waiver system has been attacked and 
generally considered as having failed for various reasons. First, Nigerian stakeholders 
have been excluded from the process of granting licences. Second, the administration 
and enforcement of cabotage laws is expensive, especially monitoring services, which 
require amphibious aircraft and patrol boats. 48  The general thrust of the argument is 
that the challenge of Nigerian cabotage arises from lack of capital and human resource 
capacity and management of these responsibilities rather than the inappropriateness of 
waivers or the general failure of Nigerian cabotage. Contrary to other Nigerian 
commentators, Kalu argues that the Nigerian cabotage framework as a whole is 
profoundly flawed because the application of the waiver system fails to safeguard the 
interests of indigenous ship operators.49  
Nigeria, with its vast coastal resources and high percentage of shipping modal share 
and other advantages, has struggled with cabotage. South Africa should therefore 
approach the matter even more carefully, bearing in mind that it has a comparatively 
low traffic base, vulnerable modal position, and virtually no vessels under its flag. In 
particular, South Africa should consider the pitfalls that follow insistence on the 
exclusive engagement of domestically-built and -flagged vessels. Observations from 
Nigeria indicate clearly that a country applying strict cabotage at the commencement 
 
48 See O. Aggbakoba Guide for the Cabotage Financing for the Financial Sector in Nigeria (2002); 
U. Nkoro The Nigerian Cabotage Policy: Its Prospects and Opportunities OCI Paper (2012) a paper 
presented for OCI. Consultants Ltd, Labour House, Central Area, Abuja, Dec. 2012; V.O.S. Okeke & 
E.T. Aniche ‘An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Cabotage Act 2003 on Nigerian Maritime 
Administration’ (2012) 2(1) Sacha Journal Policy of Strategic Studies 12–28. 
49 K.K. Anele ‘A Study of the Cabotage Policy in Nigeria from the Prisms of Ship Acquisition and 
Shipbuilding’ (2018) 17(1) WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 91–17. 
 192 
of its coastal policy may not realistically be in a position to provide sufficient tonnage 
required for its full complement of coastal services without foreign participation.  
Therefore, it would be advisable for South Africa to consider a policy position that 
allows measured foreign participation until such time as suitable tonnage has been 
secured. Currently South Africa has no plausible basis on which to adopt strict 
cabotage. Strict cabotage entails a ‘domestic-built’ requirement as its fundamental 
tenet. South Africa does not have domestically-built vessels on which strict cabotage 
could be implemented. If the country were to insist on strict cabotage, like Nigeria, 
South Africa would in all likelihood be forced to rely on waivers for the provision of 
services on the coast.  As seen in Nigeria, waivers tend to promote coastal domination 
by foreign firms because of the lack of suitable domestic tonnage. 
It must, however, be borne in mind that, unlike Nigeria, South Africa first, does not 
require a large fleet for its coastal operations. It would require a coastal fleet 
commensurate to its traffic base. As a result, South Africa may not necessarily need to 
invest heavily in increasing coastal tonnage. Second, vessels that currently operate on 
the coast are already owned by South Africans, albeit that they are flagged elsewhere. 
Therefore, a simpler approach may be to encourage the inclusion of these vessels under 
the South African flag and to disregard where such vessels were built. Approaching 
implementation in this way focuses on the lower-hanging fruits. However, the 
suggestion may not accord with the aspirations of the CMTP. The approach is therefore 
suggested as a short-term practical solution while broader issues around 
implementations are being addressed and long-term solutions are sought. Furthermore, 
observations from Nigeria suggest that approaching the matter any other way could 
result in dependence on waivers, which are cumbersome and expensive to administer 
and maintain.  
Nigeria and South Africa have a largely similar colonial past and a long history of 
deliberate exclusion of indigenous people from economic activities. Therefore, the 
tendency to want to compare these countries can be understood. However, at the heart 
of the matter is the fact that South Africa and Nigeria possess non-comparable essential 
cabotage drivers, specifically with regard to cargo volumes and modal transport 
competition. South Africa enjoys no natural advantage with respect to both cargo 
volumes and exclusivity of coastal shipping trade in the manner observed in Nigeria. 
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In light of these factors, South Africa would be well advised not to emulate Nigerian 
cabotage and its waiver system too hastily. It seems that the creation of a coastal fleet 
and a vibrant coastal trade in South Africa will inevitably require involvement of 
foreign firms, at least in the short-term, until South Africa has built its own capacity. 
Overall, observations from both the US and Nigeria indicate that the cost involved in 
propping up strict cabotage makes it difficult to justify its continued existence where it 
already exists and its implementation where it is proposed. Therefore, strict cabotage 
would not be suitable for South Africa. Attention now turns to observations with respect 
to liberal cabotage in Australia and New Zealand. 
8.3 AUSTRALIA 
Liberal cabotage by nature is not rigid. Therefore, liberal cabotage principles generally 
do not function on a finite basis. This means the articulation and form of liberal 
cabotage may differ from one jurisdiction to another. Therefore, inasmuch as Australian 
cabotage is liberal, the degree of its liberality depends on features that are unique to 
Australia. This presents a challenge when comparing Australian and New Zealand 
cabotage regimes, for instance. Therefore, in approaching liberal cabotage it is 
necessary to establish the principal determinants that limit a particular liberal stance.  It 
is essential that South African policymakers observe this principle.  
At the beginning of its cabotage practice, Australia adopted liberal cabotage, permitting 
participation of foreign vessels on the Australian coast subject to three requirements. 
Foreign vessels could not be subsidised, had to comply with Australian prescribed crew 
wage scales and had to adhere to stipulated manning quotas. These three requirements 
therefore limited the degree of the Australian liberal coastal regime.  
Over time, Australia has measured the degree of the liberality of its cabotage on a 
balancing scale that has, on the one hand, domestic fleet expansion and on the other 
hand, competitive freight rates. It seems, as will be seen, priority was given to the 
protection of domestic operations, but if there was pressure to lower freight rates, the 
tendency was to introduce a method to encourage foreign participation.   
In 1912, when Australia enacted the Navigation Act, its priority was the establishment 
of its own domestic fleet. By 1950 that had not been achieved. However, freight rates 
seem not to have been an issue at that stage. In the 1970s coastal shipping peaked at 
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52% of coastal modal share.  However, British vessels controlled virtually all coastal 
tonnage through single voyage or continuous voyage permits allowed in terms of the 
Navigation Act. 50  The permit system exempted foreign vessels from the three 
requirements that originally formed the principal determinants for Australian cabotage. 
Moreover, British vessels could be registered or flagged outside Australia. Cabotage 
liberality was therefore further extended. The immediate benefits of not paying 
prescribed crewing wages, for instance, lowered freight rates. These conditions 
favoured increased foreign vessel participation, which in turn frustrated efforts of 
developing the Australian fleet.51  
Australia continued to struggle to balance fleet development and competitive freight 
rates. During the 1980s the government established funding to deal with the shortage 
of domestic tonnage. However, government investment occurred at a time when the 
coastal modal share for shipping had declined to 35%. The effort lost impetus as coastal 
trade as a whole was sluggish. A decade later shippers began to clamour more 
vociferously for the scrapping of cabotage. The primary reason was that cabotage was 
expensive. In particular, the Sea Freight Council of Western Australia argued that 
cabotage hampered development of the petrochemical industry. They maintained that 
cabotage removal would save the industry about $22.5 million a year.52  However, calls 
for change were ignored. 
The permit system created an environment in which foreign operators trading in 
foreign-registered vessels dominated the Australian logistical chain. 53  The balance 
between domestic fleet revitalisation and competitive freights rates has not been 
established. Notably, Australia reworked its cabotage legislation in 2012 and changed 
the permit system to level the playing field between foreigners and locals. However, 
before any discernible results from the new framework could be realised, another 
amendment was introduced to parliament in 2015. The amendment seeks to reintroduce 
the main provisions of the Navigation Act that favour foreign operators in order to keep 
freight rates low. It has not as yet been passed into law.54 
 
50 S. Everett & C. Kittel Sustainability and Australian Coastal Shipping: Some Issues (2010) 2(3) 
Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 82–89. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 86. 
53 Ibid. 50. 
54 Refer to the Shipping Amendment Act, Bill 2015. 
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In summary, Australia has not been able to develop a strong domestic fleet despite 100 
years of concerted effort. At its height in the early 1970s, Australian coastal shipping 
enjoyed a little more than half of the modal share. However, the coast operated with 
foreign-controlled tonnage. At the beginning of the new millennium Australia had 33 
registered vessels under its flag.  Only five were registered outside Australia. In 2010 
the country had no containerised vessels operating under its flag. In 2017 the number 
of Australian vessels of all types had decreased to 14. Over the period from 2002 to 
2017, the coastal shipping modal share also decreased from 27% to 15%. The shrinking 
coastal modal share reflects the growth of road transport haulage and its door-to-door 
advantage over other modes of transport.55 
The continued decline of the coastal fleet has been attributed to exorbitant capital and 
operating costs of the Australian-flagged vessels. These costs are generally regarded as 
comparatively higher than those of foreign operators on the permit system and are 
higher than road haulage costs. 56  Furthermore, Australian-crewed vessel costs 
(excluding fuel) constitute an estimated 38% of total operating costs, while foreign-
crewed vessels calculated on the same basis were about 13%.57 Under these conditions, 
the Australian-flagged vessel is not well placed to compete with other modes of 
transport or with foreign-owned vessels.  
Presently, Australian coastal shipping is essentially confined to two services. First, it is 
primarily engaged in the transportation of bulk cargo such as bauxite, alumina, crude 
oil, iron ore, petroleum products, steel products and sugar. The bulk of activities in this 
service involves carriage of iron ore from Port Hedland to Port Kembla, bauxite from 
Weipa to Gladstone and oil products from refining centres to terminals around the 
Australian coast. Tonnage used in this trade is typically provided by commodity 
suppliers owning and operating the service that transports their own product.58 Second, 
coastal shipping serves transshipments, daily passenger and RORO service between the 
Port of Melbourne and Tasmania.  Notably, the Melbourne/Tasmania service is subject 
 
55 The rising dominance of road haulage cannot be overstated. Even in island trades, where waterborne 
transport is often the exclusive link to the mainland, shippers place an increasing demand on carriers to 
provide door-to-door logistics services, especially for time-sensitive cargo. Effectively, in those trades, 
the carrier will still be chosen predominantly on the basis of its road haulage provision, sometimes even 
above freight rates. See P.D. Fanam & L. Ackerly ‘Evaluating Ocean Carrier Selection Criteria: 
Perspectives of Tasmanian Shippers’ (2019) Journal of Shipping and Trade 5. 
56 Everett & Kittel (note 50). 
57 Ibid. 
58 Australian Sea Freight: 2003-2004 Information Paper 56 (March 2006) .  
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to cabotage and most significantly, this trade is 99% reliant on waterborne transport 
given its geographical restrictions and dependence on specialty shipping.59 
8.3.1 What can South Africa derive from the Australian experience? 
First, regardless of its variation and degree of liberality, liberal cabotage is founded on 
the basis of foreign vessel participation. Foreign participation occurs on the basis of a 
licensing regime. A licensing regime that does not afford foreign operators liberty to 
minimise operational costs will result in either increased coastal freight rates or foreign 
disinvestment. However, a licensing regime that is too permissive will thwart the 
development of a domestic fleet because it encourages involvement of competitively- 
priced foreign tonnage. Therefore, if South Africa prioritises flag stimulation and 
adopts a licensing regime that insulates coastal shipping from competition, it will be 
leaving the economy to absorb the impact of doing so. However, in the event that the 
bar for licensing foreign flags is too low, South Africa will be doing so at the expense 
of developing a strong domestic fleet.  Therefore, the potentially mutually exclusive 
nature of the variables for domestic flag development and low freight rates will require 
South Africa to perform a complex balancing act. 
Second, the Australian experience highlights a very important lesson. It is usually 
difficult for a country to approach the development of coastal shipping policy in the 
same way it approaches policy development of other modes of transportation. Unlike 
policies for air and land-based modes of transport, coastal shipping policy restrictions 
that confine foreign participation inevitably lead to increased coastal freight rates. 
Increased freight rates in turn negatively affect local industries that depend on shipping 
transport. Therefore, overall cabotage effects that raise costs under strict cabotage can 
also be found in jurisdictions that practise liberal cabotage. However, liberal cabotage 
allows a greater platform and faster responses to cabotage challenges. A typical 
response involves a variation of licence conditions that encourage foreign tonnage 
which in turn reduces freight costs. 
 
59 Inquiry into National Freight and Supply Chain Priorities (March 2018) Supporting Paper No 2, 
Maritime Freight, Commonwealth of Australia, available at 
https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/freight/freight-supply-chain-priorities/supporting-
papers/files/Supporting_Paper_No2_Maritime.pdf. (Accessed 11 October 2019). 
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Third, the balance between flag stimulation and competitive coastal rates is difficult. 
Modern economies encourage modal competition to keep transport freights low. 
However, in the last two to three decades, shipping has lost its modal share, particularly 
because of the advantages associated with road haulage. Door-to-door services 
complementing road transport induce transport users to divert cargo away from coastal 
shipping. This generally leaves coastal shipping with a modal share consisting 
predominantly of low freight bulk cargo (notably liquid-bulk cargo) that may not be 
suitable for road haulage.60  A shipper’s choice based on the carrier’s door-to-door 
capability is a trend even in water-dependent trades, where the carrier is chosen among 
other carriers on the basis of its ability to transport cargo to the shipper’s premises.61  
Like Australia, South African coastal shipping particularly with respect to general 
cargo, suffers from road transport domination. South African coastal shipping 
predominantly serves dry-bulk and liquid-bulk industries. Furthermore, Australian 
tonnage supply patterns were also similar to South Africa’s until recently. In South 
Africa, Shell, BP and Engen provided tonnage (sometimes in collaboration with 
Unicorn Tankers, for instance) to transport their own cargo along the coast. However, 
lately tonnage has been operated more independently. Nevertheless, product 
specialisation still means that cargo owners have a significant influence on tonnage 
distribution. Australia illustrates the point that the modal share for coastal shipping is 
generally shrinking and is largely propped by shipment of bulk cargo over long 
distances.  
Fourth, bulk cargo movement seems less sensitive to the door-to-door requirements 
which transportation of general cargo stresses so vehemently. Therefore, bulk and 
containerised shipping should be seen as distinct trades for cabotage purposes because 
of the type of cargo that the two forms of service provide. Approaching bulk and 
containerised cargo simply as similar to or as a “cluster” of coastal cargo subject to 
cabotage may prove inappropriate.62  
Notably, the definition of “cargo” in the Draft MSA excludes bulk cargo. It reads: 
“‘cargo’ means any cargo, except liquids in bulk and gases in bulk, that may require 
 




special precautions owing to its particular hazard to ships or persons on board …”. Also 
“goods” definition “includes all animals and movable property” and clearly excludes 
passengers. It appears therefore that the South African coastal cargo context recognises 
the special handling requirements that petroleum products demand. The approach 
seems to readily acknowledge the distinction between bulk liquids in particular and 
general cargo. As such what seems conclusive is that the proposed way forward 
excludes petroleum products, LPG and passengers from cabotage. Therefore, if the 
definition is retained, the cargo of petroleum products which this study argues could 
form a proper subject of cabotage would have been left out. Thus, the coastal cargo 
share for cabotage would be containerised cargo most of which constitutes movement 
of empty containers.  
South Africa would need first to conduct a proper analysis of the impact of cabotage on 
the respective trades before deciding whether in fact both cargo forms could be 
considered proper subjects of cabotage.  
8.4 NEW ZEALAND  
Coastal policy shifts in New Zealand started on the back of overall changes in transport 
policy. Deregulation of road transport in 1983 prompted efficiency and competitiveness 
in coastal shipping63 even before cabotage was introduced (which happened only close 
to a decade-and-a-half later). At the time that proposals to remove cabotage were first 
aired, coastal shipping was already actively competing with itself and with other modes 
of transport. It was already providing a wider choice of transport services.64 Cavana 
reported freight reductions of about 27% for voyages between Auckland in North Island 
and Lyttelton in South Island over the period from 1988 to 1992 and 47% freight 
reduction of ferry rates for almost a decade.  It is therefore important to note that when 
the question initially arose as to whether or not New Zealand should abolish cabotage, 
coastal freight rates were much lower than they had been in the previous decade. The 
New Zealand cabotage debate was therefore not directly about flag stimulation or job 
creation, as this was not really an issue at the time.  The coast had ten New Zealand 
companies operating 19 vessels. Coastal cargo also had a wide base that included 
 




general cargo, passengers, petroleum products, coal and coke, sand and shingle, motor 
vehicles and cement. About 1 000 people were employed in coastal operations at a 
wage bill of about NZ$70 million, excluding shore-based and downstream 
employment.65 
New Zealand conducted a cost benefit analysis.66 As the nomenclature suggests, the 
exercise was designed to evaluate all the costs and benefits associated with cabotage. 
Costs of abolishing cabotage were weighed against the benefits of abolishing it. 
8.4.1 Costs of abolishing cabotage 
These related to job retention, freight pricing, fiscal loss, balance of payments and 
environmental and strategic concerns. 
Employment was chief among factors for consideration for the support of cabotage 
retention. In particular, the concern related to the potential loss of 1 000 jobs and 
incidental payments. However, the response of the domestic shippers to this was that 
foreign labour competition was irrelevant. Associations such as Federated Farmers, 
Business Roundtable and Employers Federation advocated for cabotage removal. 
Treasury supported this view on the basis that labour protection is not a sound principle. 
Instead, the most productive labour force had to be engaged.67 This approach would, of 
course, not be appropriate in South Africa, where employment opportunity is intricately 
linked to segregation. Employment of the most effective labour force is logical only in 
a society in which individuals were always given equal opportunities. Applying this 
principle in South Africa would likely perpetuate existing inequalities. 
Regarding freight pricing, the concern was that the entrance of foreign operators would 
lead to anti-competitive behaviour. There was nothing that could prevent foreign 
vessels from operating at marginal cost pricing to gain market share. The most 
vulnerable trade route was the Auckland to South Island route, because most imports 
were unloaded in Auckland and exports loaded in the South Island. The concern was 
 
65 Ibid. 
66 The process typically involves specification of objectives, identification and alternatives, collection 
and interpretation of data, classification of costs and benefits, discounting of these, adjusting to risk and 
the unknown, criteria determination and recommendations. See Cavana (1994) (note 63) 167 for a full 
exposition on a cost and benefit exercise. 
67 Cavana (1994) (note 63) 168. 
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that in the long term foreign operators would later raise their rates once domestic 
operators had been driven out of the trade.68 
Regarding the effects on the fiscus, the analysis found that foreign operators were not 
obliged to pay company tax in New Zealand and natural persons likewise would not be 
liable to PAYE. The New Zealand government would therefore lose on taxes. Perhaps 
connected to this was the New Zealand operators’ loss of earnings and the subsequent 
effect that such loss would have on the country’s balance of payments. The concern 
regarding the environment was that the increase of foreign tonnage would increase the 
risk of pollution on the New Zealand coast, increase greenhouse emissions and increase 
the risk of disease and unwanted pests entering the country.  Strategic concerns 
involved the usual proposition that domestic crews, in particular, may supplement 
defence needs in times of conflict. Furthermore, strategically, New Zealand’s 
geography required it to have a reliable domestic coastal fleet to cope with potential 
national disasters.69 
The concerns raised with respect to marginal costs pricing operations, non-contribution 
of foreign operations to the domestic economy, adverse effects on the balance of 
payments and concerns regarding the environment have all been expressed in South 
Africa. However, not all of these reasons can properly justify the existence of cabotage.  
For instance, it seems strange to suggest that an increase in pollution (or introduction 
of unwanted pests) with foreign vessel participation would conversely be reduced by 
the exclusive use of domestic fleets. However, concerns regarding marginal cost pricing 
may be plausible. Nevertheless, the point is that the exercise of evaluating these factors 
would highlight the need for South Africa to conduct its own study to determine which 
of these would be important and why. 
8.4.2 Benefits of abolishing cabotage 
The argument for foreign participation was centred around the fact that cabotage added 
costs which, if avoided, would allow revenue redirection towards expansion of service 
choice and increased competition. The overall benefit would be lowered domestic 
transport costs. However, cognisance was taken of the fact that in the short term, 
manufacturers who ship their cargo from the North Island to the South Island would 
 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 169–170. 
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benefit until local operators had been put out of business (before foreign operators 
raised freight cost again).70  
Treasury found it virtually impossible to determine the impact of greater competition 
in the absence of data from foreign vessel operators and without having an 
understanding of the cross-elasticities of demand on the structures of foreign shippers. 
The conclusion was that abolishing cabotage would have a negative impact on the 
coastal shipping industry. New Zealand could not place reliance on the empirical cost 
benefit analysis alone to decide whether to abolish or to retain cabotage.71  
8.4.3 Observations for South Africa 
What South Africa could also learn from the analysis is that the cabotage debate usually 
arises between two main groups. One group supports job preservation, creation and 
stimulation of domestic businesses and insulation of coastal shipping on the basis that 
it is an extension of the domestic industry. This group does not focus on the cost of 
cabotage but on the benefit of its retention. Typical among its members are domestic 
ship owners and domestic transport operators, maritime workers’ unions and other 
transport sector associations (excluding shippers). This group argues that cabotage 
provides employment opportunities for seafarers and related services.72  The other 
group prioritises reduction of costs and provision of a wider assortment of coastal 
services on the strength that the paradigm offers costs that are lower than those other 
models offer. The emphasis is placed on competition and service efficiency. This group 
is not motivated by domestic development issues. It usually consists of international 
operators, manufacturers, ports, boards, other primary producers and transport users. 
However, this grouping can be expected to differ in South Africa. Unlike in New 
Zealand and other jurisdictions, coastal operators in South Africa do not support 
cabotage mainly because vessels operating on the coast are registered elsewhere. 
Therefore, South African-owned vessels do not form part of the domestic transport 
industry in the proper sense. Entities that own coastal vessels are locally registered but 
provide coastal services on the same terms that are ordinarily associated with services 
provided by foreign vessels. For the same reason, interests of the coastal bulk industry, 
 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 171. 
72 Ibid. 
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particularly of those carrying petroleum products along the coast, can be expected to be 
similar to foreign interests. On this basis, it follows that South African companies that 
operate on the coast would prefer the status quo: no cabotage. Apart from what has been 
stated, delineation of the various interest groups in South Africa would be expected to 
run in a similar vein to those of New Zealand. 
Furthermore, South Africa should bear in mind that a cost benefit analysis will not be 
of great assistance in deciding coastal policy without a better understanding of the 
pricing structure of foreign vessels that operate on the South African coast. The absence 
of such data would mean there is a weak platform on which to compare pricing of 
vessels on the coast properly, because only data in respect of domestic vessels would 
be available. It is not unreasonable to assume that the New Zealand government 
recognised the difficulty that the absence of such empirical data caused. Nevertheless, 
the government decided to respond by abolishing cabotage without comparing the total 
cost of coastal operations. The government’s ability to change policy without 
completing the study should also serve as a reminder that the state retains the 
prerogative to make decisions on policy. South African coastal stakeholders should 
therefore note that even where liberal cabotage applies, the government is not beholden 
to the findings of consultative processes. 
Turning to New Zealand again, predictably, abolishing cabotage in 1995 was soon 
followed by a decrease in freight rates. Freight rates for cargo moving between the 
North and the South Islands reduced by up to 50% owing to marginal costing and 
increased competition.73  Costs on the Auckland-Lyttelton voyage decreased by 25%, 
while coastal volumes increased by about 5% following a rise in transshipment activity. 
However, as predicted during the costs analysis debates, gains that followed the new 
coastal regime were possible because foreign flags charged marginal costs for carrying 
coastal cargo. Also, most were subsidised and had lower operating costs, and the benefit 
was passed on to shippers.74 New Zealand coastal operators, on the other hand, could 
not minimise costs because they had to pay taxes and prescribed wages for crews, 
among other expenses.75 A year after abandoning cabotage, New Zealand was left with 
 
73 R.Y. Cavana ‘A Qualitative Analysis of Reintroducing Cabotage onto New Zealand’s Coast’ (2004) 
31(3) Maritime Policy Management 179–198 186. 
74 Ibid. p. 180. 
75 Ibid. 
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nine operators76 controlling a total of 21 vessels operating only on the coast77 (without 
any capacity for international trade). Half of the coastal fleet was registered under the 
New Zealand flag, while the rest were registered under FOCs. The coastal crew 
complement of 1 000 in 1995 had been reduced to 600 by 2005.78 
In view of the above, it would be important for South Africa to note that the exclusive 
engagement of domestic fleet raises costs. South Africa should also bear in mind that 
coastal shipping functions better where competition exists but that the participation of 
foreign vessels in the coastal trade makes it extremely difficult to increase domestic 
fleet capacity. Domestic fleet operation and capacity diminishes if it does not enjoy any 
form of protection from foreign competition. In the circumstances, it seems almost 
conclusive that opening trade to foreign-flagged vessels will lower freight costs on the 
one hand while sounding the death knell for domestic fleet development on the other. 
If South Africa seeks to achieve both objectives, it would have to prepare itself 
adequately for the potential conflict of interests that would arise. 
As expected, opening the coast to foreign competition was followed by significant 
shrinkages of the New Zealand coastal ship operations. Disturbed by the decline, in 
2004 New Zealand conducted another analysis, this time for the reintroduction of 
cabotage to mitigate weakened coastal operations. The analysis focused specifically on 
coastal shipping because New Zealand’s high seas tonnage capacity had completely 
vanished at that stage. The aim of the study was to find a strategy that would encourage 
local participation in coastal shipping. However, as a prerequisite, the envisaged 
strategy needed to secure and enhance existing coastal shipping infrastructure and 
preserve a competitive range of services.79 
In South Africa, much work has been done to advocate for cabotage. However, it seems 
minimum effort has gone into defining the parameters for cabotage operation and in 
assessing the feasibility of a cabotage regime: how it will be implemented, and when 
and how its success will be measured. Prerequisites that cabotage should meet have not 
been set. The benefit of conducting a study similar to New Zealand’s would afford 
 
76 These were Silver Fern Shipping Ltd, Holcim (NZ) Ltd, Golden Bay Cement, Tranz Rail Interisland 
Line, Pacifica Shipping (1985) Ltd, Strait Shipping, Leslie Shipping, Reef Shipping Ltd and Sea Tow.  
For full details, see Cavana (2004) (note 73) 185. 
77 Ibid. 184. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Cavana (2004) (note 73). 
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South Africa the opportunity to decide its own requirements for cabotage which, it is 
hoped, would disclose the type of cabotage the country will apply. The study should 
also determine the short-term goals and what in the long run cabotage is intended to 
achieve and the parameters for such achievement.  
In New Zealand the quantitative study conducted in 2004 found that the shippers’ 
transport choice was based on service frequency and quality, transit time, price and 
value-add services (such as door-to-door services).80 Furthermore, the study also found 
that passing international vessels had a considerable amount of underutilised space on 
their vessels. Manufacturers and producers exploited such overcapacity to their 
advantages. Similar to the findings of the previous analysis, the effect of under-utilised 
space was exaggerated by the fact that imports (inbound traffic) were discharged in 
Auckland while exports (outbound traffic) were loaded from other ports.  
The study also revealed that international vessels focused more on transshipments than 
on genuine coastal trading. The coast was utilised predominantly for container 
repositioning for overseas trade. For instance, P&O Nedlloyd, Columbus and FESCO 
structured their coastal services so as not to call simultaneously at the same ports. They 
then carry each other’s “empties” from smaller ports to Auckland for transfer to other 
passing vessels, presumably for repositioning for exports in other New Zealand ports. 
The practice reduces aggregation costs, which cannot be achieved if local vessels are 
utilised. 81 In addition, while international vessels gained a proportion of the coastal 
market, 82  their existence increased coastal shipping business largely because 
international vessels discharge in Auckland. Cargo is then distributed along the coast 
through feeder services. For example, cargo volumes of Pacifica Shipping Ltd 
increased by 100%.83 
However, the 2004 study ran into similar challenges to those of its predecessor. There 
was even less statistical data available on which a rigorous cost benefit analysis could 
be conducted than was the case in 1995. Therefore, the study relied on stakeholder 
analysis instead.84 In summary, the stakeholder views followed the expected trajectory. 
 
80 Ibid. 183. These services would nowadays include parcel tracking, among others. 
81 Ibid. 185. 
82 Which Cavana (2004) (note 73) placed at 10–15%. Ibid 184. 
83 Ibid. 187. 
84 Ibid. 188. 
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Workers’ associations felt cabotage would have a positive impact on seafarer 
employment. Manufacturers opposed reintroduction for fear of increased freight rates 
and limitations of choice of service. Domestic ship owners supported reintroduction for 
the employment of New Zealand coastal vessels, while international ship operators 
opposed reintroduction, arguing that it would increase freight rates.85 Significantly, the 
government did not comment. 
The conclusion was that the reintroducing cabotage would have a net negative effect 
on the economy. Therefore, the recommendation was not to reintroduce cabotage. This 
time the government followed the findings of the study. 
The above analysis of the New Zealand coastal business once again shows the benefit 
of conducting a study of this nature. South Africa would find it quite useful to identify 
and differentiate beforehand (pre-cabotage) its shippers and to categorise their transport 
preferences in a systematic way to glean the demand (need) for coastal services, 
including expectations and long-term requirements, among others; and to tailor 
cabotage in a manner that would correctly respond to the demand patterns the study 
reveals.  
The manner in which bulk and containerised coastal trades respond to the cabotage 
debate is interesting. In New Zealand, the 2004 study found that marginal costing and 
increased competition did not affect bulk coastal shipping in the manner in which it 
affected containerised cargo. Therefore, transportation patterns before and after 
cabotage were virtually unchanged. Bulk shipping relied on dedicated domestic 
tonnage and chartered-in tonnage to supplement the fleet during times of higher 
demand. New Zealand has twice shown the importance for South Africa to conduct a 
study to determine whether the containerised and bulk coastal trades will be affected in 
the same way when cabotage becomes the official coastal policy. With regard to 
containerised cargo, the study should specifically differentiate genuine coastal 
movements from transshipment cargo volumes. It should also determine the precise 
inter-port coastal movement. It is hoped that the result would shed light on how 
containers are distributed from port to port; which of these containers are transported 
by international lines; and which move by feeder vessels and in what volumes. On the 
basis of the analysis provided in chapter 4, it would be expected that the suggested 
 
85 Ibid. 191. 
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study would show that patterns of container relocation seen in Auckland occur in 
Durban and to a lesser extent in Cape Town as well. Nevertheless, research specifically 
dealing with this aspect should be conducted to confirm the position. With regard to 
coastal bulk shipping, it is suggested that a study specific to the movement of petroleum 
products would be important. Further, the study will be important bearing in mind the 
relatively small size of the bulk fleet servicing the South African coast, the specialised 
nature of tonnage engaged and the relationship that petroleum products owners have 
with the coastal companies that transport these products. It is assumed, without 
concluding, that factors that drive bulk industry are likely compare differently to those 
that drive other South African coastal trades. South Africa would be better served by 
evaluating the extent of such difference and adjusting the tone of its cabotage 
accordingly. 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
Liberal cabotage appears far more practical than strict cabotage. The latter seems to be 
based more on principle and conviction rather than on practical business considerations. 
Liberal cabotage leaves room for debate and allows various stakeholders to debate 
issues and to come up with resolutions that may be more suitable for a particular 
jurisdiction as opposed to simply following government’s stipulation regarding how 
cabotage must function. Perhaps the chief advantage of liberal cabotage is that it 
operates on the basis that it can be altered. However, this also becomes its Achilles heel 
in that it may affect the certainty of the coastal policy.  
What is common in both Australia and New Zealand is that despite their expansive 
experiences in dealing with cabotage, both these countries have had to revise their stand 
on the policy, moving from almost no restrictions to different variations of liberal 
cabotage but have not yet been able to settle the matter to general satisfaction. 
Australia’s 2015 Bill and New Zealand’s postponed discussions provide evidence of 
the fragile nature of coastal policies and the need for their constant appraisal, especially 
if liberal cabotage undergirds such coastal policies. South Africa will have to bear the 
debates in these countries in mind in the furtherance of its cabotage ideals.  
Furthermore, liberal cabotage in Australia and New Zealand serves as a reminder that 
liberality allows an opportunity for both government and industry to engage more 
readily on what imperatives need to be accommodated and in what order. Although the 
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‘elasticity’, detail and extent of liberality may differ between jurisdictions, liberal forms 
of cabotage facilitate far greater involvement of participants and the appreciation of 
their views.  Therefore, a steady liberal cabotage form seems to be the result of a robust 
consultative process. Having said that, New Zealand shows that the government retains 
the prerogative to decide on what policy to apply. It can decide when to and when not 
to follow recommendations. 
Nevertheless, a progressive coastal shipping policy approach seems to require a set of 
clear goals to dictate the parameters for discussion and guide the degree of cabotage 
liberality. New Zealand’s paramount consideration was the preservation of coastal 
infrastructure and continued access and competition in coastal trade. The objective 
meant that requirements relating to flag stimulation, ownership of shares in coasting 
vessels and benefaction of national crews played a subsidiary role in determining the 
policy stance. Subsidiary issues may be eliminated completely if thwarting the primary 
objectives relating to coastal access, for instance. Therefore, cabotage policy 
discussions between government and stakeholders in South Africa should be directed 
at determining the primary objectives. In doing so, parameters for the form of cabotage 
the country should follow should be clearly set.  
The objectives of the South African coastal policy so far reflect a greater interest 
leaning towards domestic flag stimulation and seafarer employment-related issues 
rather than coastal access and competition. Such parameters must bear in mind the fact 
that the degree of cabotage liberality predicates the degree of access to foreign 
participants. If cabotage is too liberal, it serves little or no purpose in assisting the 
country in its quest to revitalise the domestic coastal operations.  Only about half of the 
New Zealand coastal fleet is registered under the domestic registry. However, industries 
that depend on coastal shipping benefit from such liberality. South Africa has no 
vessels. The country’s reasonable starting point is therefore foreign vessel participation.  
Notably the involvement of foreign interests in coastal trade keeps coastal freight rates 
relatively low yet suppresses development of domestic tonnage. An excessively liberal 
cabotage tone would encourage foreign vessel involvement with which local operators 
cannot compete. However, onerous cabotage requirements may induce international 
operators to relocate hub operations or establish new transshipment centres outside 
South Africa to circumvent cabotage. This would not be difficult, given long-standing 
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arrangements between international lines and the existing feeder operators. However, 
the position would be less clear if South African cabotage is the first step to SADC 
cabotage.86  This issue among others re-emphasises the need for a study on the potential 
effects of cabotage as explained above.  
In conclusion, the reality is that, regardless of the degree of its liberality, cabotage does 
not translate to coastal fleet stimulation by itself. However, a liberal cabotage approach 
considers a wider range of coastal shipping issues that are non-prescriptive. In South 
Africa it would create an environment for proper dialogue regarding domestic flag 
stimulation that the CMTP highlights and other cabotage-related benefits for other parts 
of the country’s economy.  This means South Africa should avoid a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach to cabotage implementation. The country should consider developing 
cabotage on the assumption that it will evolve until the most workable coastal policy 
has been established. South Africa should therefore avoid an inflexible basis for 
cabotage implementation. The course for coastal shipping policy should therefore 
follow liberal cabotage founded on principles befitting South Africa’s economic and 
social imperatives. 
 
86 See discussion on the overarching structure of the AU, SADC Protocol and CMTP in respect of 
regional and continental cabotage provided in chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 9:  
CONCLUSION 
The thesis sought to investigate whether or not the CMTP provides a discernible course 
for cabotage implementation in South Africa. The enquiry involved a proper 
consideration of what cabotage is; the measure of its application through a prism of 
various jurisdictions where cabotage has been applied; and what this could potentially 
mean in South Africa. The jurisdictions that the study examined in depth were Nigeria, 
the United States of America, Australia and New Zealand. The thesis stated the legal 
framework for cabotage in various jurisdictions. It was not necessary to deal with legal 
precedence to assess the practical application of cabotage. The reason for studying the 
mentioned countries were set out. The overarching basis for selecting these countries 
was that they jointly and severally encapsulate the origin, evolution, practice and 
volatility of cabotage.  
The introductory chapter defined cabotage. It distinguished the traditional approach to 
cabotage from its modern application. The traditional context for cabotage connotes a 
coastal policy in which the right to trade between ports of the same state is reserved for 
the fleet registered in that particular coastal state. However, the thesis proposed a wider 
and purpose-driven cabotage definition that reflects its modern form. Cabotage in its 
modern context has been utilised as a method of engaging a shipping fleet of choice 
(not necessarily flagged under the coastal jurisdiction) in a manner that responds to 
specified economic and social needs of the coastal state.  
Therefore, cabotage is defined as the reservation of a jurisdiction’s right to engage a 
shipping fleet of choice over its coastal waters between its ports in a manner befitting 
its economic and social imperatives. It occurs when the coastal state, through its 
legislative instruments, exercises its prerogative to dictate parameters for the 
development of its maritime industry. In this context, cabotage drivers must be 
determined first before cabotage is applied. The study proposed the tone of cabotage 
and the measure of its application that serves predetermined economic and social 
imperatives. On this basis the study suggested that the correct approach to cabotage 
should not simply pivot on the establishment of a flagged fleet or the exclusion of 
foreign vessels. Primacy should be given to the articulation of clear imperatives that 
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would benefit the economy and promote social development. Cabotage may be a factor 
but it cannot be regarded as a priori to economic and social development.  
In light of the above, the study then explained the rationale for abandoning laissez-faire. 
The conclusion drawn was that South Africa’s quest for cabotage was not strange or 
unique in that other jurisdictions have proffered similar reasons for cabotage. Many 
countries perceive cabotage as a means of stimulating shipbuilding, shipping skills 
transfer, attraction of favourable foreign exchange and job creation, among others.  
After defining cabotage and providing its rationale in South Africa, chapter 2 gave the 
historical development of coastal shipping both domestically and regionally. The 
historical narrative served two main purposes. First, it explained how coastal shipping 
has been conducted over the years. Second, by providing the proper context for 
cabotage in Southern Africa, it explained why cabotage was never contemplated as a 
coastal policy until recently.  
The chapter showed that coastal trade was almost always conducted on a regional basis. 
The strongest South African route was between the Cape and what was then Natal from 
inception. Further, cargo on this route was driven by commodity trading: sugar and 
paper products from Natal for the westbound voyage and canned foods and general 
cargo from the Cape. There were various carriers over time that traded on the various 
routes. However, early British domination meant vessel operations on the coast thrived 
when in conformity to the dictates of British-aligned conference arrangements. In later 
years, when South African coastal shipping was at its peak, Unicorn Shipping 
dominated the coastal scene. Even then, coastal operations depended largely on feeder 
cargo. After incorporating and thereby eliminating virtually all of its coastal 
competitors, Unicorn Shipping, which at that stage had become known as Grindrod, 
took a decision to flag all of its vessels outside the country. Because there is no cabotage 
in South Africa, Grindrod currently operates along the coast as the only South African-
registered company although its fleet is registered outside the country. Coastal 
operations remain largely dependent on feeder cargo from the South Africa Europe 
Container Service (SAECS) and other international formations.  
With regard to the absence of cabotage, the chapter showed that the Southern African 
coast was initially developed under British rule at the time when Britain ruled the seas 
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and lands alike. The result was that South Africa, even after the establishment of the 
Union of South Africa, conducted itself in a manner that subverted coastal trade 
independence and which worked against coastal shipping development. South Africa 
bound itself to the OFA and suppressed the growth of coastal modal share through the 
SCRR. The deregulation of road transport in the late 1980s substantially undermined 
coastal shipping development. These policy shifts, among other factors, suppressed any 
potential for the development of coastal shipping modes on which cabotage could have 
been kindled. 
Having defined cabotage and its rationale and having shown how coastal operations 
were previously conducted in the absence of cabotage, it was important to provide the 
policy environment in which cabotage will apply in the future. Chapter 3 presented the 
national and SADC policy framework in two parts. The first part covered the policy 
environment for domestic cabotage as proposed under the CMTP. The second part 
described continental and regional policies that govern the cabotage environment which 
domestic cabotage must mirror or complement. It was found that there is misalignment 
between the CMTP’s proposed cabotage and cabotage as envisaged by the AU and 
SADC. Meaningful cabotage implementation will require alignment of the CMTP with 
AU and SADC imperatives.  
Assuming policy hurdles can be resolved either through multilateral agreements or 
other arrangements, does the coast possess a cargo base on which cabotage can be 
based?  Chapter 4 attempted to respond to this question. The enquiry was conducted 
into two parts.  The chapter highlighted cargo as the pivotal ingredient for a successful 
trade in any route and that cabotage implementation as suggested would likewise 
dependent on the availability of coastal cargo.  
The discussion was divided into two parts. The first part covered the analysis of cargo 
and tonnage engaged on the coast. The second part traced regional coastal activity from 
South Africa to dominant regional trades as inter-regional data particularly for cargo 
movement from the region to South Africa was not accessible. With regard to domestic 
routes, the discussion dealt first with bulk and breakbulk cargo (primarily bulk cargo) 
and thereafter proceeded to containerised cargo. The discussion began by identifying 
sources of cargo and thereafter volumes. 
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Four crude oil refineries located along the South African coast were identified as 
sources of cargo. These sources are controlled by oil majors with centres in Durban, 
Mossel Bay and Cape Town. The chapter also showed that typically (liquid) bulk 
service are operated from Durban/East London/Port Elizabeth/Mossel Bay/Cape Town 
on the outward leg. The inward leg runs from Cape Town/Mossel Bay/Durban or, 
depending on cargo, Cape Town/Port Elizabeth/East London/Mossel Bay/Cape Town.  
The study identified Grindrod, through Unicorn Lines, as virtually the exclusive coastal 
carrier to the oil majors Shell, Total, Chevron and Sasol. Cargo sourced from centres 
controlled by these companies constituted about 90% of the total coastal volumes. After 
2014, oil majors insourced coastal services, save for Engen, which continued to engage 
Unicorn Shipping, albeit on a shared basis. However, from time to time Engen 
supplements capacity with its own tonnage. 
The overall assertion that the study made with regards to non- containerised cargo was 
that the South African coast possessed negligible breakbulk cargo volumes and that 
breakbulk was, in any event, sufficiently catered for in the tonnage capacity provided 
by multipurpose vessels that move coastal containerised cargo. The minuscule volumes 
involved in the breakbulk category did not warrant further study. Breakbulk cargo 
should be given a supplementary cargo status for cabotage purposes. 
With regard to bulk cargo, a significant amount of cargo exists in this category. Durban 
handled the highest volumes of coastal bulk shipment in South Africa at an average of 
about 1.3 million tons per annum, while Cape Town handled the highest volumes of 
landed bulk cargo, which averaged about 750 000 tons per annum. The major coastal 
commodities are sugar, paper products, wheat and malt. Another dominant cargo on 
this trade is salt. However, salt has its source in Namibia and its sink in Durban. 
Therefore it cannot, strictly speaking, be regarded as domestic cargo.  
With respect to tonnage, five vessel tonnage capacity (with a combined deadweight 
tonnage of about 118 000 dwt) sufficiently catered for current coastal cargo volumes. 
Any additional capacity would almost instantaneously lead to over-tonnage. The reality 
is that cabotage on the South African coast cannot be seen as a catalyst for an expanded 
coastal bulk fleet unless a case for increased bulk volumes can be shown. Given the 
status quo, cabotage would be impractical as a vehicle for traffic expansion. 
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The study thereafter investigated the position in respect of containerised coastal cargo. 
Cape Town receives most TEUs, while Durban showed the highest number of shipped 
TEUs. A significant amount of traffic in the dominant route (between Durban and Cape 
Town) consisted of empty containers, forming about 80% of TEUs of the total coastal 
traffic base. Movement of large volumes of empty containers arose from container 
repositioning for feeder activity between cargo sources and cargo sinks. Such activity 
reinforces the idea that feeder operations formed the backbone of cargo movement 
between South African ports and the wider Southern African coastal shipping trade, 
while domestic trade activity contributed relatively far less to such trades. 
Similar to the other trades, it would be difficult to implement cabotage on the basis of 
containerised domestic cargo volumes, especially where cabotage is intended for the 
expansion of the home fleet.  The incontrovertible conclusion regarding the first part of 
the chapter was therefore that South African coastal trade as a whole did not have 
sufficient cargo to be self-sustaining. It follows that cabotage implemented on the basis 
of existing cargo volumes cannot expand coastal trade.  
The second part of the chapter was concerned with whether or not cargo existed for the 
implementation of cabotage on a regional basis. The study investigated the position in 
respect of ports in the range between Mombasa and Luanda. The potential for regional 
cabotage was shown. However, regional coastal trade suffers from serious imbalances. 
Regional coastal trade depended predominantly on imports from South Africa. The 
major regional traffic base constituted of significant volumes of processed foods, 
chemicals, paper products and other manufactured goods. Other cargo types exist but 
only as supplementary cargo. The major cargo is exported from South Africa, 
predominantly to Mauritius, Tanzania, Kenya, Madagascar, Reunion, Mozambique on 
the eastern seaboard and to Angola and Namibia on the west. About 11 000 to 17 000 
TEUs per annum move in these trades. Volume distribution showed that a moderate 
cargo platform existed on which cabotage can operate at current coastal tonnage levels 
of about 1 100 to about 1 700 TEUs vessel capacity. However, caution was expressed 
regarding the importance of establishing proper regional integration to bind other 
SADC countries to cabotage ideals (as explained in the preceding chapter).  
Chapter 5 identified forms of cabotage practices. Two forms or types of cabotage were 
identified as worldwide norms. These were restrictive and liberal cabotage. Open 
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cabotage was not considered a form of cabotage policy because it can arise without 
legislation or policy, which is the case in South Africa. Therefore the forms considered 
(and their variations) were those that result from state intervention. Worldwide 
practices were evaluated using a broad sample of countries that engage in cabotage. 
These were assessed on the basis of the degree of the strictness of their individual 
cabotage principles (or absence thereof). An attempt was then made to relate the result 
to each practice’s influence on the respective ship registration pattern. 
An overview of cabotage practices of the top 35 maritime nations was given in view of 
the fact that South Africa aspired to be on the list of these nations. However, in order 
to make the assessment more robust, the fourth and fifth category consisted of countries 
that fall outside the list of the leading 35 nations.  The first category consisted of five 
countries that own about 50% of the total deadweight capacity in the world. The second 
category presented EU members outside the top 10 of the leading countries. The third 
category comprises South Africa’s chief trading partners in the BRICS bloc and 
Indonesia. The fourth and fifth categories comprised countries that made up the 
remaining 5% of world total deadweight tonnage. 
A table was then created which indicated that the majority of the top 35 maritime 
nations practised cabotage and that they own tonnage under two forms of fleet 
registries: domestic flag or second registries. It also appeared that the second register 
often offered relatively similar terms to FOC terms of operation. Such terms were found 
to be undoubtedly commercially better in comparison to those offered under domestic 
flag registers. Therefore, the degree to which each jurisdiction applied cabotage 
restrictions seems to determine which of the two forms vessel operators preferred. 
The overview revealed that globally, the implementation of the form of cabotage the 
country desired, whether strict or liberal, largely depended on each country’s capacity 
(including the country’s economic strength) and what each deemed beneficial for its 
development bearing in mind its coastal resources. The approach of each state depended 
on what was considered paramount (for example, if it was vessel ownership, cabotage 
policy would allow coastal operations regardless of where the vessels were built. 
However, if priority was given to shipbuilding, such vessels, although they might be 
registered under the flag, would not be allowed to trade on the coast). Therefore the 
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degree of austerity of each cabotage practice would be reflected in its domestic register. 
There seems to be no one-size-fits-all approach. 
The discussion then proceeded, under Chapter 6, to deal with the practice of strict 
cabotage using the US and Nigeria as exemplars. Liberal cabotage was dealt with in the 
following chapter.  
Chapter 6 dealt with the trademark of strict cabotage which centres around the 
promotion of indigenous tonnage ownership and the exclusion of foreign interests from 
coastal trade participation. Under strict cabotage waivers were used but often with 
onerous conditions attached to them.  
In the case of Nigeria, the legislative intention was to enact strict cabotage with a view 
to thrusting the country into an era of total coastal independence. At the heart of the 
Cabotage Act lay the desire for Nigeria to build its own ships, owned and operated by 
its people, manned by its crews and flagged in the country.  However, continued lack 
of expertise and capital shortages to supplement tonnage forced compromises that were 
manifest in how cabotage was implemented in Nigeria. Therefore, the reality of 
Nigerian coastal trade was its dependence on foreign tonnage introduced to the trade 
through its waiver system. The main reason for reliance on waivers was that the country 
had not as yet been able to produce appropriate vessel capacity to serve its vast oil and 
gas industries which form the core of its coastal shipping base. Nigerian cabotage trades 
had more than 50% foreign participants. The conclusion was that the Nigerian cabotage 
framework supported strict cabotage while in reality, Nigeria practised liberal cabotage. 
By contrast, the US has managed to promote and sustain strict cabotage over a 
significant period of time. Notably, US cabotage requirements are less strict then those 
of Nigeria, which requires 100% ‘local content’. US cabotage rests on four pillars. 
Cabotage is reserved strictly for US-flagged vessels that are 75% owned by US citizens, 
operated by at least 75% US citizens and 100% built in the US. Therefore, the US 
allows a margin of 25% percent foreign participation, albeit only in respect of its 
manning and ownership requirements. Further, the US was a developed country with a 
long history of vessel ownership and is one of the largest economies in the world. Its 
security needs are more urgent and its resources allow the US to implement cabotage 
independent of others.   
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The US has a strict code for its cabotage implementation. It has granted very few 
waivers to allow foreign vessel participation. These seem to have been limited to 
emergency and disaster management cases only. In those cases, waivers were granted 
with strict conditions attached. In any other case, cabotage implementation remained 
tight and closely monitored by multiple administrative agencies who ensure strict 
compliance with US cabotage rules. 
On the basis of the variances on the stricture of cabotage implementation in Nigeria and 
the US, the conclusion was that strict cabotage seemed to gain traction only in 
jurisdictions that possessed a suitable skills base and sufficient government capital 
funding for investment in coastal fleets; and where there is strong administration 
process of government policies. Therefore, ex facie, strict cabotage seemed primarily 
more suited for developed countries then for developing countries such as South Africa. 
Chapter 7 evaluated liberal cabotage practices. Liberal cabotage is by nature flexible 
and is often driven through consultation and consensus. Its flexibility also allows 
adaptable cabotage implementation that accommodates evolving political, social and 
economic imperatives. However, three central observations were made with regard to 
Australia and New Zealand. First, the size, shape, location and whether the country is 
an island or not is irrelevant. Second, liberal cabotage is usually applied in varying 
degrees. The degree of liberality of cabotage depends on the policy objectives of each 
state. Lastly, each state has its own boundary prescribing the extent of liberality of each 
cabotage. 
In general, liberal cabotage ameliorated the anomalies created by blanket foreign 
exclusions observed under strict cabotage. Instead, liberal cabotage provided space for 
the application of waivers through which foreign flagged vessels may be engaged on 
the coast at the convenience of the coastal state. Further, subject to certain (often 
reasonable) conditions, the state usually adapted the degree of (the stricture of its) 
waiver application in line with its social and economic interests at various stages of 
coastal policy development to meet its priorities. The conclusion was therefore that 
liberal cabotage would be more suited for a country like South Africa which is at 
developmental stages of its coastal policy. Coastal policy liberality will accommodate 
South Africa’s evolving political, social and economic imperatives which would be 
determined by consultation and consensus.  
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The penultimate chapter amalgamated observations gleaned from the primary study 
sample of the United States, Nigeria, Australia and New Zealand.  Essentially chapter 
8 focused on the specific findings deemed instructive for South Africa confined to 
factors that provide direct lessons for formulating the South African cabotage policy. 
Bearing the rationale for cabotage in South Africa in mind, and having considered the 
lessons derived from the study of the US, Nigeria Australia and New Zealand, could it 
be said the CMTP provided a probable course for cabotage in South Africa? The 
response to this question is negative. 
The study revealed that strict cabotage as seen from the US raises costs and definitely 
diminishes domestic fleet capacity while raising consumer prices. Nigerian practice 
showed that strict cabotage without a domestic fleet cannot be sustained. Without a 
domestic fleet, coastal shipping depends on erratic application of the waiver system 
which works in favour of foreign flags. In general, strict cabotage was not 
recommended for South Africa.  
Liberal cabotage was instead recommended. It was observed that the objectives of the 
South African coastal policy so far reflected a greater interest leaning towards domestic 
flag stimulation and seafarer employment-related issues rather than coastal access and 
competition. However, liberal cabotage, like strict cabotage, served little or no purpose 
in assisting the country in its quest to revitalise domestic coastal operations. It was 
observed that the degree of cabotage liberality predicates the degree of foreign 
participation. As such South Africa should adjust the degree of liberality of its own 
cabotage to meet its social and economic requirements bearing in mind the need to 
allow some degree of foreign participation. 
9.1 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The conclusions to be drawn from this study are that the adoption of a policy of 
cabotage has been conducted on policy assumptions not based on adequate research. I 
have shown that the only type of cabotage regime that is feasible given South Africa’s 
circumstances is liberal (flexible) cabotage built on the foundation of the current coastal 
trade in conjunction with existing tonnage controlled by South African interests, albeit 
flagged offshore.  
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In order to determine the precise contours of such a policy, South Africa needs to devote 
more attention to setting the parameters for cabotage and determine the ‘elasticity’ of 
its liberal cabotage. In doing so, the key would be the continued discussions between 
various industry participants and the relevant government departments. The process 
would require studies to establish the real nature of cargo movements along the coast. 
The investigation must evaluate, among other things, the following: the volumes of 
containers shipped from each port and establish precisely where such containers are 
landed and vice versa, what constitutes proper feeder cargo and volumes involved in 
such trade, the potential for coastal vehicle transportation, and the extent to which oil 
and gas could influence the coastal cargo base. 
The South African cabotage context presents an opportunity for job creation (the 
antecedent skills development and retention vehicle), industry expansion and greater 
trade autonomy. It is therefore a commendable step in the right direction. However, the 
status quo firmly indicates that South African policy makers need to revisit the method 
of implementing cabotage. The approach ought to prioritise the old adage “cargo is 
king”.1 Cabotage can only be sustained if there is cargo to support it. It therefore raises 
great concerns that the government forges ahead with cabotage without clear 
pronouncement regarding the “cabotage route” or the cargo base for cabotage. The draft 
legislative framework also does not deal with these central issues. Instead the proposed 
framework excludes the only potential cargo base on which cabotage can be sustained.  
 
My own view is that there is scope for gains in terms of a modest revival in the South 
African register; the investigation of a special cabotage regime for the off-shore oil 
industry; improved training and jobs for South African seamen; development of service 
trades and supporting industries. Without the existence of a clear traffic base for 
cabotage, an approach focused on increased domestic tonnage is a fallacy.  South Africa 
will be better served by an in-depth and very careful consideration of the appropriate 
dimensions for its proposed cabotage trades.   
 
1 See for instance comments of SAL President, Anders Hyrup available ata 
https://www.joc.com/breakbulk/breakbulk-carriers/sal-heavy-lift/special-report-‘cargo-king’-sal-heavy-
lift_20191209.html, and concurrence from Thuso Mhlambi  Director of Linsen Nambi available at  
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